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Ethiopia is one of the few countries in Africa to implement large-scale land titling 
programmes aiming to improve land related-investments. Since 1995, Ethiopia also 
has partially liberalised rural land rental markets with the aim of improving the 
functioning of these markets. Evidence on whether these reforms resulted in 
improved land access by the poor and increased land-related investments though are 
scarce and inconclusive. This thesis investigates empirically the relationship between 
land tenure issues on one hand, and land-related investments and the functioning of 
rural land and labour markets on the other. It also analyses the relationship between 
participation in land rental markets and household welfare. Detailed descriptive data 
analysis and various econometric models were used to examine these issues. The data 
source for the study is the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS), which consists 
of a panel of 1477 sample households covering four regions in the country.  
Findings from the study show that factor, input, and financial markets are poorly 
developed in rural Ethiopia. In addition, land title ownership does not give farmers 
additional rights other than the rights provided in the federal and regional legislation. 
This has particular ramifications. For instance, despite having a land title, farmers in 
Ethiopia are not allowed by law to sell or use their land as collateral in credit markets. 
There are also various limitations on land rental transactions. These findings suggest 
that the preconditions for economic effectiveness of land titling are not satisfied in the 
case of Ethiopia.   
Furthermore, in contrast to earlier studies, this study finds no significant link between 
farmers’ perceptions of tenure insecurity and their land-related investment and factor 
 
 
market participation decisions. Instead, it establishes that poverty in faming resources 
and market failures in the credit and factor markets are the major binding constraints 
that adversely affect farmers’ land-related investment and factor market participation 
decisions in rural Ethiopia. The results reveal that asset rich households were more 
likely to get access to more land and labour through factor markets, and they were 
also more likely to invest on their land, while female-headed and/or asset poor 
households were more likely to lease out their land and remain poor.   
The findings of this study do not necessarily suggest that the existing land tenure 
system in Ethiopia is satisfactory for farmers’ intensification efforts. It is widely 
argued that past and current land polices in the country have led to reduced and 
fragmented land size holdings in rural areas. As a result, there is limited room for 
farm intensification. For instance, data from this study show that among sample 
households who did not grow tree crops on their land, 40% of them reported that land 
shortage is the first major problem. In this regard, the existing land tenure system can 
be equally restrictive for most farmers. Therefore, the results of the study suggest 
that, without reforming the existing land policy and addressing problems in factor and 
credit markets, land titling is expected to play a very limited role in improving tenure 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Background and Motivation  
Halving extreme poverty rates by the target date of 2015 is one of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (UN Millennium Project, 2005). Although there are 
some success stories in reducing poverty in the developing world, recent evidence 
suggests that the share of undernourished people in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has 
increased from 17% in 1990–92 to 27% in 2010–12 (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2012). This indicates that food insecurity 
remains a great challenge in the continent. In most settings, poverty in the region is 
predominantly a rural phenomenon where the majority of the population works in 
agriculture and related activities (El-Ghonemy, 2007).   
Subsistence farming is the main economic activity in rural Ethiopia as the majority of 
the population (82%) lives in rural areas (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development [MoARD], 2010). Despite the large percentage of the labour force 
being employed in agricultural sector, Ethiopia faces challenges of high levels of food 
insecurity and poverty. For instance, the share of economically active labour force 
that works in agriculture is significantly higher (about 85%) than the contribution of 
agricultural output to total GDP (about 43%), implying that people who work in 
agriculture earn a very low income in Ethiopia (MoARD, 2010). Over the past 
decade, Ethiopia has achieved high economic growth rates, averaging 11% per year 
(Ministry of Finance and Economic Development [MoFED], 2014). Despite the 




Recent estimates show that close to 29.6% of the population lives below the national 
poverty line (1.5$ in 1993 PPP) and 87.3% of the population in Ethiopia is 
multidimensional poor (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative [OPHI], 
2014).These figures highlight not only the extreme poverty but also the immense 
development challenges the country faces in the future.   
Lack of improved technology investment in agriculture, acute land shortage, and soil 
degradation coupled with continuous growth in the rural labour force are among the 
major reasons for the low levels of growth in agricultural productivity in Ethiopia 
(Deininger, Ali, & Alemu, 2009; Hurni, 1993; MoARD, 2010; Shiferaw & Holden, 
1998). Under such conditions, policies that enhance efficient allocation of scarce 
resources such as land, investment in improved technology, and soil conservation 
practices are considered key to increased agricultural productivity and reduced rural 
poverty in the country (Dercon, 2009; Dercon, Hill, & Zeitin, 2009; Mellor & Dorosh, 
2010).   
In this regard, poor land governance and lack of tenure security are considered 
important challenges that must be addressed in order to increase land-related 
investments and agricultural productivity in poor agrarian economies (Byamugisha, 
2013; Deininger, 2003). For these reasons, formalisation of property relations through 
the registration of land and the issuance of title deeds is widely recommended in the 
developing world. The rationale for land registration and titling is based on the 
perception that provision of land titling increases tenure security, thereby improving 
access to credit, efficient allocation of resources, and land-related investments 
(Deininger & Binswanger, 1999; Feder & Nishio, 1999). However, there is lack of 




registration of land and the issuance of title deeds can, in and of itself, really improve 
tenure security, access to credit, and land-related investments in poor agrarian 
economies (Bromley, 2008; Firmin-Sellers, 1995).   
Ethiopia is one of the few African countries to successfully implement a cost effective 
and large-scale land registration programme (Deininger, Ali, Holden, & Zevenbergen, 
2008). The programme started first in Tigray regional states in 1998, Amhara region 
in 2002/2003, Oromia and SNNP in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Close to 88 % of 
the rural households in Tigray and 79 % of them in Amhara received land titles at the 
end of 1999 and in 2004/2005, respectively (Deininger et al., 2008). Although 
registration started, land title provision has been delayed in Oramia and SNNP 
regional states. As of 2008, close to 20 million plots (6.3 million households out of 
about 13 million rural households) have been registered (Deininger et al., 2008; 
MoARD, 2010). Overall, the first stage of the land registration process is considered 
low-cost and efficient, because mainly local traditional methods were used in the 
process (cadastral system was not used) (Deininger et al., 2008). 
Although evidence from other parts of Africa show limited economic benefits of title 
deeds (Bellemare, 2013; Brasselle, Gaspart & Platteau, 2002; Carter, Wiebe, Blarel, 
Bruce, & Migot-Adholla, 1994; Place & Migot-Adholla, 1998), recent studies from 
Ethiopia showed that title ownership had significant and positive impact on land-
related investments, land productivity, and land rental market participations 
(Deininger, Ali & Alemu, 2011; Holden, Deininger & Ghebru, 2009, 2011).  
However, there are also researchers who argued that land title ownership have no 
significant long-term economic impact in Ethiopia (Rahmato, 2004, 2009; Segers et 




For example, all land is under state ownership and farmers only have usufruct rights. 
Land transfer through sale and the use of land as collateral in credit markets are 
prohibited by law, despite the land-titling programme. In such context, it would be 
important to understand how the land registration and titling programme in Ethiopia 
could have a long-term positive economic impact. This issue is not well addressed in 
the existing studies. This study aims to fill this gap by investigating whether or not the 
preconditions for economic effectiveness of land registration and titling are satisfied 
in the case of Ethiopia.   
Additionally, although economic theory suggests that secure property rights in land 
lead to increased investment and enhanced efficiency in allocating resources (Besley, 
1995; Besley & Ghatak, 2010; Deininger, 2003; Demsetz, 1967), the empirical 
evidence linking insecurity of tenure and lack of land-related investment is less clear, 
especially in Africa (Arnot, Luckert & Boxall,2011; Brasselle et al., 2002; Fenske, 
2011; Place, 2009). The existing studies of the relationship between tenure insecurity 
and investment incentives in Ethiopia also reported conflicting results.   
On one hand, there are studies that documented a significant relationship between 
tenure insecurity and land-related investment (Ali, Dercon & Gautam, 2011; 
Deininger & Jin, 2006; Gebremedhin & Swinton, 2003; Mekonnen, 2009). On the 
other hand, there are studies that found no significant impact of tenure insecurity on 
farmers’ land-related investment decisions (Gavin & Ehui, 1999; Hagos & Holden, 
2006; Holden & Yohannes, 2002; Pender & Fafchamps, 2005). Therefore, whether it 
is lack of tenure security or if there are other and more binding constraints to land 




of this thesis is to analyse the effects of land tenure insecurity on land-related 
investment decisions in rural Ethiopia.  
Aside from land tenure issues, in densely populated countries such as Ethiopia, lack 
of access to additional agricultural land is one of the major constraints to increasing 
agricultural production (FAO, 1993; Rahmato, 2009). Currently, the average land 
holding size per household is less than one hectare in rural Ethiopia (Central 
Statistical Agency of Ethiopia [CSA], 2012). In addition, access to well-developed 
employment opportunities off the farm is very limited with less than 3% of the rural 
population exclusively relaying on non-farm jobs (MoARD, 2010). This implies that 
growth in agricultural productivity and sustainable poverty reduction depends on how 
problems relating to access to land and labour markets are addressed in the country 
(Omiti, Parton, Ehui, & Sinden, 2000). Therefore, understanding the barriers that 
affect farmers’ participation decisions in rural labour and land rental markets, and the 
potential link between these participation decisions has significant policy relevance to 
reduce rural poverty in the country.  
A limited number of studies in Ethiopia have analysed, separately, decisions by 
households concerning participation in the land rental markets (Benin, Ahmed, 
Pender & Ehui, 2005; Deininger, Ali  & Alemu, 2007; Deininger, Jin, Adenw,  
GebreSelassie & Demeke, 2005; Holden, et al., 2011), and decisions concerning 
participation in off-farm employment (Bedemo, Getnet, Kassa & Chaurasia, 2013; 
Bhatta & Årethun, 2013; Lemi, 2006; Woldenhanna & Oskam, 2001). However, these 
studies ignore the potential interdependency between land and labour market 
participation decisions in the rural areas. Therefore, the third aim of this study is to 




Ethiopia concerning land and labour market participations, while explicitly taking 
into account the potential connectedness of land and labour allocation strategies in 
rural areas.  
Moreover, although the development of land rental markets is central to facilitating 
access to land for the poor, thereby reducing rural poverty (Deininger, 2003), there is 
a scarcity of empirical work analysing the effects of participation in land rental 
markets on household economic well-being. This study also aims to fill this gap by 
examining the relationship between farmers’ land rental market participations and 
household economic well-being for both tenant and landlord households using data 
from rural Ethiopia.  
1.2. Objective and Research Questions  
The broad objectives of this thesis are: (i) to examine whether or not the preconditions 
for economic effectiveness of land registration are satisfied in the case of Ethiopia. 
(ii) to analyse the effect of land  tenure insecurity on land-related investments, (iii) to 
analyse the factors influencing decisions by households in rural Ethiopia concerning 
land and labour market participation, and, (iv) to analyse the relationship between  
farmers’ participation in land rental markets and household economic well-being in 
rural Ethiopia.   
Consequently, the purpose of the thesis is to answer the following core research 
questions:  
1) Are the prerequisites for economic effectiveness of land registration 




2) Is tenure insecurity a major binding constraint to land-related 
investments in rural Ethiopia? 
3) What factors determine farmers’ land rental and labour market 
participation decisions in rural Ethiopia? Are these participation 
decisions interdependent?  
4) What is the relationship between farmers’ land rental market 
participation and poverty dynamics in rural Ethiopia?  
 
The study will contribute to the existing literature in four major ways. First, existing 
studies provide little evidence regarding whether or not the prerequisites for economic 
effectiveness of land titling are satisfied in the case of Ethiopia. Given the nature of 
the land tenure system in Ethiopia and the lack of significant effectiveness of land 
titling projects in other parts of Africa (Deininger & Jin, 2006), it is important to 
examine this issue in the case of Ethiopia.  This thesis aims to fill this research gap.  
Second, many of the existing studies analysing the relationship between tenure 
insecurity and land-related investment decisions in Ethiopia relied on small samples 
and/or cross-sectional data with limited geographical representativeness. One 
exception is a study by Deininger and Jin (2006), which used large data covering 
seven regions of the country1. Their study, however, employed cross-sectional data 
and did not control for regional variations in the analysis. It is known that, in the case 
of Ethiopia, land redistribution experiences and land-related investment (for example 
soil conservation practices) systematically vary across different regions (villages) 
                                                 
1  The seven regions are Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ 




indicating the importance of controlling for regional variations. As a result, their 
result might suffer from omitted variables bias.   
This study uses a panel dataset covering four regions of the country. The regions 
included are Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP regional states. These four regions 
are the largest of the nine regions of the country, where 85 % of the population lives 
(CSA, 2012). In addition, the study augments the econometrics analysis of the impact 
of tenure insecurity on land-related investments with additional evidence based on 
analysis of farmers’ perceptions of factors affecting their investment decisions. Such 
an analysis can help identify, directly, households’ major investment constraints as 
mentioned by the farmers themselves. It can also help to check the robustness of 
econometrics results.   
Third, the study investigates the potential interdependency between land and labour 
market participation decisions in rural Ethiopia. From existing studies, it is not 
possible to derive conclusions about which combinations of factor market 
participation decisions are more likely to be taken up by rural households in Ethiopia. 
This study models and quantifies the degree of inter-linkage between land and labour 
market participation decisions, recognising the probable correlations between the 
participation decisions across the two factor markets for the same household through 
unobserved characteristics. For example, asset-poor households often may rent out 
their land and then participate in off-farm jobs. This suggests that policy makers 
should give due consideration to the development of rural off-farm jobs to reduce 




Finally, the study will improve understanding of the effects of participation in land 
rental markets on household welfare in rural areas. The relationship between 
participation on the supply side of the land rental markets and household welfare is 
not well addressed by the studies conducted to date. This study examines these 
relationship for both tenant and landlord households. In addition, in contrast to other 
studies that use consumption or income data to analyse poverty transitions, the study 
uses both an asset index and self-rated subjective poverty indicators to measure 
household poverty. One advantage of using self-rated and asset-based poverty 
indicators is that these indicators account for non-income dimensions of welfare. 
Asset-based poverty indicators are considered less prone to measurement errors and it 
enables us to distinguish persistent structural poverty from transitory poverty (Baulch 
& Hoddinott, 2000; Carter & Barrett, 2006).  
1.3. Data Sources and Sample Design   
The data for this research are obtained from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey 
(ERHS). The ERHS is a rich panel dataset made available by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).2 The initial survey was conducted in 1989 covering 
seven Peasant Associations (PAs) 3  and 450 households located in three regional 
states: Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP. The panel survey began in 1994, incorporating 
six areas surveyed earlier and covered in the 1989 survey, and an additional nine new 
areas that were selected to account for diversity in the farming system. Farming 
systems were used as a stratification base to select the fifteen PAs from the Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNP, and Tigray regions of the country. Random sampling was then 
                                                 
2 The data set is available at: http://www.ifpri.org/dataset/ethiopian-rural-household-surveys-erhs  





employed to select households within each PA (Dercon & Hoddinott, 2011). 
Appendix C provides the details of the sampling frame used in the survey.   
In the 1994 survey, samples of 1477 households were selected from the 15 PAs, with 
the sample size in each PA determined by an attempt to obtain a self-weighting 
sample. Accordingly, each person represents approximately the same number of 
persons from the same farming system (Dercon & Hoddinott, 2011). Survey weights 
were not used in this study as none were available in the dataset. Although the self-
weighting sampling is considered adequate for regional representation, it is suggested 
that the data should not be considered as nationally representative as sample 
households might only represent the non-pastoralist farming systems in the country 
(Dercon & Hoddinott, 2011).4 Further rounds were conducted in 1995, 1997, 1999, 
2004, and 2009. Because some important variables are not available in the 1995 and 
1997 survey rounds, the thesis uses data from four rounds of the survey (1994, 1999, 
2004, and 2009).  
In addition to the ERHS data, some data from the 2011/12 Ethiopian Rural 
Socioeconomic Survey (ERSS) were also used as additional data source in Chapter 2. 
The survey was conducted as a collaborative project between the Central Statistics 
Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) and the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study 
– Integrated Surveys of Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) team. The ERSS covered all 
regional states except the capital, Addis Ababa. It primarily collected information on 
                                                 




rural areas. It was implemented in 290 rural and 43 small town Enumeration Areas 
(EAs) and 3,969 households.5   
Regarding the ERHS, the attrition rate between the 1994 and 1999 survey rounds was 
7.89%, and a further 5% were lost between 1999 and 2004, along with a further 3% 
between 2004 and 2009. According to Dercon & Hoddinott (2011), these attrition 
rates were partly caused by some site-specific factors such as the loss of agricultural 
land in some villages because of expansion work on Lalibela airport, and households 
in some resettlement villages have decided to return to their original villages. 
Although the attrition rates were low, I examine whether attrition rates were non-
random and whether attrition potentially biases estimates of model parameters. In 
doing so, I followed the framework proposed by Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitte 
(1998) to analyse attrition bias.   
Following Fitzgerald et al.(1998), I examine first whether  the 1994 survey year 
household characteristics differ between those who were present in 2009 and those 
who were ever out after 1994. Then, I provide attrition probit estimates for the main 
model variables used in the study. The analysis in this thesis models farmer 
participation decisions in land-related investments, land rental and labour markets, 
and analyse poverty dynamics. Thus, the main variables of interest in the attrition 
probit model are dummy variables indicating farmers’ participation decisions in land 
rental markets, off-farm employments, tree growing, and household livestock 
                                                 





holdings.6 If the coefficients on these variables are significant in the attrition probit 
models it suggests that attrition rates might bias model parameter estimates 
(Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Outes-Leon, & Dercon, 2008).  
Table C.3 in the Appendix shows mean values of the 1994 characteristic variables for 
those households who were “always in” between 1994 and 2009 and those households 
“ever out” during the same period. Results indicate that, on average, attritors had 
smaller family size, livestock and land holdings; and female household heads; were 
more likely to lease out their land, and less likely to grow trees and work off-farm. 
These results suggest the presence of non-random attrition pattern in the sample. 
However, it has been suggested that the presence of non-random attrition does not 
necessarily lead to a biased estimate (Outes-Leon, & Dercon, 2008).  
Hence, to test whether the presence of non-random attrition pattern may lead to a 
biased estimate, I presented results from attrition probit model estimates for the above 
selected variables (Table C.4 in the Appendix). Estimation results suggest little 
evidence of attrition bias. The estimated coefficients of the variables indicating 
household participation in land rental markets, off-farm employment, tree crop 
planting, and livestock holdings are insignificant. Furthermore,  R-square is very low 
(< 10%) in all the model estimates indicating that less than 10% of the attrition rates 
could be explained by the variables included in the models. This suggests that attrition 
remains largely a random phenomenon. From these results, I can conclude that 
although there is evidence of non-random attrition rates, there is little evidence that 
                                                 
6 Livestock holding was among one of the main variables that used to construct an asset index to 
measure poverty which is available in all the survey years. Thus, this variable is used as a proxy 




parameter estimates on non-attriting samples be biased. Thus, in this study, correction 
for attrition is assumed to be not important.    
1.4. Organisation of the Thesis  
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the 
thesis, the main theme, motivation and the objectives of the thesis, and description of 
the dataset used in the study. Chapter 2 addresses the issues relating to land titling, 
tenure insecurity, and rural factor and credit markets in rural Ethiopia. It provides a 
historical review of land reform and land titling in Ethiopia and answers questions 
pertaining to whether or not the prerequisites for economic effectiveness of land 
titling are satisfied in the context of Ethiopia. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the 
relationship between land tenure insecurity and land-related investments in Ethiopia, 
while Chapter 4 presents results from the analysis of land and labour market 
participation decisions in rural Ethiopia. Investigation of the relationship between 
participation in land rental markets and household economic well-being in rural 
Ethiopia is addressed in Chapter 5. A summary of major research findings of the 











CHAPTER 2: LAND TITLING, TENURE SECURITY, AND LAND RENTAL 
MARKETS: CAN LAND TITLING BE A PANACEA IN ETHIOPIA?  
2.1. Introduction   
Secure property rights in land are considered important in most developing countries 
where land is the primary means for generating a livelihood for most of the 
population (Deininger, 2003). However, there have been heated debates on the 
structure of tenure system associated with better tenure security and what measures 
should be used to improve tenure security over land (Bromley, 2008; Firmin-Sellers, 
1995). In particular, the debate has been immense in Africa where various customary 
land tenure systems and individual property right systems coexist (Firmin-Sellers & 
Sellers, 1999). Despite this, as part of the individualising process, formalisation of 
property relations through the registration of land and the issuance of land titles is 
widely recommended in Africa and other parts of the developing world (Deininger, 
2003)  
Ethiopia is one of the few African countries to successfully implement a large-scale 
and cost-effective land registration programme (Deininger et al., 2008). However, 
there are on-going debates on whether land titling in Ethiopia meaningfully benefit 
smallholder farmers in the country. Some researchers showed that land title 
ownership had significant and positive impacts on investment, land productivity, and 
land rental market participation (Deininger, et al., 2011; Holden, et al., 2009, 2011), 
others argued that unless appropriate measures are taken to improve the existing land 
tenure system and other social and economic conditions in rural areas, the economic 
benefits of land titling in Ethiopia are limited and will not be sustainable (Rahmato, 




It is suggested that land registration and titling are likely to be effective/attractive 
where there are well-functioning formal financial markets, incentives for investment 
in land (such as distance to markets, availability of inputs), demand for land 
transactions, an enabling regulatory framework for land registration, and in areas 
where indigenous land rights are week or absent (Barrows & Roth, 1990; Bromley, 
2008; Feder & Nishio, 1999; Lipton, 2009; Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel, & Place, 
1991). Hence, it is important to ask to what extent these conditions are satisfied in 
rural Ethiopia. This issue is not well addressed in the existing studies. Thus, this 
chapter aims at contributing to the debate over whether or not the prerequisites for 
economic effectiveness of land titling are satisfied in the case of Ethiopia. The 
following research question guides the study: Are the prerequisites for economic 
effectiveness of land registration and titling satisfied in the case of Ethiopia? To 
answer the question, I examine the land tenure system, and the structure of rural 
factor and credit markets in rural Ethiopia.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents a review of the 
literature on land tenure and land titling issues. Section 2.3 provides a review of the 
land tenure system and the titling programme in Ethiopia. Section 2.4 discusses the 
relationship between the security of land tenure and the land titling programme in 
Ethiopia. Section 2.5 explores the relationship between development of land rental 
markets and the land titling programme in rural Ethiopia. The structure of credit and 
input markets in rural Ethiopia is examined in section 2.6. The chapter concludes with 




 2.2. Literature Review: Theory and Empirical Evidence   
Land tenure has important implications for equity, growth and political stability 
(Deininger, 2003; Deininger & Feder, 2009). For this reason, in most developing 
countries, land tenure institutions have long been the subject of agricultural and 
economic development policy measures aimed at improving the asset base of the 
poor, as well as enhancing overall growth and efficiency (Bardhan, 1996; Maxwell & 
Wiebe, 1998; Lipton, 2009). In the literature, tenure is defined as “a bundle of rights” 
and tenure insecurity can be narrowly defined as the perception of losing land in some 
future time. Or it can be broadly defined as “... the fear of not being able to benefit in 
full from the set of rights to which one lays claim, and the uncertainty associated with 
the nature of this set of rights”(Sjaastad & Bromley, 2000, p. 373).  
Economic theory suggests that secure property rights lead to increased investment, 
enhanced efficiency in allocating resources, and environmental sustainability (Besley, 
1995; Besley & Ghatak, 2010; Carter & Yao, 2002; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; 
Dorner, 1972; Gordon, 1954). In particular, secure property rights in land are 
considered important in most developing countries where land is the primary means 
for generating a livelihood for most of the population (Deininger, 2003).The principal 
arguments for a positive link between secure property rights and investment include 
the following three points. First, secure property rights remove disincentives to invest 
as such rights give the assurance that individuals would not be expropriated from their 
property (Binswanger, Deininger & Feder, 1995; Demsetz, 1967; Feder & Onchan, 
1987). Second, secure property (usually land) can be used as collateral in the credit 
market, which may increase access to funds for investment through formal credit 




security allows individuals to sell or rent their investment, which increases the 
incentive to invest and benefit from trade (Besley, 1995; Besley & Ghatak, 2010).   
Although there is a general consensus, at least at the conceptual level, on the 
importance of secure property rights to induce individual investment and economic 
growth, there has been heated debates on the structure of tenure system associated 
with better tenure security and what measures should be used to improve tenure 
security over land (Bromley, 2008; Firmin-Sellers, 1995). In particular, the debate has 
been immense in Africa where various customary (usually communal) land tenure 
systems and individual property right systems coexist (Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, 
1999).   
On one hand, proponents of individual property rights over land argue that change in 
relative factor prices (due to increase in population density or technological change) 
generates economic rents, and that these economic rents can be better captured by 
private property rights than communal property right systems (Demsetz, 1967; Dorner 
1972; Johnson, 1972; Harrison 1987 as cited in Firmin-Sellers, 1995). These 
researchers consider individual property rights as the most efficient and secure. They 
argue that customary tenure systems discourage investment and induce inefficient 
allocation of resources because property rights are not clearly defined and contracts 
are not enforceable under customary tenure systems.  
On the other hand, there are researchers who argue that tenure security should not be 
equated with private property as it can be vested in a community of users (Atwood, 
1990; Bromley, 1991; Ho & Spoor, 2006; Platteau, 1996). These researchers suggest 




community they belong socially constructs these rights. Furthermore, some 
researchers argue that customary land tenure system is a dynamic and complex 
phenomenon as it evolves in an economically efficient manner to changing socio-
economic conditions (Barrows & Roth, 1990; MigotAdholla, et al., 1991; Sjaastad & 
Bromley, 1997, 2000). This means that under specific conditions, customary land 
tenure systems are sufficient in providing landlords with basic tenure security to 
rights of use as well as, facilitate land transfers, and investment (Atwood, 1990; 
Barrows & Roth, 1990; Brasselle et al., 2002; Deininger & Feder, 2009; Feder & 
Nishio, 1999).   
Despite the on-going debate on the structure of tenure system for better tenure 
security, formalisation of property relations through the registration of land and the 
issuance of land titles is continuing in Africa. In the context of most developing 
countries, the rationale for registration and titling is based on the perception that 
provision of land titling increases tenure security and, thereby, improves access to 
credit, increases incentive to investment, and facilitates efficient resource allocation 
(Deininger & Binswanger, 1999; Feder & Nishio, 1999).  
A formal treatment for the link between land titling, credit access, investment, and 
productivity is provided by Feder and Onchan (1987) and Feder and Nishio (1999).  
The latter paper identifies three channels through which land titling will have positive 
impacts (Figure 2.1). First, increases in land productivity require increases in 
complementary land-related investments. The incentive to invest in such activities 
depends on tenure security. In such case, registration of land ownership can provide 
tenure security, thereby increasing the incentive to invest on land leading to increase 




Figure 2. 1. The link between land titling and economic outcomes.  
  
Source: Adapted from Feder & Nishio (1999).  
 
Second, formal lenders with limited information on borrowers require collateral to 
limit risks around default and usually fixed assets, mainly land, are used as collateral 
in credit markets. In this regard, provision of land title reduces the cost of verification 
of ownership of the land used as collateral. Access to cheap credit increases 




and titling can reduce asymmetric information in land markets, thereby facilitating 
efficient land transfers.   
However, it has also been proposed that land registration and titling is not always a 
necessary or sufficient measure to improve tenure security (Deininger, 2003; 
Deininger & Feder, 2009; Feder & Nishio, 1999; Lipton, 2009). Deininger (2003), for 
example, noted that: “Increasing security of tenure does not necessarily require 
issuing formal individual titles and in many circumstances more simple measures to 
enhance tenure security can make a big difference at much lower cost than formal  
titles” (p.39). Additionally, it is suggested that the economic impacts of land titling 
depends among other factors, on farmers’ capacity to respond to investment options, 
the functioning of other input and credit markets, the rights that are conveyed by 
individualised land title, as well as the level of technological changes (Barrows & 
Roth, 1990; Boucher, Carter & Guirkinger, 2007; Bromley, 2008; Feder & Nishio, 
1999; Lipton, 2009; Rahmato, 2009). For example, Bromley (2008) points out that:   
If the legal foundations of an economy are tenuous then titles are 
meaningless and will lack the necessary force to do the work they are 
claimed to do. That is, formalisation will do little good if it is not 
backed up by a coherent legal system and authority structure that 
promises effective enforcement of the rights inherent in, and implied 
by, the granting of titles (p.2).    
This implies that the act of implementing formal land title may not ensure that the 
benefits of land titling will be realised if it is undertaken without improving the poor 




Existing empirical evidence on the relationship between land titling and economic 
outcomes documented mixed results. Some studies from Latin America and Asia 
found positive effects of land titling on access to credit, investment, and land value 
(Deininger 2003; Feder, 2002; Feder & Onchan, 1987; Galiani, & Schargrodsky, 
2010). For example, the study by Feder (2002) found that land titling had led to 
increased land values (in Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, and Philippines), increased 
investment levels (in Thailand, Brazil, and Honduras), and increased access to credit 
(in Honduras and Thailand). Similarly, Deininger (2003) also found increased land 
values and agricultural investment following registration programmes in Nicaragua, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela.   
In contrast, there are studies that found limited impacts of land titling programmes on 
investment and credit market participation in Latin America (e.g. Carter & Olinto, 
2003; Fields & Torero, 2006). For instance, Carter and Olinto (2003) show that the 
credit supply effects of tenure security are absent for the smallest farms in Paraguay 
suggesting that the impact of land tilting on credit supply has a wealth or land size 
bias. Likewise, Field & Torero (2006) show that the effect of titling on credit access 
is limited in Peru. In particular, they found no effect of titling on receiving credit from 
private sector banks, although interest rates are significantly lower for titled 
applicants. According to Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2007) the limited impact of 
land tiling on credit access can partly be explained by the presence of moral hazard 
constraints and lack of insurance markets, which induces risk rationing in credit 
markets. This means, while titling may reduce quantity rationing in credit markets (by 




increase the farmers’ willingness to put her/his wealth at risk (increased risk 
rationing). 
When it comes to Africa, many studies found no significant relationship between land 
titling, on the one hand, and tenure security, credit use, investment, agricultural 
productivity, or expansion of land rental markets, on the other (Atwood 1990; 
Bellemare, 2013; Brasselle et.al., 2002; Carter et al., 1994; Jacoby & Minten, 2007; 
Migot-Adholla et al., 1991; Migot-Adholla,  Benneh,  Place,  & Atsu, 1994; Place & 
Migot-Adholla, 1998; Roth, Unruh, Barrows, Bruce, & Migot-Adholla, 1994). For 
example, the study by Bellemare (2013) showed that land titles had no significant 
impact on changing agricultural productivity in Madagascar, although some informal 
land rights were significantly associated with changes in agricultural productivity. 
Among other reasons, imperfections in other complementary markets and lack of 
infrastructure are suggested as the major reasons for the lack of significant economic 
impacts of land titling reforms in Africa (Barrows & Roth, 1990; Bruce & Migot-
Adholla, 1994; Ensminger, 1997; Migot-Adholla et al., 1991).  
Contrary to what was found in other African countries, new research from Ethiopia 
showed that land title ownership had significant and positive impact on investment, 
land productivity, and land rental market participation (Deininger et al., 2011; Holden 
et al., 2009, 2011). For example, the study by Deininger et al. (2011) assessed the 
impacts of land registration and titling using data from the Amhara region of Ethiopia. 
Their results showed that tenure security increased with land title ownership as these 
households expected less administrative redistributions in the future. Regarding 
investment decisions, they showed that the propensity to invest in soil and water 




Ownership of land titling in Ethiopia also significantly improved participation in land 
rental markets in the Tigray and Amhara regions of Ethiopia (Holden et al., 2009, 
2011). In particular, Holden et al. (2011), who analysed the impact of land titling on 
both tenant and landlord households, argued that land certification significantly 
increased land rental market participation of (potential) tenant and landlord 
households.   
However, there are others that suggested that ownership of land certificate does not 
entitle the holder to any more rights or benefits than those already included in existing 
federal and regional land legislation (Rahmato, 2004, 2009; Segers et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the expected positive economic benefits of land titling are very limited. 
For example, a study by Rahmato (2009) from two districts in the country found that 
despite land titling, large percentage of households reported that they expected land 
redistributions in the future, which may increase tenure insecurity.   
Similarly, based on their study from Tigray region of the country, Segers et al. (2010) 
argued that there is no “evidence that farmers’ land rental decisions are influenced by 
the level of legal or perceived tenure security” (p.1025). These findings imply that 
unless measures are taken to address problems in the existing land tenure system and 
other development challenges, land titling is not expected to result in any long-term 
solution in Ethiopia.   
The discussion above clearly suggests that the positive economic impacts of owning 
land titles will be realised if farmers are able to mortgage their land, and are able to 
sell or rent the land more smoothly to others. However, in Ethiopia, land is owned by 




Given the lack of significant effectiveness of land titling projects in other parts of 
Africa (Deininger & Jin, 2006), it is important to ask whether the prerequisites for 
economic effectiveness of land titling are satisfied in the case of Ethiopia. This issue 
has been not well addressed in the existing studies.  
This chapter aims to examine whether or not the prerequisites for economic 
effectiveness of land titling are satisfied in the case of Ethiopia. To do so, I examine 
the land tenure system, and the structure of rural factor and credit markets in rural 
Ethiopia. The next section provides a review of the land tenure system and the land 
titling programme in Ethiopia. In subsequent sections, I examine the link between the 
land titling programme and the development of rural factor and credit markets in the 
case of Ethiopia.   
2.3. Overview of the Land Tenure System in Ethiopia   
The land tenure system in Ethiopia has undergone a remarkable shift, mainly 
associated with regime changes over the past forty years. This section provides an 
overview of the land tenure system in Ethiopia. It summarises the land policies based 
on the three recent regime changes in the country: (i) the imperial regime (Pre-1974), 
(ii) the military-socialist government of the Derg (1974-1990), and (iii) the current 
regime (since 1991).  
2.3.1. Tenure Systems in Pre-1974 Ethiopia  
During the imperial regime prior to 1974, land was predominantly controlled by the 
king, the church, and the ruling elites. Land tenure system was not uniform in the 
country. In particular, there was a basic distinction between land ownership patterns 




tenure system known as rist was the major land ownership system in the Northern 
part of the country. According to this system, an individual’s access to land was 
determined, based on his or her membership of a village community and both male 
and female descendants of the original settlers could access land but only through 
family inheritance (Rahmato, 1984; Jemma, 2004). Community leaders were 
responsible for the allocation of land to the members of the village community 
(Rahmato, 1984). As land was a common property of the village community, 
individual holders had only usufruct rights over their land holdings, which restricted 
land transfer by sale, mortgage, or gift. However, they were allowed to rent out their 
land to others. Problems faced by rist claimants include disputes among peasants and 
diminishing land holding sizes due to excessive land fragmentation (Rahmato, 1984; 
Rahmato, 1993; Jemma, 2004).  
In the late nineteenth century, following the conquest of the Southern region by 
Northern emperors, land was redistributed among the new landlords, local elites, and 
the church in the Southern part of the country. In this region, government land was 
given to local elites associated with the emperor. Members of this elite group were 
responsible for tax collection as civil servants in lieu of salary. Because of this policy, 
many local people were left landless and became servants and tenants to the Northern 
elites. Furthermore, there was a clear contrast in what tenancy meant to Northern and 
Southern peasants. According to Hoben (as cited in Jemma, 2004, p.7), in the 
Northern part, tenancy meant “a system of sharecropping among different households 
who pooled their resources together based on the mutual interest of the parties 
involved, while, in the South, tenants were landless laborers and landlords were 




labour services of tenants to landlords was common in the Southern part of the 
country. In effect, the agrarian structure was characterised by an exploitative 
landlord-tenant relationship with great inequality in land distribution (Rahmato, 1993; 
Jemma, 2004).   
2.3.2. The Derg Era (1974-1990)  
Lack of commitment to reform the land policy by the imperial regime led to the 
popular unrest and revolution with the famous slogan “Land to the Tiller” which 
resulted in the collapse of the imperial system in 1974. Following the overthrow of 
the imperial regime by the military regime (Derg), the government announced a 
radical land reform in 1975 that nationalised all rural and urban land, as well as all 
natural resources in the country. The land reform placed emphasis on abolishing the 
exploitive landlord-tenant relations that prevailed in the South, and the granting of 
land to those people who actually produced from the land.   
Following the land reform, the government confiscated all privately owned land 
without compensation to the former owners. Land was redistributed to individual 
households based mainly on family size, and the land holding per household was 
restricted to no more than ten hectares. The reform also applied in the Northern part 
of the country. Because every plot of land was held by the peasants in the Northern 
part (mainly under the rist land ownership system), the reform also gives possessory 
rights over the lands they were tilling during the reform period (Ambaye, 2013, p. 
62). Thus, uniform land polices followed throughout the country, in both the Northern 
and Southern parts. Peasants were granted only usufruct rights depending on a 
peasant’s continued residence in the village, and inheritance was possible only among 




In addition, as a means of transition to socialism, Peasant Associations (PAs) were 
created as lower administrative units in every village. They were responsible for 
approximately 800 hectares of land, and large-scale state farms were organised 
(Rahmato, 1984). Furthermore, farmers were organised into producers’ cooperatives, 
and usually forced to sell fixed proportion of their output at fixed prices to the state 
owned agricultural marketing corporations established in 1979. Members of 
producers’ cooperatives were favoured in terms of obtaining subsidies and the best 
land in their PAs. In some cases, peasants who had fertile lands but did not belong to 
the association were displaced to other areas if the land was needed for cooperative 
farming (Rahmato, 1993; Jemma, 2004).    
The land reform banned any private ownership of land, and land transfer through sale, 
rental, or mortgage market. It also restricted the hiring of agricultural labour in family 
farming (unless the individual is sick or weak), despite the availability of surplus 
labour from large households (Omiti et al., 2000). To some extent, households 
attempted to overcome the problems related to these restrictions though inter 
household exchange of labour on alternate working days and sharecropping (Omiti et 
al., 2000; Rahmato, 2004). Formally, administrative land redistribution was the only 
instrument used to adjust land holdings and address landlessness problems (Pender & 
Fafchamps, 2005; Rahmato, 1984).  As a result, as time passed, many Peasant 
Associations (PAs) had to redistribute land frequently to meet the demand for land 
caused by high population growth or for other reasons such as the demand from 
government to implement collectivisation and compulsory resettlement programmes 




The initial land reform in 1975 was successful in terms of changing the land tenure 
system and reconfiguring social class in Ethiopia (Rahmato, 1984). However, the 
subsequent agrarian policies, and the limited technical ability of administrative 
officials to anticipate and correct changes in factor proportion at farm level resulted in 
land fragmentation, increased tenure insecurity, and lowered labour mobility, and 
agricultural productivity (Rahmato, 1993; Teklue & Lemi, 2004). For instance, during 
the period 1982–1991, the overall GDP growth was 1.4% with agricultural GDP 
growing at only 2%.7  
2.3.3. The Current Land Tenure System (Since 1991)   
After the downfall of the socialist regime in 1991, the transitional government 
adopted a new economic policy in 1992, which more closely resembled the free 
market economic policy. Despite the transition from a socialist to market economy, 
the government reserved ultimate control over land. A new Constitution in 1995 
(Proclamation No. 1/1995) asserted that all rural and urban land belonged to the state 
and the people of Ethiopia. Accordingly, land is the property of the state and 
individuals have only usufruct rights. This, once again, limits transfer of land through 
sale or mortgage. The Constitution guarantees access to land free of charges for any 
individual aged 18 and above who wishes to take farming as the main livelihood 
activity. Unlike the previous regime, the current land policy officially allows farm 
households to rent out their land on a short-term basis, hire agricultural labour, and to 
claim compensation for investment on their land in cases of displacement from that 
land.   
                                                 




In 1997, the government enacted a Federal Rural Land Administration Proclamation 
(Proclamation No. 87/1997) which was later replaced in 2005 with the current 
governing legislation (Proclamation No. 456/2005). This legislation transferred power 
to regional governments to formulate their own land legislation within the framework 
of the general principles provided in the federal law. The implications are that there 
are regional variations in regards to some land laws. For example, despite land renting 
out being officially allowed since 1995, different regions impose different restrictions 
on the size of the land to be rented out and the rental duration. For example, in Tigray, 
the length of a lease period can extend up to 20 years for modern technology and up 
to only two years for traditional technology.  
Likewise, in the Amhara regional state, farm households are allowed to rent out their 
land for a duration of up to 25 years, irrespective of the technology being used, while 
duration is restricted to a maximum of 3-15 years in Oromia, and 2-25 years in the 
SNNP regional states based on the technology employed. The restriction on the 
maximum amount of land area to be leased also varies across different regions. For 
instance, farmers in the Oromia and Tigray regional states are allowed to rent out only 
50% of their land holdings, while in other regions, although the size is not mentioned, 
the amount of land remaining should be enough to produce the annual food 
consumption needs for the farming families.   
There are also important regional differences regarding access to land and residency 
requirements. For example, the land policy in the Amhara and Tigray regional states 
emphasised that rights to land will be terminated if the holder leaves his/her village 
(for example for more than two years in Tigray), while the legislation in Oromia and 




elsewhere. The land legislation in Tigray region further declares that siblings can 
inherit land from their parents only if they have no land of their own or have 
insufficient income from non-agricultural activities.  
With diminishing per capita land holding sizes in rural areas, restrictions on land 
transactions are expected to reduce farmers’ transaction in land rental activities. For 
instance, data from the 2009 ERHS round show that less than 10% of the lands used 
by farmers were obtained through land rental markets (Table 2.1). Land allocated by 
PA officials and inheritance were the two most important means of access to 
cultivated land in rural Ethiopia. Among the plots used in 2009 by sample households 
a large proportion were PA- allocated plots (60.8%), followed by inheritance 
(27.2%).8 However, there are significant regional variations. For example, compared 
to other regions, land acquisition through inheritance was larger in SNNP (67.2%), 
followed by Oromia (22.6%).  
Table 2.1: Mode of plot acquisitions by region (2009)  












Tigray 90.42 5.56 3.83 0.19 0 0 522 
Amhara 74.99 8.9 13.29 2.39 0.19 0.23 2,594 
Oromia 67.55 22.59 3.08 5.15 1.19 0.44 3,439 
SNNP 20.03 67.15 3.34 1.35 7.86 0.27 1,857 
Total  60.77 27.15 6.34 3.15 2.28 0.31 8,412 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS, 2009.Note: *’ Other means’ includes mortgage 
and land borrowed free; PA means Peasant Association. About 19 plots had missing information or 
“don’t know” response.  
                                                 
8 Other means includes mortgage and land borrowed free. However, close to 93% of the land 
borrowed free had been kept under the current holder for more than seven years and those 
who reported the plot as mortgaged or purchased also kept it for more than 20 years. This 





With the objective of increasing tenure security, starting in 1998, the current 
government has begun the implementation of the first stage of a land titling 
programme in various parts of the country. According to the current ruling land 
legislation (Proclamation No. 456/2005), land titling is defined as: “certificate of title 
issued by a competent authority as proof of rural land use right”. The programme 
started first in Tigray regional states in 1998, Amhara region in 2002/2003, Oromia 
and SNNP in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Close to 88% of the rural households in 
Tigray and 79% of them in Amhara received land titles at the end of 1999 and in 
2004/2005, respectively (Deininger et al., 2008).9  Although registration started, land 
title provision has been delayed in Oramia and SNNP regional states. As of 2008, 
close to 20 million plots (6.3 million households out of about 13 million rural 
households) have been registered (Deininger et al., 2008; MoARD, 2010). 10   
The first stage land registration and titling process did not involve the use of cadastral 
system. Except in two selected pilot areas (in Amhara region), where  relatively better 
technologies were used, mainly local traditional methods (e.g. measuring tapes and 
ropes) were used in the demarcation process and the registration and documentations 
were done manually (Bezu & Holden, 2014; Deininger et al., 2008). According to 
Bezu and Holden (2014: p.193), “The main sources for determining plot boundaries 
were field markings, in conjunction with the memories of the neighbors whose farm 
plots border those owned by the households in question.” As a result, the first stage of 
                                                 
9 The current ruling land proclamation, proclamation No.456/2005, was enacted at federal 
level with the main objective of consolidating the land tenure laws in various regions. So the 
timing of this law does not relate with the ongoing land titling programmes in various 
regions. However, the 2005 proclamation formalises the land registration programmes in 
various regions.   
10 The estimated number of total agricultural land holders in 2009/10 production season was about 




the land registration process is considered low-cost and efficient (Deininger et al., 
2008).The process also avoids the common shortcomings of land titling programmes 
in other parts of Africa as it is considered to be cost effective, accessed equitably, and 
participatory.11  However, Rahmato (2009) has argues that the cost advantage of using 
traditional methods will be overshadowed by other limitations of the process.  
For example, results of area delineations from this process are not up to-date. 
Therefore, results can be inaccurate, inconsistent, and unreliable in the long run, 
which may lead to more conflicts (Rahmato, 2009: p.81).To overcome these 
shortcomings the government is currently staging the second round of the land 
certification programme, which seeks to be more accurate in terms of delineation and 
the recording of property boundaries using modern methods. This second-stage 
process is expected to be expensive though as it intends to use advanced technology 
(Deininger et al., 2008).  
In summary, the discussion in this section shows that despite some policy change 
relative to the previous regime land policy, the current land tenure system in Ethiopia 
is very restrictive in many aspects. Land is owned by the state and although renting is 
allowed, there are still various restrictions imposed on land rental market transactions 
and labour movements. In addition, land titling in Ethiopia grants usufruct rights only 
because private ownership of land is prohibited by law.   
                                                 
11  Land titling and registration programmes in other parts of Africa have proved to be 
expensive, very slow,  exclusive of poor claimants and holders of secondary land rights( for 
example women), difficult to keep up-to-date, and in some cases led to increased conflict 





The main objective of the land reform (land titling) in Ethiopia is to enhance tenure 
security of farmers, thereby stimulating greater land-related investments and 
minimising boundary disputes. This in turn is expected to increase agricultural 
productivity. However, the discussion in the conceptual framework clearly indicates 
that land titling will have significant positive impact only if there is well-functioning 
credit, input and other factor markets, and where existing tenure systems are weak/not 
effective (Barrows & Roth, 1990; Feder & Nishio, 1999; Migot-Adholla et al., 1991). 
Based on this conceptual framework, in the subsequent sections, I examine whether 
such basic prerequisites for economic effectiveness of land registration are in place or 
not in the context of Ethiopia.  
2.4. Tenure Insecurity and Land Title Ownership   
During both previous and current regimes, government sponsored land redistributions 
have been widely used to equalize the distribution of operational land holdings in 
rural Ethiopia (Benin & Pender, 2001). This can be seen from the figures in Table 2.1 
as more than 60% of operated plots in rural areas are acquired through government 
allocation. However, land redistributions are also the main source of tenure insecurity 
among farmers because redistributions to date have generally taken place without fair 
compensation (Ambaye, 2013; Holden & Yohannes, 2002; Rahmato, 2009). In 
particular, as land belongs to the state, farmers have  not been compensated for the 
lands they lost during land redistributions and in events when farmers were moved, 
often they received land which was of poor quality (Rahmato, 2009).This means 




Improvement in tenure security of farmers is one channel through which land 
registration and title ownership is expected to improve both investment and efficient 
resource allocations, thereby increasing agricultural productivity (Feder & Nishio, 
1999). Supporting this theory, some researchers from Ethiopia found that land title 
ownership increased tenure security of farmers (Deininger et.al, 2011; Holden et.al, 
2009, 2011). For example, Holden et al. (2009) noted that:  
The main reason for positive impacts of certification is that 
certification has reduced tenure insecurity that was high due to the past 
policy with state ownership of land, providing households restricted 
use rights to land only, and frequent land redistribution that 
undermined investment incentives (p.360).   
Deininger et al. (2011) also argue that the main channel through which land 
titling is expected to result in a positive outcome is only through its positive 
impact on tenure security. These arguments suggest that land title ownership 
gives farmers more secure land rights than earlier tenure systems in rural 
Ethiopia. However, there are also others who have argue that land title 
ownership has hardly changed the situation from what is stated in the existing 
land policies in rural Ethiopia (Rahmato, 2004, 2009; Segers et al., 2010).   
For example, Rahmato (2009) argues that titling could not guarantee tenure 
security to farmers because the government still possesses the power to 
expropriate their land from farmers when it is necessary to do so. The current 
reform (land titling) does not eliminate the government’s contradictory 




Constitution and regional legislation continues to promise the right to have 
land for all adults living in rural areas free of charge. In reality though, given 
the existing land scarcity and population pressure on land, the government 
could achieve social equity objectives mainly using periodic land 
redistributions, which may also increase tenure insecurity (Ege, 1997; 
Rahmato, 2004). This fact is confirmed in the current land legislation which 
states that:   
Upon the wish and resolution of peasants farmers, semi-pastoralists 
and pastoralists where land distribution becomes the only alternative, it 
shall be undertaken in such a way that it shall not be less than the 
minimum size of holding and in a manner that shall not result in 
fragmentation of land and degradation of natural resources (Article 9,  
Sub-Article 3 of Proclamation No. 456/2005).  
Additionally, under some conditions, farmers may lose their land rights. For instance, 
both federal and regional legislation in all regional states clearly declares that rights 
holders must ‘properly manage’ the land, soil and other natural resources that are in 
their possession. According to Rahmato (2004), the term ‘properly manage’ is 
problematic because it is not clearly defined. As a result, different officials can 
interpret it differently. These restrictions and ambiguities in the land policy are 
expected to undermine tenure security of farmers. In this regard, de facto land title 
ownership does not relax any of the above restrictions or clarify the existing 




federal and regional land legislation. The new land proclamation (Proclamation No. 
456/2005) states that:  
Any holder of rural land shall be given a holding certificate to be 
prepared by the competent authority and that indicates size of the land, 
land use type and cover, level of fertility and borders, as well as the 
obligation and right of the holder (Article 6, Sub-Article 3 of 
Proclamation No. 456/2005).   
 
Article 10 Sub-Article 1 of the legislation further states that:   
A holder of rural land shall be obliged to use and protect his land. 
When the land gets damaged, the user of the land shall lose his use 
right. Particulars shall be given in the land administration laws of the 
regions.  
This suggests that ownership of land titling does not protect farmers from 
expropriation by government officials if they fail to ‘properly manage’ their land. 
Fear of land expropriation by the government remains high among farmers despite 
titling programme in some parts of the country. For instance, since 1997, land 
redistribution has been banned in Tigray regional state and the actual land 
redistribution experience among the sample households was zero after 1997 (Table 
2.2). However, the number of households who reported fear of losing land because of 
land redistribution in Tigray was 11.6% during the period 1999–2004 which declined 
only to 9.7% during 2004–2009. In other regions though, farmers’ fear of losing land 




data also show that none of the households in the sample area had reported that they 
had lost land in the past or expected land loss in the future due to land grabs by other 
households.12 This suggests that governments’ power to expropriate land is the main 
source of tenure insecurity.  
Table 2.2: Percentage of households that experienced and expected land redistribution reforms 
(1994-2009) 
 
Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP Total (%) 
Total 
sample 
Households Lost land due to land redistribution (%) 
Lost land before 1994 38.1 44.5 34.7 19.1 33.5 1,455 
Lost land during 1983-1994 20.9 17.1 6.3 1.1 9.8 1,455 
Lost land during 1994-1999 0.8 22.7 1.6 2.3 8.6 1,358 
Lost land during 1999-2004 0.0 2.6 0.9 2.1 1.7 1,353 
Lost land during 2004-2009 0.0 1.3 0.3 2.7 1.3 1,345 
       Households Expected redistributions and land loss due to redistributions (%) 
Expected land redistributions 
during  1999-2004* 14 21 33 10.6 20.4 1,403 
Expected land loss  
during  1999-2004 11.6 14.4 13.2 6.4 11.4 1,403 
Expected redistributions   
during 2004-2009 12.7 11.1 12.8 4 9.6 1,348 
Expected land loss  
during  1999-2004 9.7 6.2 7.0 3.2 5.9 1,348 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.Note:* ‘Expected redistributions’ includes both those 
expected land losses and gains due to land redistributions. 
 
Likewise, other studies from the Amahar region of the country suggest that despite 
titling, fear of land expropriation by the government remained high (Rahmato 2009; 
Deininger, et.al, 2009). For example, Rahmato (2009) reported that among a sample 
of 110 peasants interviewed, more than 44% reported that land redistribution was 
                                                 




likely in the future, while 28% of them reported that they were not sure about it. 
According to Rahmato (2009, p. 89), such uncertainties about future government land 
policies are prevalent in rural areas because often peasants are not consulted 
beforehand when new initiatives are planned. Regarding the land registration 
programme Rahmato (2009) stated that: “Almost all peasants in our two research 
locations said they heard about land registration when they were called to attend a 
general meeting to elect the committee that was to be responsible for implementing 
it”(p.89).  
Some researchers, however, argue that titling is beneficiary in the case of 
expropriation by the government as “possession of a certificate can improve 
negotiating power or at least provide a basis for compensation, again implying that 
certification could lead to potentially large tenure security effects” (Deininger et al., 
2009, p.316). Previous land redistribution experiences suggest that often fair 
compensation was not necessarily guaranteed during expropriation by government 
officials (Ambaye, 2013; Holden & Yohannes, 2002; Rahmato, 2009). For instance, 
during the land redistribution in Amhara in 1997, farmers were compensated for their 
trees only if the trees were at harvestable age when they lost their land. This means 
that they lost rights to younger trees planted (Holden & Yohannes, 2002, p. 577).   
This indicates that despite the fact that both the constitution and regional land 
legislation promise fair compensation for investment on land during expropriation, 
the government does not fully respect these rights in practice. After extensive study of 
the land redistribution in the Amara region in 1997, Ege (1997) described the 




The current reform confirmed the worst fears of those who opposed 
state ownership of land, since it showed very clearly that the state 
reserves for itself the right to dispose of land at will, and the peasants 
have no independent rights, only the rights that the state at any point 
chooses to respect (p. 143).  
Also, a recent study of two villages in Ethiopia suggests that although farmers 
indicated that they are sure they will get some compensation if they lose land due to 
government expropriation, they are not sure whether the compensation will be fair 
(Rahmato, 2009, p.88). This is because, when peasants lose land due to land 
expropriations, they often receive land that is of poor quality as compensation. This is 
mainly because local officials cannot afford to pay compensation in cash, and good 
quality land is not easily available due to land scarcity (Rahmato, 2009).   
Furthermore, there is some evidence that despite having land titling proof, some 
farmers were denied fair compensation to part of their previous land use rights such as 
rights to communal grazing lands during expropriation by government (Rahmato, 
2009). Communal lands were not included in the land titling process. Given that all 
rural land belongs to the state, the government has the right to change communal 
lands to private holdings (Proclamation No. 456/2005). As a result, there have been a 
number of problems associated with communal lands during the land titling process. 
For example, Rahmato (2009) described the conflict between local officials and 
farmers who lost their land due to road development projects in Amhara regional state 
(west of the Dessie Zuria district) as follows:   




eligible for compensation. Peasants were angry because they felt 
cheated: they had been farming those lands for over a generation and 
had their certificates as proof of ownership, yet they were denied the 
fair treatment that they were promised by the certification programme 
(p.77).  
This situation suggests that land titling does not necessarily guarantee full 
compensation in the case of expropriation. In fact, by delineating use rights only to 
individual farm sizes, it may even restrict farmers’ use rights on secondary land 
rights, such as communal grazing lands.   
In general, from the above discussions, it is clear that land reform in the form of land 
titling has changed little with regard to the existing land tenure system in the case of 
Ethiopia. Considerable tenure insecurity remains high mainly due to government 
sponsored land redistribution practices in the country. Thus, if the objective is to 
reduce tenure insecurity (which is mainly due to government-sponsored land 
redistributions), the government can commit itself to stopping land redistribution and 
respect the rights already stated in the Constitution and regional legislation without 
land titling.   
2.5. Land Titling and Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia  
The other major benefit of titling mentioned in the literature is that land registration 
and titling leads to the emergence of a well-functioning land markets as it can reduce 
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers (Feder & Nishio, 1999; Deininger 
& Feder, 2009). Feder and Nishio (1999) has, nevertheless, emphasised that land 




if the transaction in land markets mainly takes place within a village where everyone 
knows each other; ii) if there is a low demand for land transactions, or the existing 
land tenure system is sufficient to the types and volumes of transactions that are 
typical in the area under consideration; and, iii) if there are restrictions in the 
functioning of land markets.   
In the context of Ethiopia, where land sale and private ownership of land are 
prohibited, the development of land rental markets is considered important in order to 
equalise the marginal product of land across households with different land and 
labour endowments. Hence, land renting out is officially allowed since the 
introduction of the new Constitution in 1995. However, as the discussion in section 
2.3 shows, both federal and regional legislation impose restrictions on the size of the 
land to be rented out and the rental duration. In this regard, land titling does not 
change any of the restrictions imposed on land rental markets. Additionally, land sale 
and the use of land as collateral in credit markets are still prohibited in Ethiopia, 
despite the land-titling programme. The current land proclamation states that:  
Peasant farmers, semi-pastoralists and pastoralists who are given 
holding certificates can lease to other farmers or investors land from 
their holding of a size sufficient for, the intended development in a 
manner that shall not displace them, for a period of time to be 
determined by rural land administration laws of regions based on 
particular local conditions (Article 8, Sub-Article 8 of Proclamation 




This legislation seems even more restrictive as it states that farmers “who are holding 
certificates” are allowed to rent out their land. There is no mention of farmers who do 
not own certificates, which suggests that, without a certificate, they are not allowed to 
rent out land. Such ambiguity in the land law may in fact increase tenure insecurity 
among households who do not receive titling due to various reasons.   
Despite the law, more recent data from the Ethiopian Rural Socioeconomic Survey 
(ERSS) in 2011/12 show that households leased out their plots even if they did not 
have titling (Table 2.3). Out of 5,752 parcels, 63.7% of the parcels had land title, and 
4.8% of the parcels had at least one field that rented out during the agricultural season 
(in 2010/11). Looking at renting-out activities by land title ownership suggests that 
there was no significant difference between parcels that had land titles and those 
without it, with the exception in Oromia where the mean difference is marginally 
significant (at 10% level of significance).  
However, these figures do not include land rentals through sharecropping, which is 
the dominant contractual arrangement in rural Ethiopia (see Table 2.5 and Table 4.1 
in chapter 4). Based on the main data set used in this thesis, ERHS, households’ 
participation in land rental markets (including sharecropping) was 33.5% in 1994, 
which is comparable with other countries (e.g about 27% in China, in 2000 (Kimura, 
Otsuka, Sonobe, & Rozelle, 2011); and 24% in Hungary in 1998 (Vranken & 























Tigray  768 62.11 3.62 3.35 4.12 
 Amhaa 2,129 77.45 9.11 9.52 7.71 
 Oromia 1,513 56.64 2.3 2.92 1.52 * 
SNNP 1,342 50.89 1.56 1.76 1.37 
 Total  5,752 63.73 4.82 5.73 3.26   
Source: Own calculations using data from ERSS, 2011/12. 
Note: Number of parcels excludes parcels which have missing data on whether the 
parcel is rented out or not. Thus, out of the total of 6579 parcels 820 parcels 
excluded. And parcels rented out does not necessarily mean that the whole parcel, it 
could be fields in the given parcel.  * Significant at 10%. 
Furthermore, the nature of the transactions in land rental markets suggests that a 
significantly large proportion of the land transactions are between relatives. For 
example, data on rented plots from the 2009 survey years of the ERHS indicate that 
40% of the plots were leased from relatives (Table 2.4). In addition, there is evidence 
that most of the land rental transactions took place within the same village where 
farmers reside. For example, data from the 1994 survey year reveal that among 
households who leased out land, close to 88% of the plots leased out were to tenants 
who were located within the same PA the landlords resided in, while 35% being 
neighbours.   
Table 2.4: Transacting agents in land rental markets(1994 and 2009) 
Pots leased out in 1994 (%)     Plots leased in 2009 (%)   
To families in the same village 31.82 
 
From peasant associations  3.64 
To  neighbours 35.39 
 
From husband’s/ wife's  parents 2.64 
To others in the same village 21.1 
 
From other relatives  37.64 
To others, elsewhere 4.55 
 
From non-relatives  55.33 
To families, elsewhere 7.14 
 
From others (not specified) 0.75 
Total sample  308     797 
Source: Own calculations using data from the ERHS. 




Other similar studies from Ethiopia also show that land rental transactions in Ethiopia 
were mainly between relatives, neighbours or friends (Belay & Manig, 2004; 
Deininger et al., 2009; Segers, et al., 2010). Likewise, using data from Dominican 
Republic, a study by Macours, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2010) also show that among 
the plots rented out in their study area, about 43 % of them rented out to family 
members. In the presence of tenure insecurity, renting out land to family members or 
neighbours may help reduce the likelihood of losing land to tenants who are socially 
distant (Macours et al, 2010).  
In the context of rural Ethiopia, where there is limited mobility, information about 
land ownership, assets, and ability is easily available among residents of the same 
village. This suggests that transaction costs related to verification of land owners or 
tenants are not expected to be a constraint to land rental transactions. As a result, the 
benefit of land titling in reducing transaction costs in land rental transaction is 
expected to be very limited in the case of rural Ethiopia. However, it is suggested that 
land renting to family members or individuals within the same community may lead 
to efficiency loss if landlords rent less or rent it to less productive tenants when the 
landlord cannot find productive tenants among those with close social relationships 
(Macours et al, 2010; p.898). 
Despite the above conditions, recent studies analysing the impact of land titling on 
land rental markets in Ethiopia have indicated that titling had positive and significant 
impacts on land rental market participation, in particular for female-headed 
households (Deininger et al., 2011; Holden et al., 2011). For instance, Holden et al. 
(2011)’s study disclosed that female-headed households were more likely to rent out 




resources (endowment effect), but female-headed households supplied less land 
because they felt more tenure-insecure. Their estimation results show that the 
coefficient on ownership of titling variable (proxied by a random certificate residual 
variable) was insignificant in the landlord model; while the interaction variable 
between the random certificate residual and sex of household head was positive and 
significant. Based on the positive coefficient on the interaction term, they concluded 
that tenure security (in the form of land titling) significantly increased land supply by 
female-headed households, despite evidence of strong dominance of the endowment 
effect over the tenure insecurity effect. However, other researchers (Ali & Norton, 
2003; Green, 2010) have noted that this way of interpretation of the ‘coefficient on 
interaction’ term is incorrect13. This suggests that further analysis is needed before 
any conclusion on the estimation result is made.  
The result found by Holden et al. (2011) also suggests that land renting-in had 
increased in the sample area because land titling increased land supplies, making 
more land available in the market. To test this, they included a variable “years since 
certificate” in the tenant model. The coefficient on “years since certificate” was 
positive and significant in the tenant model, implying that access to land for tenants 
improved in the sample area. However, contrary to their hypothesis, their descriptive 
statistics show that land supply increased by only 12% (from 24% to 27% ) 
immediately after certification (between 1997 and 2000), while land demand 
increased by more than 280%  (from 0.08% to 31% ) during the same period. 
                                                 
13 Ai & Norton (2003) showed that the statistical significance of the interaction effect cannot be 
tested with a simple t-test on the coefficient of the interaction term. Unlike the case in the linear 
model, the interaction effect is conditional on other independent variables. As a result, the 
interaction effect may have different signs for different values of covariates. Therefore, the sign 





Therefore, it is not clear why land renting-in increased by such a large number while 
land renting out increased only marginally.   
Contrary to the findings in the literature (Holden et al., 2011; Deininger et al., 2011), 
analyses of land transaction activities using panel data from four regions of Ethiopia, 
suggest that there is a limited relationship between land titling and participation in 
land rental markets in rural Ethiopia (Table 2.5). The data show that participation in 
land rental markets, in particular land supply, significantly increased in all regions 
during the period 1994–1999. The increase in participation rate mainly comes from an 
increased participation in land rental markets using cash rental arrangements. For 
instance, the incidence of participation using the cash rental contractual arrangement 
in 1999 increased by more than 200% from a level of less than 5% in 1994.   
The increase in land supply was higher in the Oromia and SNNP regional states 
where, land titling started only after 2004. During the same time, the percentage of 
households that rented out land in the SNNP regional state increased by about 150%, 
followed by the Oromia regional state with an increase of 123%, while the figure was 
39% in the Tigray region where, by the end of 1999, almost 88% of the households 
had received a title. Following the substantial increase in 1999, the average 
participation rate in land rental markets declined in 2004 (except in the Amhara 
region), then significantly increased again in 2009 in all regions.   
This trend in land rental market participation seems not following the land titling 
process because land registration and titling only started after 2003 in all regions 
except in the Tigray regional state. The figure in 1994 also suggests that farmers have 




sharecropping. Thus, the initial period increase in land rental activities is consistent 
with the change in land policy in 1995 that officially allows farm households to rent 
out their land, while the decline in land rental market participation rates in all regions 
in 2004 may be related to the recurrence of drought in the 2002/2003 production year. 
This could have significantly reduced transactions in the land rental markets. During 
this period, agricultural GDP fell by 10.5%. It then registered an average growth rate 
of 10% during the 2005–2008 production years (MoFED, 2011). The average trend in 
land rental market participation thus seems to follow a similar pattern to weather 
conditions and the associated agricultural production. This is a plausible explanation 
because agricultural production in Ethiopia is highly vulnerable to weather 
conditions.  
Table 2.5 also shows that the average amount of land area transacted in both the 
supply and demand side of the land rental markets was lower than 0.2 hectare, 
however with significant regional variations. For instance, in 2009, a relatively higher 
average area was transacted in the Amhara and Oromia regional states (0.72 and 0.33 
hectares, respectively) compared to the Tigray and SNNP regional states (0.09 and 
0.16 hectares, respectively). From Table 2.5 it is evident that sample households from 
the Amhara and Oromia regional states had relatively higher averages allocated per 
adult land holdings and higher participation rates in land-renting transactions. This 
may suggest that given policy restrictions on the amount of land to be rented out, 
relative to other regions, sample households with higher average land labour ratio 





Table 2.5: Land rental market participation by tenancy type 
and region (1994-2009)  
  1994  1999  2004  2009  
Tigray  region   
Rented- in (% households)  3.3  2.0  6.1  10.1  
Rented-out (% households)  12.0  16.7  8.8  14.7  
Cash rental (% of rents)  0.0  6.9  4.5  5.6  
Area rented in(hectares)  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.03  
Area rented out(hectares)  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.05  
Per capita land size  0.14  0.14  0.18  0.17  
Total households  150  150  148  148  
Amhara region  
Rented- in (% households)  32.7  37.3  39.2  42.3  
Rented-out (% households)  22.6  29.0  26.8  33.2  
Cash rental (% of rents)  4.9  15.2  13.0  17.5  
Area rented in(hectares)  0.34  0.34  0.34  0.43  
Area rented out(hectares)  0.24  0.27  0.23  0.29  
Per capita land size  0.83  0.57  0.58  0.6  
Total households  480  466  426  418  
Oromia region   
Rented- in (% households)  14.1  14.9  13.8  12.2  
Rented-out (% households)  10.4  23.2  20.7  27.4  
Cash rental (% of rents)  21.6  55.6  55.4  49.7  
Area rented in(hectares)  0.11  0.14  0.12  0.1  
Area rented out(hectares)  0.07  0.18  0.2  0.23  
Per capita land size  0.47  0.46  0.61  0.63  
Total households  405  396  363  371  
SNNP  
Rented- in (% households)  17.6  14.8  11.0  12.7  
Rented-out (% households)  5.2  13.0  11.7  15.3  
Cash rental (% of rents)  10.78  26.98  24.47  21.01  
Area rented in(hectares)  0.09  0.06  0.04  0.08  
Area rented out(hectares)  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.08  
Per capita land size  0.18  0.17  0.34  0.28  
Total households  442  440  426  418  
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: Per capita land size indicates 
land holdings excluding land obtained through land rental marks. Cash rental indicates 
the percentage of households transacted in the land rental markets using cash rental (both 






Overall, parcel and regional leve1 analysis of land rental market participations 
suggests that the link between land-renting transactions and land title ownership is 
limited in rural Ethiopia. The analysis in this section may suggest that, due to the 
existing nature of land rental transactions in rural Ethiopia, lack of titling may not be 
a major problem for participation in land rental markets. This result is consistent with 
Segers et al. (2010)’s findings that farmers’ participation in land rental markets was 
not influenced by titling or perceived tenure insecurity in the Tigray region of 
Ethiopia.  
However, some of the studies that found positive impacts of titling (for example 
Holden et al., 2011) argue that land title ownership increased tenure security of 
landlords, which increased participation in land rental markets. This claim suggests 
that landlords (without land title) fear land grab by potential tenants. It is necessary to 
point out though this claim is merely proposed but not justified. Data from three 
rounds of the ERHS (1999, 2004, and 2009) show that none of the households in the 
sample had reported that they had lost land in the past or expected land loss in the 
future due to land grab by tenants (potential tenants). Instead, land redistribution by 
the government was reported as the main reason for actual or expected land losses 
reported in the sample area. This suggests that the mere allocation of land titling is 
unlikely to lead to the emergency of well-functioning land rental markets in rural 






 2.6. The Structure of Credit and Input Markets in rural Ethiopia  
 
In this section, I examine the functioning of credit and input markets in rural Ethiopia. 
It is recognised that improved access to working capital plays a significant role in a 
farmer’s production decisions (Eswaran & Kotwal, 1986). In this regard, the 
dominant advantage of titling is that it reduces transaction costs in credit markets as it 
allows lenders to verify ownership of collateral (usually land) with lower cost. The 
demand for credit and collateral availability in turn is expected to improve the 
development of rural credit markets. Thus, in the absence of other constraints of the 
operation of financial markets, access to land title is expected to increase access to 
more credit (Feder & Nishio, 1999; Deininger & Feder, 2009).   
It is necessary to note that in Ethiopia, provision of land titling does not provide 
benefits, which are linked to credit markets. This is because farmers are not allowed 
to mortgage or use their land as collateral in credit markets even if they have land 
title14. This suggests that a meaningful development in rural financial markets in 
Ethiopia is not expected in the near future. The existing financial markets in rural 
areas are poorly developed with the informal and semi-formal sectors still playing 
significant roles in providing credit to rural households (Table 2.6). For example, the 
informal and semi-formal sectors provided 90.8% and 66.9% of the total loans taken 
by farmers in 1999 and 2009, respectively.15  
                                                 
14 However, investors are allowed to use land as collateral in credit markets.  
15 Farmers were asked if any member of their household had taken a loan amount of at least 20 







Table 2.6: Changes in rural credit markets in rural Ethiopia (1994-2009)  
Category  1994  1999  2004  2009  
Households take loans (% )  46.99  52.2  54.45  62.69  
Loan Source  









Friend and relative   *  65.76  63.79  68.65  
Moneylender   *  17.01  9.99  9.56  
Equb and Eddir  *  14.4  25.04  20.28  
Other**  *  2.83  1.19  1.52  
Formal(Micro-finance, banks and  
NGOs\ local government bureaus)  *  9.17  32.29  33.02  
Reasons for taking Loans For 
production purpose  33.6  25.41  46.76  38.41  
For consumption purpose  66.4  74.59  53.24  61.59  
Total number of loans  862  971  991  1,281  
Total sample households  1477  1452  1372  1358  
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.   
Note: * indicates information is not available. ** no list is provided here. The 
figures for friends and relative, Money lender, Equb and Eddir, and other are as a 
percentage of informal and semiformal loans.  
  
Amongst the informal and semi-formal providers, mutual help amongst friends and 
relatives provided more than 60% of the total loans. Other sources such as Equb 
(rotating saving) and Eddir (informal funeral insurances services) provided 25% and 
20% of the loans in 2004 and 2009, respectively. However, there was an increase in 
access to formal sector loans. The significant increase in the formal sector loan access 
from 9.2% in 1999 to 33.0% in 2009 comes from an increase of loans provided by 
rural microfinance services, NGOs, and local government bureaus. This is consistent 
with government programmes in microfinance since 1995.   
The data also show that loans for covering consumption expenditures such as food, 




during the study period. This indicates that households in Ethiopia mainly use 
informal credits to overcome temporary shortfalls in consumption expenditures rather 
than to finance investment projects. In addition, the data show that the percentage of 
households that had taken out loans for production purposes increased with land size 
(Table 2.7). For example, the percentage of households that participated in credit 
markets for production purposes was at least two times higher for households with 
land holding size of greater than three hectares compared to those households with 
land holding size of 0.5 hectares or less, except in 1999.  
Table 2.7: Percentage of households taken loans for production 
by land size (1994-2009)  
Land holding size  
(in hectares)  1994  1999  2004  2009  
<= 0.5   14.16  9.87  23.24  19.65  
> 0.5 and <= 1  13.13  18.61  18.55  22.35  
>1 and <=3   19.76  18.74  29.40  31.37  
>3   22.03  8.80  47.95  48.06  
Total (%)  17.47  15.01  28.50  29.75  
Total households  1477  1452  1372  1358  
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.  
These results may suggest that land-poor households may be rationed out from the 
credit markets due to their perceived low re-payment potentials. Furthermore, formal 
credits, which were taken mainly for production purposes usually included interest 
payments that could be too high for poor farmers to afford. For example, Table 2.8 
shows that 42.7% of the loans from the informal and semi-formal sectors included 
interest payments, while the figure was 84.3% for loans from the formal sectors.16 
Similarly, while 26.0% of the loans from the informal and semi-formal sectors 
required provision of some guarantor, the figure was 47.1% for formal sector loans. 
                                                 
16 Information regarding interest rate and collateral requirements was collected only in the 




However, among informal loans, 88.6% of the loans from local moneylenders 
included interest payments and 46.5% required provision of some guarantor. In 
general, these figures suggest that relative to poor farmers, better-off farmers in terms 
of land holdings are more likely to get loans for production purposes.   
Table 2.8: Interest payment and collateral requirements (1999)  
Loan Sources  







Informal and semi-formal 
loans (% loans)  
42.74 12.9 26.04 
Friends and relatives  26.13 11.56 17.51 
Moneylender  88.67 17.24 46.53 
Equb and Eddir 57.94 12.6 40 
Other 72 20 33.33 
Formal loans(% loans)  84.27 17.44 47.13 
Total number of loans  966 963 966 
Total (% of loans)  46.58 13.31 27.97 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.   
 
In addition to rural credit markets, private sector development was also very limited 
in input markets. As a result, farmers had to rely on government or other NGOs and 
local organisations to get access to fertiliser and other improved farm inputs. For 
instance, data from the 1999 survey year show that farmers who used fertiliser and 
improved seeds reported that close to 75% of the fertiliser and 80% of the improved 
seed they had purchased were provided by government related organisations (Table 
2.9). Moreover, more than 60% of the sample households reported that market 
competition between the existing input suppliers was low or did not exist. This 




input markets. This is demonstrated by the fact that as close to 67% of the sample 
households reported high input prices as a major problem they faced in input markets.  
Table 2.9: Markets for improved farm inputs (1999) 
  Input types 
    Chemical fertiliser 
Improved 
seeds Chemicals All inputs 
Households supplied by (%) 
PAs 
 
41.5 22.5 19.5 31.8 
MOA nurses* 33.3 57.4 28.1 36.0 
Other sources 25.2 20.1 52.5 32.3 
Reported level of market competition among input suppliers 
 (% of households) 
High 
 
16.4 5.9 15 14.2 
Average 
 
18.8 18.5 19.4 18.9 
Low 
 
23.1 25.1 27.7 24.8 
None 
 
41.7 50.5 37.9 42.2 
Major problems in input markets (% of households reported) 
No problem  5.3 14.3 2.3 5.3 
High price 67.5 42.9 67.4 67.4 
Late arrival 9.6 14.3 7.0 9.5 
Lack of credit 8.5 0.0 14.0 8.7 
Other  reasons 9.1 28.6 9.3 9.2 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.  
Note: * MOA (Ministry of Agriculture). 
 
In summary, the analysis in this section shows that input and credit markets are 
poorly developed in rural Ethiopia. The incentive to invest on one’s farm requires 
well-functioning input, credit, and output markets. In the absence of these markets, 
farmers’ response to land titling is expected to be very limited (Barrows & Roth, 
1990; Feder & Nishio, 1999). Additionally, in the absence of formal credit access and 
private sector development in the input markets, farmers were forced to rely heavily 
on local officials to get credit and improved farm inputs. Such heavy reliance on local 
officials for access to credit and improved farm inputs may add to the insecurity of 




 2.7. Conclusion   
This chapter examine whether the preconditions for positive economic impacts of 
land titling are satisfied or not in the case of Ethiopia. A review of the details 
concerning land reform indicates that land title ownership in Ethiopia does not give 
farmers any more rights other than the rights provided in both the federal and regional 
legislation. All land is under state ownership and farmers have only usufruct rights. 
There are also legal restrictions that limit farmers’ transactions in land rental markets. 
Despite land titling programmes, land expropriation by government officials and 
uncertainty about future land polices were major sources of tenure insecurity in 
Ethiopia. In addition, the land law prohibits both land transfer through sale and the 
use of land as collateral. This suggests that provision of land titling in Ethiopia does 
not provide benefits that are linked to credit access.   
Analyses of land rental transactions from four regions of the country show that in 
1999, participation in land rental markets increased in all regions considered in this 
study, while it declined in all regions in 2004. This pattern is not in line with the 
timing of the land titling process in Ethiopia, which started only in 1998 in Tigray 
followed by Amhara region in 2003. In contrast, the increase in land renting out in 
1999 is consistent with the change in land policy in 1995 that officially allows farm 
households to rent out their land, while the decline in 2004 may be related to the 
recurrence of drought in the 2002/2003 production year. Additionally, land rental 
transactions in Ethiopia were mainly between relatives, neighbours or friends. Given 
this type of land rental transactions, the role of land titling in reducing asymmetric 




The study also demonstrated that existing input, credit, and land rental markets are 
poorly developed in rural Ethiopia. This means that under the prevailing condition, 
land titling is expected to play a highly muted role in improving access to credit, 
investment, and participation in land rental markets in rural Ethiopia. Thus, policies 
that encourage private sector development, in both input and credit markets, and 
improve the functioning of rural factor markets may be more important if real change 
in poverty reduction is to be seen.   
The rationale for land tilting is based on the perception that insecure tenure conditions 
are a primary impediment to prompt land-related investments and efficient land 
transfer in rural Ethiopia. Thus, it is important to examine to what extent farmers’ 
perception of tenure insecurity affects their land-related investment decisions and 
transaction in land rental markets. In the next two chapters, I will further examine 
empirically if tenure insecurity can play any role in explaining the variations in land-


















CHAPTER 3: DOES TENURE INSECURITY EXPLAIN THE VARIATIONS IN 
LAND-RELATED INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN RURAL ETHIOPIA?  
3.1. Introduction   
The analysis in the previous Chapter show that the prerequisites for economic 
effectiveness of land titling were not satisfied in the context of Ethiopia. However, 
there are also studies that have documented significant and positive impacts of land 
titling on, investment, productivity, and land rental market participations in the case 
of Ethiopia (Deininger, et al., 2011; Holden, et al., 2009, 2011). These findings 
depend on the presumption that tenure insecurity is among the major binding 
constraints to households’ investment and land rental market participation decisions 
in rural Ethiopia.   
However, existing studies of the relationship between tenure insecurity and 
investment incentives in Ethiopia reported mixed results. There are studies that 
documented a significant relationship between tenure insecurity and investment (Ali, 
et al., 2011; Deininger & Jin, 2006; Gebremedhin & Swinton, 2003; Mekonnen, 
2009). In contrast, other studies found no significant impacts of tenure insecurity on 
farmers’ investment decisions in rural Ethiopia (Gavin & Ehui, 1999; Hagos & 
Holden, 2006; Holden & Yohannes, 2002; Pender & Fafchamps, 2005).   
Furthermore, some of the studies that have reported a significant impact of tenure 
insecurity on investment have documented conflicting results on how tenure 
insecurity affects investment decisions in rural Ethiopia. For example, Mekonnen 
(2009) found that tenure insecurity measured as a perception of losing land in the 
future, had increased the likelihood that farmers grow Eucalyptus trees, while the 




in the study by Deininger and Jin (2006). Hence, it is open to question as to whether 
lack of tenure security or perhaps other and more binding issues are the main 
constraints to land-related investments in rural Ethiopia.   
In other parts of Africa, the debate on the impact of secure land rights on land-related 
investment has also continued with no consensus although there is empirical evidence 
that supports both sides of the debate (Arnot, et al., 2011; Brasselle, et al., 2002; 
Fenske, 2011). Such empirical uncertainty suggests that the relationship between the 
degree of tenure security and farmers’ investment decisions need further scrutiny. 
With this purpose in mind, this chapter is set out to ascertain whether there is a link 
between tenure insecurity and farmers’ land-related investment decisions in rural 
Ethiopia.  
The study contributes to the existing literature on land tenure and investment issues in 
the following ways. First, unlike many of the studies which relied on small samples 
and/or cross-sectional data with limited geographical representativeness, this study 
uses a panel data set covering four regions of the country17. This allows us to control 
for unobserved time-invariant household heterogeneity. Unobserved household 
heterogeneity such as farming ability, the farmer’s attitude towards risk, and time 
preferences are expected to affect farmers’ decisions in land-related investments.   
While Deininger and Jin (2006) use a large cross-sectional data set covering seven 
regions of the country18, they do not have panel data and they do not control for 
                                                 
17 The regions included are Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regional states. The four 
regions are the largest regions from the nine regional states of the country, where 85% of 
the population lives (CSA, 2012).  
18 The seven regions include: Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and SNNP, Benshangul-Gumz, Afar, 




regional variations in their analysis. In the case of Ethiopia, land redistribution 
experiences and land-related investments (for example soil conservation practices) 
systematically vary across different regions (villages) indicating the importance of 
controlling for regional variation. As a result, their result may suffer from omitted 
variables bias. Second, the study augments the econometrics analysis with additional 
evidence based on analysis of farmers’ perceptions of factors affecting their 
investment decisions. Such an analysis can help to identify, directly, households’ 
major investment constraints as identified by the farmers themselves. These efforts 
also help to check the robustness of our econometrics results.   
Third, recent studies suggest that access to extension services and learning from 
others (social learning), has significant impact on the decision to adopt new 
technologies among rural farmers (Conley & Udry, 2010; Krishnan & Patnam, 2014). 
For example, the study by Krishnan and Patnam (2014) suggests that visits by 
extension officers and neighbours’ decisions to adopt a new technology (i.e. improved 
seeds and fertiliser) raise the probability of one’s own decisions to adopt a new 
technology. This suggests the importance to account for such factors in our analysis. 
Therefore, I analysed the impacts of access to extension services and informal social 
networks (for example labour-sharing arrangements) together with perceived tenure 
insecurity on farmers’ land-related investments.   
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides a review of the literature on 
land tenure and investment issues. Section 3.3 discusses the theoretical model. A data 
description and descriptive statistics are presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 deals 
with estimation strategies used in the analysis. Section 3.6 discusses the results. 




3.2. Literature Review: Theory and Empirical Evidence   
According to the discussion in Chapter 2, security assurance, collateralisation, and 
benefit from trade are the three main channels through which secure property rights 
are expected to affect investment positively (Besley, 1995; Besley & Ghatak, 2010; 
Demsetz, 1967; Feder & Onchan, 1987). Hence, it is believed that improvement in 
tenure security leads to increased investment and efficient allocation of resources. 
Although the theory is clear about why secure land rights are expected to enhance 
investment incentives, the empirical evidence linking land tenure security and  
investment is less clear, especially in Africa (Arnot et al., 2011; Brasselle et al., 2002; 
Fenske, 2011; Place, 2009).   
Some studies showed that greater security of tenure was associated with more land 
related investments (for example Ali et al., 2011; Deininger & Jin, 2006; Deininger et 
al., 2011; Gebremedhin &  Swinton, 2003), while others  found no significant 
relationship between insecurity of land tenure and investment decisions (Hagos &  
Holden, 2006; Holden & Yohannes, 2002; Pender & Fafchamps, 2005; Place & 
Otsuka, 2002). Further, some studies reported mixed results (Besley, 1995; Place & 
Hazell, 1993). For example, looking at two regions in Ghana (Wassa and Anloga), 
Besley (1995) showed that tenure security had a positive impact in only one of the 
regions that he studied (Wassa). A similar study by Place and Hazell (1993), using 
data from Kenya, Ghana and Rwanda, found a significant impact of tenure security on 
investment, only in Rwanda.   
Research in Sub-Saharan Africa also found evidence of reverse causality. There are a 
number of studies that suggest that insecurity of land tenure might lead to more 




al., 2002; Deininger & Jin, 2006; Holden et al., 2009; Mekonnen, 2009; Sjaastad & 
Bromley, 1997).  For example, the study by Mekonnen, (2009) showed that the 
perceived risk of land expropriation was associated with more likelihood of tree- 
growing in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. Similarly, Deininger and Jin (2006) found 
that past redistribution experiences at village level encouraged tree-planting in rural 
Ethiopia. Deininger and Jin (2006) argued that tree growing plays a significant role as 
a means to enhance security of tenure in addition to its productivity enhancing and 
other roles.  
Despite the substantial number of studies of secure property rights and investment 
incentives, research on the relationship between tenure insecurity and land-related 
investment incentives has not yet reached a definitive consensus on whether the 
existing poor farm-related investments in Africa can be explained by the lack of 
tenure security or other more binding factors. A number of potential reasons are 
proposed for such mixed findings in the literature. Among other factors, some of the 
main problems mentioned include: lack of clarity in the definition of tenure security, 
variations in the use of different aspects of tenure to quantify tenure security, 
endogeneity of tenure security and investment decisions, measurement error, and 
omitted variable bias (Aront et al., 2011:308; Fenske, 2011). Because of these, even 
the studies that reported a significant impact of tenure insecurity on investment have 
documented conflicting results on how tenure insecurity affects investment decisions.   
For example, some of the studies in Ethiopia found that the perception of the 
possibility of losing land in the future (measured at household level) was not a 
significant factor in the decision to grow perennials (Ali et al., 2011; Holden & 




likelihood of tree planting in another study by Mekonnen (2009). In another study, 
Deininger and Jin (2006) showed that past redistribution experiences at woreda 
(village) level increased the likelihood of tree growing, while past land redistribution 
experiences at household level had no impact on tree growing. The perception, at 
household level, of possible future land redistribution had decreased the likelihood of 
growing trees by the same households.   
Likewise, studies that used transfer rights as an indicator of tenure security reported 
mixed results. For example, Deininger and Jin (2006) reported that at household level, 
a perceived right to mortgage land significantly increased the likelihood of tree 
planting (all types of trees) and increased the likelihood of applying soil conservation 
practices, while the perceived right to sell land had affected only soil conservation. 
However, Ali et al. (2011) showed that perceived transfer rights (not specified)19 at 
plot level affected investment decisions positively in coffee and chat crops but had no 
significant impact on the decision to grow Eucalyptus trees. Further, Holden et al. 
(2009) documented that land title ownership (as a measure of tenure security) had a 
weak impact on soil conservation practices, while Deininger et al. (2011) found that it 
had significantly increased the propensity to invest in soil and water conservation. 
These studies reported conflicting results, although they have used similar indicators 
for tenure insecurity and investment variables.   
Furthermore, estimation problems such as measurement error or omitted variable bias 
might also explain the observed mixed results. For example, Deininger and Jin (2006) 
                                                 
19 For each plot cultivated by the household, household members were asked whether anyone 
in the household had a right to transfer the plot to other family members. However, from the 
questionnaire, it is not clear whether the transfer right variable indicates the right to sell, 




did not control for regional variations in their study that covered seven regions of the 
country. In addition, unlike the other studies, Deininger and Jin (2006) made no 
distinction between households who expected to lose land and households who 
expected to gain land through land redistribution when measuring tenure insecurity.   
The study by Ali et al. (2011) has not specified which aspect of the transfer right they 
actually measured. For example, does their term ‘transfer right’ refer to the right to 
sell or mortgage, the right to rent out, or give it as a gift, or any combination of these? 
In addition, the question was asked in respect of all plots that a farmer cultivated 
including plots that were sharecropped or rented from other households. Therefore, it 
is not clear from the outset why one could reasonably expect a farmer who 
sharecropped someone else’s land to have a right to transfer the plot. Such ambiguity 
can lead to serious measurement errors and misleading results.  
Furthermore, in some of the studies, temporal ordering was violated when measuring 
tenure insecurity and investment variables. For example, in the studies by Mekonnen 
(2009) and Ali et al. (2011) the investment variables indicated investments that took 
place just before each survey was conducted. In contrast, the tenure insecurity 
variables indicated perceptions of expropriation of land in the five-year period after 
the surveys were conducted (future perceptions). In such cases, it is difficult to assert 
that the results indicate causality rather than a mere statistical correlation.   
Overall, the available evidence on the relationship between land tenure insecurity and 
investment is far from conclusive in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa. Therefore, 
further empirical investigation is needed in order to understand better the potential 




decisions in rural areas. Against this background, this study tries to examine the 
relationship between insecurity of tenure and farmers’ investment decisions in rural 
Ethiopia. In doing so, I tried to overcome some of the observed shortcomings 
mentioned in the existing literature.   
3.3. Theoretical Model   
According to the discussion in the previous section, security assurance, 
collateralisation, and benefit from trade are the three main channels through which 
secure property rights are expected to influence investment positively. However, it is 
difficult to separate the impact of these channels in empirical analysis. In the context 
of Ethiopia, it is mainly the assurance aspect of tenure security that is important 
because farmers are not allowed to sell or use their land as collateral in credit markets 
even if they have land titling. This makes it possible to test the ‘assurance effect’ in 
isolation from the other effects. 
The theoretical framework used for this study is based on a simple model developed 
by Besley (1995) to explain how land rights could enhance investment incentives. 
Following Besley (1995), consider a farm household deciding at each period  how 
much capital, denoted by , to invest in land. The returns function for time   is 
given by V ( , ), and depends on property rights at period  denoted by . 
It is assumed that the return function, V ( , ) is increasing in both arguments and 
concave in . The cost of the investment is denoted by C ( , ), which is 
t
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assumed to be increasing in  and non-increasing in .20 The optimal investment 
choice thus satisfies: 
 
   [1] 
where  indicates net returns. From equation 1 we obtain: 
 
     [2] 
Because  at a maximum, equation [2] implies that investment increases as 
rights are improved, provided that .  Based on the security argument, let us 
assume that in the period  there is a finite probability that a household will have 
its land expropriated and that this probability is a decreasing function of the rights that 
the household enjoys. The probability of expropriation function is given by 
 ( ), where . 
The expected return on investment is , where the 
physical return on the investment is , and it is assumed that the farmer keeps 
none of the return after an expropriation. By differentiating the returns function with 
respect to capital first and then with respect to property rights, we obtain. 
  = - '( ) F’ ( ) > 0     [3] 
                                                 
20  The return on investment increases with more tenure security. The return on investment also 
increases with the amount of capital used for the investment; however, with a decreasing rate. And 
investment cost increases as farmers use more capital to invest, but it does not necessarily increase as 
the degree of tenure insecurity increases (investment costs are independent of tenure security).  
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Further, under the assumption that costs are independent of , the result implies 
that, . The approach models insecurity in property rights in a very similar way 
to a random tax on land and it is suggested that this view is most relevant “for 
situations in which the rule of law has broken down and individuals are able to 
appropriate others' assets or else that the state seizes individuals' property after a 
revolution” (Besley, 1995, p.908). This assumption is a bit extreme, but it serves as a 
simple benchmark to represent how governments’ land expropriation policy affects 
investment incentives. 
In the context of Ethiopia, the discussion in section 2.4 (Chapter 2) indicates that land 
appropriation by individuals was not a serious problem but the government has 
ultimate power to expropriate land from farmers whenever it is necessary to do so. 
However, some writers argued that government expropriation of land should not 
necessarily be associated with tenure insecurity as long as there is an institutional 
setting that guarantees fair compensation (Sjaastad & Bromley, 2000). In the context 
of Ethiopia, however, redistributions to date have generally taken place without fair 
compensation (Ambaye, 2013; Holden & Yohannes, 2002; Rahmato, 2009). In 
particular, as land belongs to the state, farmers had not been compensated for the 
lands they lost during land redistribution and in events when farmers were displaced 
from their land, often they receive land which of poor quality (Rahmato, 2009).  
In addition, if we assume land rights are exogenously given the return function can be 
written as V ( , ), in which case the decision to invest during one period does not 








   [4] 
In this model, we can assume that land rights are exogenously determined. This 
means we do not expect reverse causality in estimating the relationship between 
tenure insecurity and investment decisions.  Therefore, tenure insecurity is expected 
to have a negative impact on land-related investment decisions. In the context of 
Ethiopia, this is a plausible assumption because land-related investments such as tree 
planting do not prevent the government from practising land redistributions or 
expropriations. Some previous evidence suggests that land loss due to redistribution 
could happen even though households planted trees on their land, and in some cases 
without fair compensation (Ambaye, 2013; Holden & Yohannes, 2002; Rahmato, 
2009). As a result, farmers might not expect that they can change their tenure status 
by growing trees.  
3.4. Measurement Issues and Descriptive Statistics  
In this section, I first discuss the variables used to indicate tenure insecurity and the 
type of investments considered in the analysis. Then, I provide descriptive evidence 
on the factors that affect farmers’ land-related investment decisions in rural Ethiopia.   
3.4.1. Indicators of Insecurity of Tenure  
Although there is no significant variation in de jure land rights in Ethiopia, there have 
been a number of government-sponsored land redistribution experiences in the past 
with significant regional variations (see Table 2.2 in Chapter 2). As a result, the 
perception of land security can vary among households, mainly due to past land 
redistribution experiences and expectations about potential land redistributions in the 
future. For this reason, in this study, insecurity of tenure is defined in terms of the 
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households’ perceptions of the probability of losing land in the future due to potential 
land redistribution. In addition, issues relating to insecurity of tenure such as 
perceived transfer rights and past redistribution experiences were also included in the 
analysis in order to compare results from other studies that have used these variables 
as tenure security indicators (for example Ali et al., 2011; Deininger & Jin, 2006).   
Thus, three variables are used to measure security of tenure in this study. The first is 
whether a household expected, within the next five years, a reduction in land size due 
to government sponsored land redistribution. The second variable indicates whether 
or not a household actually lost land as a result of government sponsored land 
redistribution in the past; that is, before 1999. The third variable indicates whether a 
household has transfer rights on its plots. In the dataset, information on the perceived 
risk of expropriation and past land redistribution experiences were collected at 
household level, while transfer rights were measured at plot level.  
Table 2.2 (in Chapter 2) shows that  33.5%  of the sample households reported that 
they had lost land due to land reforms before 1994, and this mainly reflects the land 
reforms that took place in 1975. Reported land losses because of land reform were 
only 9.8% during the period 1983-1994; however, there were significant regional 
variations. During the same period, land losses as a result of redistribution were 
reported by 21% and 17% of the sample households in Tigray and Amhara regional 
states, respectively, while the figure was only 1.1%  in SNNP and 6.3%  in the 
Oromia regional states. Similarly, in 1994-1999, 22.7% of the sample households in 
the Amhara regional state reported land losses because of land redistribution, while 




the fact that there were major land redistributions between the period 1983 and 1999, 
mainly in the Tigray and Amhara regional states.   
Information on future land redistribution expectations, which is the main variable of 
interest in this study, was collected only in the 1999 and 2004 survey rounds. In the 
1999 survey round, 20% of the sample households reported that they expected land 
redistributions (both gain and loss) in the next five years (during 1999-2004); 11.5% 
of the sample households expected land loss because of redistributions. It is clear 
from Table 2.2 that the farmers’ fear of losing land because of land redistribution 
declined significantly over time. This might be related to the fact that the actual 
experience of losing land because of land reform had significantly declined in most 
regions. However, this might not be the case in all regions. For instance, since 1997, 
land redistribution has been banned in the Tigray regional state and the actual 
redistribution experience was zero after 1997. However, the number of households 
who reported fear of losing land as a result of land redistribution decreased only by 
16%   between 1999 and 2009, while in the same period the figure decreased  by 56%  
in the Amhara region, where there were some redistribution experiences after 1997.   
Table 3.1 provides information on the mode of plot acquisition and plot level transfer 
rights in the 2004 and 2009 survey rounds21. During both periods, large numbers of 
plots were either Peasant Association (PA) allocated or inherited. For instance, in the 
2009 survey round, 61%, and 27% of the plots were acquired via PA allocation and 
inheritance, respectively. During the same time 89.5%  of PA allocated plots and 
83.6%  of inherited plots were reported  had transfer rights, while the figures were 
                                                 
21 Although information on plot level transfer rights was collected during the 1999 survey 
round the plot level data has too many missing observations. For this reason I cannot use it in 




only 74.5%  and 57.1%, respectively in 2004. In addition, average duration of 
ownership by a single owner for plots acquired via PA allocation, inheritance and 
purchase was more than 20 years. However, the average duration and the percentage 
of plots with transfer rights were systematically lower for plots that were leased from 
other households. The percentage of plots with transfer rights was only 4.9% for 
leased-in plots (using chase rental) and 7.8% for sharecropped-in plots in 2004, while 
the figure was only 2.7% and 1.2% in 2009.   
From Table 3.1 it is clear that there is a significant change in the perception of 
transfer rights between 2004 and 2009 even for PA-allocated plots. Ali et al. (2011) 
also reported similar large changes in plot level transfer rights. However, it is 
puzzling why this is the case because there were no major policy changes concerning 
transfer rights in Ethiopia since 1995 (these rights include sell, mortgage and lease 
rights). Measurement error could be one potential explanation. The transfer right 
variable measures the extent to which a head of a household perceives that a plot can 
be transferred to someone else (Ali et al., 2011). For example, in the 2004 and 2009 
survey rounds, the question was: “Does anyone in the household have the right to 
transfer this land to someone else?” However, it is not clear from the questionnaire 
which aspects of the transfer right were measured in each round. For example, was 
reference being made to the right to sell or mortgage, the right to rent out or to give it 
as a gift to someone else, or any combination of these?   
In addition, the question was posed in respect of all the plots that a farmer had 
cultivated, including plots that were sharecropped or rented-in from other households. 
In such cases, it is not clear whether the researcher was expecting the farmer to 




farmer. This is an important issue because it is possible that the respondent might not 
have understood the question properly and therefore gave misleading information 
regarding the transfer right on rented-in plots.  
For instance, in the 1999 survey round, households were asked whether or not they 
could transfer plots they had cultivated to other family members.22 Those respondents 
who reported “yes” were then asked who in the household has the right to transfer the 
plots.23  Among households who reported that they had transfer rights for plots which 
they had leased from others, 44% responded that the original land owner had the right 
to transfer the plots. This is clearly inconsistent with the following question posed to 
them: “Does anyone in the household have the right to give away this land to other 
family members?” This indicates either that they were answering the question on 
behalf of the landlord or they did not understand the question properly. This implies 
that based on the way the question posed by the interviewer we can get different 






                                                 
22 The question on plot-level transfer rights in both the 1997 and 1999 survey rounds was as follows: 
“Does anyone in the household have the right to give away this land to other family members?”  
23 In the 1999 survey round there was a follow-up question asking households: “Who in the household 
has a right to transfer each plot cultivated”. However, this question was removed in the 2004 and 2009 




































   
 
   
From PAs 74.5 17.8  3 604  
 
89.5 23 4 002 
Purchased 52 24 173 
 
73.1 26 167 
Inherited 57.1 25.1 1 710 
 
83.6 23.8 1 776 
Mortgageda 35.7 4.5 14 
 
66.7 13 3 
Cash rental 4.9 4.2 143 
 
2.7 4.1 148 
Sharecropped-in 7.8 5.1 397 
 
1.2 5.5 435 
Borrowed free 33.3 22.1 36 
 
0.0 7.4 12 
Others  30.8 17.2 13   0.0 * 1 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS, 2004 and 2009. 
Note: a  Mortgaged refers to informal form of mortgage between farmers. * indicates information is 
not available. Farmers asked the following question for each plot they cultivate: Does anyone in the 
house have the right to transfer the plot? 
 
In this study, I attempted to determine whether a given household reported different 
transfer rights for the various plots that they had cultivated in a given survey round. 
Table 3.2 shows that 84.1% of the households in 2004 and 78.9% in 2009 reported no 
variations in transfer rights for the different plots they had cultivated. In the same 
period, 14% of the households in 2004 and 19.3% in 2009 were reported within 
household variations in transfer rights because those households had at least one plot 
they had leased (including sharecropping) from others. This finding suggests that the 
source of within-household variations in transfer rights is mainly because of the 
existence of rented-in plots in a household. Often households did not have the right to 
transfer such plots (rented plots). For this reason, this study uses a variable that 
indicates transfer rights at household level, while excluding plots that were leased in 




presence of leased plots in a household(which were  <2% ), a household is considered 
to have a transfer right if the respondent in that household had reported that at least 
one of the household plots can be transferred24.  
Table 3.2: Transfer rights and within household variations in plot transfer 
rights(2004 and 2009) 
Plot transfer rights  2004   2009 
Percentage of households that reported   
   
No within household variations in plot transfer rights 84.1 
 
78.9 
Within household variation in plot transfer rights due 
to the presence of leased-in plots 14.0 
 
19.3 
Within household variations in plot transfer rights for 
reasons not related with leased-in plots  1.9 
 
1.8 
Household level transfer rights excluding leased-in plots 
   Households with transfer rights at least for one plot 
(%) 71.7  88.1 
Total sample households  1360  1355 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
 
The variable indicating household level plot transfer rights indicates that 71.7% of the 
households in 2004 and 88.1% of them in 2009 reported that they had transfer rights. 
Significant change in the perception of transfer rights between 2004 and 2009 
remained high. After excluding plots that were leased-in, we expect this reported 
variation across the two periods indicates the real change in the perception of plot 
transfer rights. However, as the discussion above indicates the ‘transfer right’ variable 
in the questionnaire is not specific therefore it can indicate the right to sell or 
mortgage, the right to rent out, or give it as a gift, or any combination of these. Thus, 
care is required while interpreting the coefficients on the transfer right variable.  
 
                                                 
24 After excluding the leased plots the observed variations in most cases are most likely due to 




Table A.11 in the Appendix shows that the proportion of households that had a 
change in their tenure status between 2004 and 2009 is small in the sample. Among 
the sample households, 10.31% had a change in tenure status regarding their 
perception of losing land due to land redistribution, while the figure is 6.45 % for 
tenure status measured using transfer rights. Looking at household characteristics, 
among households who reported change in transfer rights (reported had transfer rights 
in 2004 but not in 2009) a large proportion are female headed, had on average smaller 
livestock holdings, experienced more land redistributions in 2004, and a large 
proportion of them are located in Oromia and SNNP regional states. Such limited 
intrahousehold variation over time means panel data methods, which rely on changes 
in households’ perception of tenure security, and other household characteristics over 
time can be statistically demanding. For this reason, regression analyses of cross-
sectional and pooled data are used as a robustness check. 
 
3.4.2. Investment Decisions  
Soil degradation is one of the most serious environmental problems in Ethiopia and it 
adversely affects agricultural production and food security (Hurni, 1993; Shiferaw & 
Holden, 1998). Despite the seriousness of the problem, the extent of adaptation of soil 
conservation practices remains low in the country (Gebremedhin, 2004). Tree 
planting and soil conservation practices (mainly stone bund) are considered long-term 
land-related investments in rural Ethiopia. For this reason, participation in soil 
conservation and tree planting activities has been the subject of many studies that 
looked at the potential link between tenure insecurity and land-related investment 
decisions in rural Ethiopia. Following the literature, I used tree planting and soil 




Table 3.3 shows that 44.6% and 56.6% of the sample households reported that they 
had practised some kind of soil conservation on their land in 2004 and 2009, 
respectively. However, there are significant regional variations during both years. For 
instance, the data for 2004 show that participation in soil conservation practice was 
very high in Tigray (89.2%), while the figure was only 12% in SNNP.25 Moreover, 
long-term investment in soil conservation (stone bund) was the dominant type of soil 
conservation practice in Tigray (70.3%), while a relatively large number of 
households invested in short-term soil conservation practices (soil bund) in Oromia 
regional state (36.6% ).  
The result is consistent with the fact that soil erosion is a relatively serious problem in 
the highlands of Ethiopia. For this reason, since 1991, soil conservation practices 
have been encouraged by the government and NGOs through mandatory community 
labour, food-for-work projects and provision of extension services in these areas 
(Gebremedhin & Swinton, 2003; Hagos & Holden, 2006).  The results are also in line 
with what was found in village studies. According to these studies, in Harresaw (in 
Tigray), both government extension agents and local NGOs were heavily involved in 
facilitating afforestation works and soil and water conservation practices. For 
instance, after 1991 more than 26,625 eucalyptus seedlings and about 11,000 other 
tree seedlings were grown in the area through food-for-work projects (Bevan & 
Pankhurst, 1996; p. 28). 
Turning to the subject of tree planting, 70% of the sample households had planted 
some tree crops (permanent crops) on their land during the period 1999–2009. 
                                                 
25 Because very similar regional patterns were observed during the 2004 and 2009 survey rounds, I 




However, a significant regional variation in the tree planting practice becomes 
apparent from examining the types of trees planted. The results from the 2004 survey 
round show that planting of fruit trees and cash crops (for example chat and coffee) 
was dominant in the regional states of SNNP (88% ), followed by Oromia (43%), 
while the figure was only 2.7%  in Tigray and 10.7%  in  Amhara. Eucalyptus trees 
were the dominant tree type planted in the sample area. In the 2009 survey round, 
50% of the households reported that they had planted Eucalyptus trees on their plots 
(without time reference), while 26% planted Eucalyptus trees over the past five years 
(during 2004–2009).  
Table 3.3: Percentage of households that practiced land-related investments(2004 and 2009) 
 Investment type Year      Region (in 2004)   
  2004 2009   Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNPR 
        
Grew any tree crops  73.0 74.0  72.5 59.8 66.4 92 
Grew fruits or cash crops  42.6 43.9  2.7 10.7 43.3 88.3 
Grew Eucalyptus   43.8 52  40.9 43.7 36.4 50.2 
Grew Eucalyptus (5 yrs)*  21.3 26.1  27.5 15.1 14.9 29.8 
        
Practice soil conservation  44.6 56.6  89.2 56.8 50.4 12 
Stone bund (terracing) 24.9 32.7  70.3 50.2 3.1 2.4 
Soil bund 14.9 18.1  18.9 4.9 36.6 4.9 
        Total sample  1,358 1,358   150 466 396 440 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
Note:  Cash crops include coffee and “chat” (a stimulant crop).  
** indicates investment within the past five year during each survey round.  
 
3.4.3. Descriptive Evidence on Reasons for Land-related Investment Decisions  
In the 1999 survey round, farmers were asked to provide information on the main 




conservation practices.26 Of those households that reported that they did not grow any 
type of tree crops, 41.6% reported that land shortage was the main constraint; 
however, there were significant regional variations (Table 3.4). The figure was 
significantly higher in Tigray (75%) and SNNP (68%) regional states, while it was 
lower in the Oromia region (19%). The result is consistent with the fact that per capita 
land size is relatively smaller in the Tigray and SNNP regional states (see Table 2.5 in 
chapter 2).   
Other factors, such as water shortage, labour shortage, and lack of funds were 
reported by 17.8%, 13.2%, and 10.4% of the respondents, respectively. A lack of 
security of tenure was reported as a major constraint by only 1.2% of the respondents 
with the figure being higher in Tigray (3.6%) and Amhara (1.9%). This result is 
expected as Tigray and Amhara are the regions where land redistributions were 
widespread during the current regime. Likewise, in the case of households that did not 
practised any soil conservation on their plots, a large number reported absence of 
erosion as a major reason (75.9%), followed by labour shortage (16.2%). None of the 
households in the sample areas reported lack of security of tenure as a reason for not 
practising soil conservation on their land. 27 These results may suggest that farmers’ 
tree planting and soil conservation decisions in rural Ethiopia are mainly determined 
by the cost and availability of resources, not by the incentive structure of the land 
tenure system. 
                                                 
26 The same information was collected in the 2004 and 2009 survey rounds, but it is available 
only for soil conservation practices. However, the reasons provided for not participating in soil 
conservation practices were more or less the same in all three survey rounds: 1999, 2004 and 
2009.   
27 None of the households reported tenure insecurity as a reason, also in the 2004 and 2009 




Table 3.4: Major investment binding constraints by region(1999) 
 
Reasons  Regions   
 
Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNPR Total 
Reasons for not growing trees (% hhs) 
   Land shortage 75 47.6 19.1 68.1 41.6 
Shortage of labour 3.6 16.5 10.5 12.8 13.2 
Lack of fund 7.1 9.7 12.5 8.5 10.4 
Shortage of water 0.0 1.0 49.3 0.0 17.8 
Less profitable 0.0 2.4 3.3 8.5 3.2 
Tenure insecurity 3.6 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.2 
Other reasons  10.7 20.9 5.3 2.1 12.7 
Reasons for not practising soil conservation (% hhs) 
  No erosion 68.2 63.6 74.2 86.6 75.9 
Labour shortage 31.8 27.1 16.3 7.1 16.2 
Other reasons* 0.0 9.3 9.5 6.3 7.9 
Source: Own calculations using data from the 1999 ERHS round. Note: * indicates none of 
the households reported tenure insecurity as a reason. 
 
In addition, during the 1999 survey round, farmers were asked to provide information 
on the main reasons why they were growing tree crops on their land (Table 3.5). 
About 50.5% of the sample households who planted trees reported that they did this 
to provide a source of income, while 23.9% reported that they did this as a source of 
food. None of the sample households reported that they had planted tree crops in 
order to improve their tenure security status. The result is consistent with the 
assumption I made in the theoretical model (section 3.3) that tree planting does not 
prevent the government from practising land redistributions. As a result, farmers 







Table 3.5: Major reasons for growing tree crops (1999)  
Reason for growing tree 
crops    




Source of Income   
Tigray  Amhara  Oromia  SNNPR  Total  
54.5  75.8  50.1  43.9  50.5  
Consumed as food  21.7  4.6  28.9  27.4  23.9  
For own use   19.57  7.12  11.16  9.33  10.16  
Income security  1.06  0.85  3.28  11.09  7.35  
Other reasons*   3.18  11.69  6.57  8.35  8.08  
Source: Own calculations using data from the 1999 ERHS round.   
Note: Of the total of 1452 sample households, 990 had planted some type of trees on 
their land. * indicates mainly for construction material and firewood.   
  
Further, Table 3.6 indicates that participation in soil conservation and tree planting 
exercises were higher for those households who were richer in resources than in 
resource-poor households. For example, compared to those who did not grew trees 
households which participated in tree planting had relatively higher proportion of 
households with access to extension services (46.9% vs 31.5%), educated and male 
headed households, and had more livestock holdings. Similarly, compared to those 
who did not invest in soil conservations household who practiced soil conservations 
on average hade higher proportion of households with access to extension services, 









Table 3.6: Household characteristics by investment decisions (pooled data 2004 and 
2009) 
 
Grow Eucalyptus tree  
Practice soil 
conservation 
Yes No t- test  Yes No t-test  
Lost land during 1983-99a 
(yes=1) 15.1 18.9 *  34.1 11.1 *** 
Expected smaller land  
during 1999-2009b(yes=1) 15.0 17.0  
 
17.3 16.0  
Extension service(yes=1) 46.9 31.5 ***  41.4 33.8 *** 
Labour sharing(yes=1) 44.2 40.5  
 
43.5 40.7  
Male labour  (num) 1.6 1.4 ***  1.4 1.5  
Female labour (num) 1.7 1.5 ***  1.5 1.6  
Head sex(=1 female) 23.9 33.3 ***  31.8 29.9  
Head age(years) 51.9 51.8  
 
53.0 51.4 * 
Head can educated(yes=1) 51.4 38.2 ***  41.0 42.4  
Primary education(yes=1) 37.6 41.2  
 
39.7 40.3 * 
Secondary and above  
education(yes=1) 48.0 29.1  
 
31.4 35.9  
Have a pair of oxen(yes=1) 36.4 33.5  
 
49.5 28.2 *** 
Plot size(hectares) 1.7 1.6  
 
1.6 1.6  
Livestock holdings(real value) 1881 1301 ***   1996 1253 *** 
observations 704 1751 
 
  713 1736 
 
Source: Own Calculations using data from ERHS.  
Notes: ‘a’ indicates lost land due to land redistributions; ‘b’ indicates expected smaller land size due 
to land redistributions in either between 1999 and 2004 or between 2004 and 2009. The education 
variable indicates the maximum level of education in the household. Male and female labour refers to 
the number of working age family members. 
 
Regarding land redistribution experiences, of those households that participated in 
soil conservation practice, 34.1% had lost land because of previous land 
redistributions (during the period 1983-1999). This was significantly higher than the 
corresponding figure of 11.1% for the non-participant households. The result is 
consistent with the fact  that those areas affected by land redistribution in the past (i.e. 
Tigray and Amhara regional states) are also areas where there were large government 
interventions such as public work programmes to encourage farmers to practice soil 




was no significant difference in the perceptions of tenure insecurity (expected smaller 
land during 1999–2009) of participants and non-participants. These results together 
with the observed regional patterns of change in tenure security indicators (Table 2.2) 
may imply that time-varying unobserved regional factors affect both farmers 
perception of tenure security and investment decisions.  
Overall, the descriptive evidence suggests that lack of security of tenure appears to be 
unimportant in farmers’ investment decisions in rural Ethiopia. Instead, factors, such 
as topography (erosion), lack of resources (land and labour), and lack of funds were 
reported as major constraints for not participating in land-related investments in rural 
areas. However, the descriptive analysis cannot control for factors that affect both 
farmers perception of tenure insecurity and decisions to participate in land-related 
investments. Therefore, the next section provides a further econometric analysis 
examining whether or not a lack of tenure security is a significant factor in explaining 
the variations in land-related investment decisions in rural Ethiopia.  
3.5. Estimation Strategies    
The empirical analysis in this section is based on the conceptual model developed in 
section 3.3. One assumption made in that model was that land-related investment does 
not affect tenure security status of farmers in rural Ethiopia, which means I assume 
that there is no reverse causality. The descriptive statistics in the previous section also 
suggest that long-term investment in either tree planting or soil conservation practices 
were not expected to affect the tenure security status of a farmer as none of the 
farmers reported that they were planting trees for improving their tenure security 




on land-related investment decisions, while improvement in transfer rights is expected 
to have a positive impact on such investment decisions.   
The validity of the identification strategy depends on the fact that the tenure 
insecurity variables were measured in the 1999 and 2004 survey rounds; here, the 
main tenure insecurity variable is the one that indicates whether a household had 
expected to lose land due to redistribution during 1999–2004 and 2004–2009. 28 
Investment variables reflect investment decisions made after 1999, at least, for tree- 
growing29. In effect, a household’s decision to invest in the periods 1999–2004 and 
2004–2009 would have taken into consideration the household’s expected tenure 
security status as reported in 1999 and in 2004, respectively.   
However, in measuring transfer rights, the data collected in the 1999 survey round 
could not be relied on as the plot level data have too much missing information. As a 
result, the transfer right variables in 2004 and 2009 indicate transfer rights with 
reference to about one year before each survey was conducted, while the investment 
decisions could be made at any time between 1999 and 2004 or 2004 and 2009. The 
data on past redistribution refer to experiences only before 1999 because the figures 
are too small after that year (1.7% and 1.3% during 1999–2004 and 2004–2009, 
respectively).  
All the dependent variables measured whether or not a farmer invested in a particular 
investment activity. Therefore, in line with the literature, the decision to invest in a 
                                                 
28  In the 1999 survey round, households were asked whether or not they had expected land 
redistributions in the next five years, that is, between 1999 and 2004. A similar question was asked in 
the 2004 survey round, but not in the 2009 survey round.  
29 The information on soil conservation practices did not have any time frame. It could be possible to 
identify whether the household had been practising soil conservation before 2004 by referring to data 
from the 1999 Survey round. However, the plot level data in 1999 are not reliable as there is a large 




particular type of investment was modelled as a binary choice model. Incorporating 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in the model the underlying latent variable 
can be defined as: 
 ]0[1 1  itIititIiit XSI                                 [5]
  
 iit X|1 )1,0(~ Normal   
In [5],  is a dummy variable equal to one if  household i  has undertaken  land-
related investments  at time t (in 1999–2004 and 2004–2009),  indicates the 
expected tenure security status at time t which  is reported at the beginning of time t 
(in 1999 and 2004, except for the transfer right variable), indicates other socio-
economic household characteristics that are expected to affect land-related investment 
decisions at time t,  and  (ignoring the subscript I) are parameters to be estimated, 
 is a random error term, and (ignoring the subscript I) indicates time-invariant 
unobserved household heterogeneity. Unobserved household heterogeneity such as 
farming ability, farmer’s attitude towards risk, and time preferences may also affect 
farmer’s decisions in land-related investments.  
The standard panel data approach to estimating equation (5) is to use either fixed-
effects or random effects estimation techniques. In the case of fixed effects approach 
no assumptions are made about the unobserved time-invariant household 
heterogeneity; therefore  is treated as a nuisance parameter. The fixed effects 
approach allows the unobserved time-invariant factors (for example farming ability) 











consistent estimates of the coefficients of time-varying regressors (for example the 
tenure insecurity variable) in the model. However, the coefficients for time-invariant 
variables are not identified if fixed effects model is used. In addition, Greene (2002) 
showed that with very small T, the fixed effects estimator shows a large finite sample 
bias. This is a relevant issue as I have used a short panel data set. 
The use of a standard random effects technique is also problematic due to the strong 
assumption that the unobserved factors are uncorrelated with all explanatory variables 
in the model. In the case of this study, the assumption that unobserved variables such 
as farming ability and attitude towards risk may be correlated with some of the 
explanatory variables included in the model. In particular, unabsorbed factors like 
attitude towards risk could be correlated with the tenure security measure variables. 
For instance, perception of tenure insecurity could be more prevalent among more 
risk-averse households. Failing to control for such unobserved factors (or factors 
which are not easy to measure) could bias our estimates.   
The alternative approach to the standard random effects probit model was proposed 
by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984). According to this approach the 
unobserved household heterogeneity  can be assumed to be correlated with the 
exogenous variables  for all t in a linear way. This method specifies that the 
unobserved factors (for example farming ability or attitude towards risk) captured by 
 is partially dependent on a function of the other exogenous covariates in the 
model. Thus,  in (5) can be modelled as: 








 ii Xa | ),0(~
2
aNormal   
Where  iX  are time averages of strictly exogenous covariates in the model (5), ia  is a 
new unobserved individual effect, which is simply assumed as identically and 
independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance. After substituting 
equation (6) into equation (5), both the parameters of the model and average partial 
effects can be identified.  
Additionally, the approach allows estimating dynamic models (Wooldridge, 2009).30 
In this case, the model can be extended to estimate whether past investment decisions 
have feedback effects into future investment decisions. This can be done by including 
a variable indicating past investment decisions in equation (5). For such reasons, I 
used both the static and dynamic correlated random effects probit models (CRE) to 
estimate equation (5). Data on the main variable of interest, perception of expected 
land loss due to land redistribution were not collected in the 1994 and 2009 ERHS 
survey rounds. Thus, the static CRE probit model is estimated based on data from the 
last two rounds of the survey (2004 and 2009). However, the dynamic CRE probit 
model used data from 1999, 2004, and 2009 survey rounds. Thus, the model includes 
variables indicating households’ perceived transfer rights and land loss experiences in 
the past as an indicator of tenure security.   
                                                 
30 According to Wooldridge (2009,p.5 ) although the CRE approaches put restrictions on the 
conditional distribution of heterogeneity given the entire history of the covariates which is a 
drawback relative to fixed effects (FE) or conditional maximum likelihood estimation ( 
CMLE) approaches. CRE requires few other assumptions for estimating average partial 





Besides, the tenure insecurity variable, household characteristics such as the gender of 
the head of the household, education, and household asset measures such as livestock 
holdings and plot size, availability of working age male and female family members 
were included in the model. Further, social networks and access to extension services 
were found to be important factors in farmers’ decisions in land-related investments 
(Conley & Udry, 2010; Krishnan & Patnam, 2014). Access to extension services can 
provide farmers with more information on the benefits of land-improvements and 
improves their access to inputs such as fertiliser or seeds.   
Similarly, participation in local labour-sharing arrangements is expected to solve 
labour shortage problems in rural areas. To account for such institutional factors, I 
included a variable indicating whether a household had participated in local labour 
sharing arrangements and whether a household had access to extension services. 
Furthermore, village (woreda) dummies were also included in the estimation model to 
control for the differences in agro-ecological conditions, cropping practices, 
population pressure, access to markers, and prices.  
Endogeneity Issues  
One potential econometric problem that arises when estimating equation (5) is that the 
tenure insecurity variable can be endogenous in the investment equation. Although I 
assumed that there is no reverse causality, measurement error and time varying 
omitted variables (e.g village specific policy changes) can bias the estimate. One 
possible approach to deal with this endogeneity is to find instruments that are 
correlated with the endogenous variable but not with the error term in equation (5). 




However, the choice of the appropriate instruments is difficult to get in the data. 
Furthermore, some studies show that the conventional linear IV method can lead to 
bias in the estimation of a binary endogenous variable on a binary response variable 
(Bhattacharya, Goldman & McCaffrey, 2006; Terza, Bradford & Dismuke, 2008). 
With the presence of both heterogeneity and binary endogenous variables in non-
linear panel data, Wooldridge (2010) suggests the use of a pooled bivariate probit 
model with correlated random effects. This allows us to specify a reduced form 
equation for the perception of tenure security status as follows: 
 ]0[1  itssitisit XS       [7] 
  iits X| )1,0(~ Normal  
The time-constant unobserved factor in equation (7), si , is modelled the same way as 
equation (6). Then, we can write the resulting models as: 
 ]0[1 1  itaIitaIititaIaIit XXSI     [8] 
 ]0[1 2  itasiasitasit XXS     [9] 
In each equation 212 )1()( aitiit a    has a standard normal distribution 
conditional on iX . The subscript “a” in the parameters indicates division by 212 )1( a .In 
this way, we can estimate the scaled coefficients, and we can identify both the 
parameters of the model and average partial effects (Wooldridge, 2010). In this case, 
the error terms in equations 8 and 9 are assumed identically distributed as bivariate 
normal with zero mean, unit variance, and correlation coefficient ( jm ). According to 
Wooldridge (2013), in using this approach we are averaging out both time-invariant 




In addition to tenure security measures, some of the variables such as access to 
extension services and participation in labour-sharing arrangements may also are 
endogenous in the investment model. For instance, access to extension services may 
not be random as extension officers may select farmers with better land management 
practices or large landholdings. Similarly, unobserved factors that increase the 
likelihood of land-related investments can also increase households’ likelihood of 
participation in local labour-sharing arrangements. Thus, a reduced from equations is 
specified for labour sharing participation and access to extension as follows:  
 ]0[1 3  itaeiaeitaeit XXE               [10] 
 ]0[1 4  itaLiaLitaLit XXL               
[11] 
              ititmitj XCov |, = jm  
Where itE  and itL  represent access to extension services and participation in labour 
sharing arrangements respectively. A recursive multivariate probit model is used to 
simultaneously estimate equations indicating decisions to participate in land-related 
investments, access to extension services, participation in local labour sharing 
arrangements, and households’ perception of tenure insecurity while controlling for 
potential unobserved heterogeneity affecting these equations. Following the method 
of Cappellari and Jenkins (2006), model parameters were estimated using the 
simulation maximum likelihood (SML) estimation procedure.31 When jm  is zero it 
means that the univariate probit models will generate consistent estimates. Pooled 
data from 2004 and 2009 EHRS years were used in this estimation.   
                                                 




3.6. Results and Discussions  
This section, presents estimation results from the CRE probit model, the pooled 
bivariate probit model, and the recursive multivariate probit model regarding farmers’ 
participation decisions in land related investments. In addition to these models, 
estimation results from cross-sectional probit models and the standard random effects 
probit models are also presented as a robustness check.    
In all estimation result tables (except for the bivariate and the reclusive multivariate 
probit model), Model 1 presents the results of the baseline estimation model. Thus, 
Model 1 includes perception of expected land loss due to land redistribution as the 
main variable of interest in the model, and controlled for family labour, education, 
head characteristics (age and sex), per capita land size, and time and village dummies. 
Models 2, 3, and 4 include additional variables indicating farmers’ tenure insecurity 
status, livestock holdings, access to extension services, and participation in labour 
sharing arrangements. Model 5 presents results from the dynamic CRE probit model, 
but only for the tree planting decisions due to data limitation regarding the soil 
conservation practices. In addition, the dynamic CRE probit model (Model 5) did not 
include the main variable of interest, perception of expected land loss due to land 
redistribution, as data on this variable were not collected in the 1994 and 2009 survey 
rounds.   
3.6.1. Participation in Tree Planting   
 
Table 3.7 presents estimation results from the correlated random effects (CRE) probit 
model. Estimation results from the static CRE probit model show that the coefficient 




significant (at 10% level) in some of the models suggesting that tenure insecurity was 
negatively associated with the decision to plant trees. The coefficient is significant (at 
10% level) in Model 1 where other tenure insecurity variables are not included. Then, 
it becomes insignificant in Model 3 when I introduced the variable indicating whether 
a household had lost land in the past due to land redistributions. Then, it becomes 
significant again when another tenure insecurity indicator is included, perceived 
transfer rights in the model. However, it becomes insignificant when other 
determinants of investments such as access to extension services, livestock holdings, 
and participation in labour sharing arrangements are controlled for. 
Similar estimation results found from the dynamic CRE probit model (Model 5 in 
Table 3.7), the standard random effects (SRE) probit model estimates (Table A.3 in 
the Appendix),and from separate cross-sectional probit estimates for each year (Table 
A.1 and Table A.2 in the Appendix) that tenure insecurity was not a significant factor 
in the tree planting estimations. However, the coefficient on perceived transfer rights 
variable is positive and significant (at 10% level) only in the 2009 cross-sectional 
probit model even after including all the other control variables in the model. This 
suggests that improvement in perceived transfer rights was associated with more 
likelihood of growing trees. However, as in the discussion in the earlier section (sub-







Table 3.7:Static and dynamic CRE probit estimates of the determinants of tree planting 
decisions (1999-2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Expected land loss in 5 
years' time -0.21* -0.20 -0.21* -0.22 
 
 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) 
 Lost land during 1983-1999 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.13 
  
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.08) 
Perceived land transfer right  
 
0.11 0.08 -0.08 
   
(0.10) (0.09) (0.07) 
Male family labour  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.01 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Female family labour -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Adult literacy  0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17) 
Primary education 0.18 0.18* 0.18 0.14 0.12* 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) 
Secondary education 0.29** 0.29** 0.29** 0.20 0.12 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.08) 
Head sex -0.34** -0.34** -0.32** -0.29** -0.22* 
 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) 
Head age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Per-capita land size 0.51** 0.48** 0.45 0.35 0.27 
 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.29) (0.25) (0.19) 
Access to Extension services 
  
0.08 0.04 
    
(0.10) (0.07) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) 
 
0.02 0.03** 
    
(0.02) (0.01) 
Member in labour sharing arrangements 
 
0.26*** 0.22*** 
    
(0.10) (0.07) 
Planted tree in the previous year 
  
0.19** 
     
(0.09) 
Planted tree in initial year (1994) 
  
0.16** 
     
(0.07) 
Observations 2,437 2,431 2,413 2,361 3,472 
chi2 541,4 506.8 627,8 491,5 791.0 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sigma_u 0,548 0.545 0,536 0,486 0.258 
lnsig2u -1.20*** -1.22*** -1.25*** -1,44 -2.19 
 
-0,31 (0.33) -0,4 -1,48 (2.35) 
Loglikelihood -1118 -1115 -1111 -1074 -1705 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: Regression includes woreda(village) and 
time dummies,  head age square , land size square , time averages of the covariates ,and, a constant. I 
Model 1-4 used data from the 2004, and 2009 survey years. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 





Estimation results from the dynamic CRE probit model (Model 5) indicate that the 
estimation coefficient on variables indicating previous period investment decisions 
are positive and significant (at 5% level) indicating that households that had invested 
in the past were more likely to invest in the current period. This suggests that 
households’ current decisions to invest in land directly influence their propensity to 
invest in the future by altering the cost of investment and preferences. For instance, 
having invested in the past could allow farmers to learn about the benefits associated 
with land-related investments. Thus, they would be more likely to invest again. This 
implies that providing more information regarding the benefits of tree planting may 
improve farmers’ participation in growing trees.  
3.6.2. Participation in Soil Conservation   
Regarding farmers’ participation decisions in soil conservation practice, Table 3.8 
presents estimation results from the CRE probit model. Moreover, Table A.4 and A.5 
in the appendix provide estimation results from the cross-sectional probit models for 
years 2004 and 2009, respectively, while Table A.6 in the Appendix presents 
estimation results from the SRE probit model.  
The coefficient on the variable indicating households perception of tenure insecurity, 
perceived expected land loss due to land redistribution is significant (at 10% level ) 
only in the 2009  cross-sectional probit model. This result suggests that households 
who had expected land loss due to land redistribution were less likely to invest in soil 
conservation. However, the coefficient on this variable becomes insignificant in the 
panel data models, both in the SRE probit model (Table A.6 in the Appendix) and the 




Table 3.8: Static CRE probit estimates of the determinants of soil conservation 
practices (2004 and 2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expected land loss in 5 years' time -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.15 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) 
Lost land during 1983-1999 
 
0.11 0.12 0.06 
  
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) 
Perceived land transfer right  
  
-0.00 -0.03 
   
(0.12) (0.12) 
Male family labour  0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.10 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female family  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Adult literacy 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) 
Primary education -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
Secondary  education 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) 
Head sex -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 
 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) 
Head age -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per capita land size -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 
 
(0.24) (0.28) (0.25) (0.29) 
Access to Extension services 
   
0.16 
    
(0.13) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) 
   
-0.01 
    
(0.02) 
Member in labour sharing arrangements 
  
0.23** 
    
(0.10) 
Observations 2,312 2,306 2,289 2,247 
chi2 408.9 431.4 421.2 288.7 
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sigma_u 0.408 0.425 0.420 0.460 
lnsig2u -1.79 -1.71 -1.74 -1.55 
 
(2.02) (2.01) (1.87) (1.53) 
Rho 0.143 0.153 0.150 0.174 
Loglikelihood -816.0 -811.2 -805.9 -770.1 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: Regression includes woreda (village) 
and time dummies, head age square, land size square, time averages of the covariates, and a 






Likewise, the estimated coefficient on the transfer rights variable is insignificant in all 
the estimation models. These results suggest that limited land transfer rights were not 
an important factor in farmers’ decisions in practising soil conservation in rural 
Ethiopia. Given land rental markets and non-farm economic activities are poorly 
developed in rural Ethiopia, the limited impact of land transfer rights on land related 
investments is not surprising. Improvements in land transfer rights facilitate factor 
price equalization across households (Carter &Yao, 1999). However, Carter &Yao 
(1999; 2002) suggest that the impact of land transfer rights on labour intensity (or 
investment) depends on households’ land rental regime and expected future off-farm 
employment growth. They suggest that in the absence of prospects for future off-farm 
employment growth, the effect of improved transfer rights on labour intensity is 
positive, negative or null, when a household is in rent-out, rent-in, or autarky regime. 
According to Carter and Yao (1999:p.1), land transfer rights become more important 
when a given economy “industrializes and its population begins to specialize in non-
agricultural activities.” 
3.6.3. Results from bivariate and multivariate probit models    
Table 3.9 provides coefficient estimates from the pooled bivariate probit model with 
CRE controlling for both household heterogeneity and possible endogeneity of the 
tenure insecurity variable in the investment equation. The estimated correlation 
coefficient ( jm ) between the investment equation and the tenure security equation is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels in all specifications (for both tree 
planting and soil conservation equations). This suggests that the tenure security 
variables are not endogenous in the investment model. Consequently, estimated 




presented in Table A.7 (for tree planting decisions), and Table A.8  (for soil 
conservation practices). In the case of panel CRE probit model estimates, the tables 
provide average partial effects along with bootstrapped standard errors (200 
replicates).  
Results from Table 3.9 indicate that the estimated coefficient on farmers’ perception 
of losing land is not significant in the pooled bivariate probit model estimates for both 
tree growing and soil conservation practices. In contrast, results from the pooled 
probit model estimates suggest that households with tenure insecurity have 5% lower 
probability (at a 10% significant level) of planting eucalyptus trees when compared to 
households that had reported more tenure security (Table A.7). However, the 
estimated marginal effect on this variable becomes insignificant once we control for 
unobserved household heterogeneity in the panel CRE probit model. Likewise, the 
estimated marginal effect on the plot transfer rights variable is 0.02 and not 
significant in tree planting equation. These results suggest that, ceteris paribus, 
perceived tenure security is not a significant factor in tree growing decisions. 
In the case of soil conservation practices, the marginal effect on the perceived plot 
transfer rights variable is not significantly related with soil conservation in the form 
of stone terraces, while it is significantly related with land improvements in the form 
of soil bunds. This result contrasts with what was found by Gebremedhin and Swinton 
(2003; p.80) that “tenure security favours long-term soil conservation investments 
such as stone terraces, whereas insecurity favours short-term investments, such as soil 




for the significant land rights coefficients obtained for soil conservation. In addition, 
the information on soil conservation practices does not have a time frame.  
 Table 3.9:Pooled bivariate probit estimates of the determinants of land-related 
investment decisions 
  
 Eucalyptus tree   Soil conservation 
1 2   3 4 
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Labour sharing  0.23*** 0.23*** 
 
0.16** 0.16** 
  -0.07 -0.07 
 
-0.07 -0.07 
Observations  2,359 2,359   2,359 2,359 
Rho -0.37 0.24 
 
-0.42 0.27 
  -0.31 -0.27  -0.48 -0.18 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS (2004 & 2009). Note: Regression includes, head 
age and age square, time averages of time-varying exogenous covariates, time and village 






Looking at other factors, results indicate that access to extension services, 
participation in labour sharing arrangements, and land and livestock holdings are 
important determinants of land-related investment decisions. Increase in land holding 
size is associated with more likelihood of planting eucalyptus trees. This result 
suggests that farmers plant trees on their land if the opportunity cost of forgone 
benefits on the land used is lower than the benefits they get from planting trees. In 
particular, given most farmers in rural Ethiopia are subsistence farmers with very 
small land holdings, we expect planting of non-food trees such as eucalyptus could be 
easier for farmers with more land holdings compared to land-poor farmers. In the case 
of soil conservation, results show that the marginal effect on land size is insignificant. 
These results may suggest that an increase in land holding size is not necessarily 
associated with more soil conservations because soil conservation practices are 
largely driven by presence of soil erosion. 
Likewise, access to extension services and participation in local labour sharing 
arrangements are associated with more likelihood of land related investments. As 
mentioned it the previous section access to extension services and participation in 
labour sharing arrangements could be endogenous variables in the investment 
decision models. For this reason, Table A.9 and A.10 present estimation results from 
the recursive multivariate probit model. The null hypothesis of no joint significance 
of the correlation coefficients is rejected using a likelihood ratio test (at 1% level). 
This result implies that the equations are not statistically independent and that single 
probit estimates would have led to inefficient standard errors.   
There is a negative relationship between the equation indicating access to extension 




correlation between the equation indicating households’ participation in labour 
sharing arrangements and the equation indicating households’ access to extension 
services, and between the equation indicating households’ access to extension 
services and the equation indicating households’ tree planting decisions. These results 
suggest that after controlling for observed factors there were unobserved factors that 
increased the likelihood of getting access to extension services also improved 
households’ perception of tenure security (reduced perceived tenure insecurity), 
increased their likelihood of tree planting and participation in labour sharing 
arrangements. This might suggest that access to extension services, ceteris paribus, 
may increase knowledge about the benefits associated with tree planting, and 
information on land policy issues (for example minimise uncertainties about future 
land redistributions). Such knowledge in turn may increase the incentive to invest in 
land. In addition, access to extension services may also improve access to farm inputs 
such as access to tree seeds.  
Results from the recursive multivariate probit estimation also indicates that after 
controlling for the endogenity of access to extension services and participation in 
labour sharing arrangements, tenure insecurity was not a significant factor in farmers’ 
decisions either to plant tree crops or practice soil conservations. Instead, factors such 
as education, sex of the household head, land and livestock holdings, and 
participation in local labour sharing arrangements found to be important factors in 
farmers’ decisions to plant tree crops or practice soil conservations.  
Those households with more educated members, had more land and livestock 
holdings, and got access to local labour sharing arrangements were more likely to 




to invest in their land (plant trees).  On the contrary, the coefficient on household 
head variable is negative and significant suggesting that female-headed households 
were less likely to invest in tree planting when compared to their male counterparts. 
This finding is expected as female-headed households are on average poorer (in terms 
of farming reduces) than their male counterparts they may lack the necessary 
resources needed to invest in land.32  
Estimation results from the recursive multivariate probit model indicates that  female-
headed households were also associated with less likelihood of getting access to 
extension services and participation in labour sharing arrangements. Looking at the 
other determinants of access to extension services indicates that households that had 
more educated family members, older household head, and more land and livestock 
holdings were more likely to get access to extension services. Likewise, looking at the 
determinants of participation in labour sharing arrangements suggests that households 
with more labour, land and livestock holdings were more likelihood to participate in 
local labour sharing arrangements, while households with old age household head 
were less likely to participate in labour sharing arrangements. These results indicate 
that access to extension services and participation in local labour-sharing 
arrangements in rural areas were more biased towards farmers with better faming 
experiences and recourse.   
However, perception of tenure insecurity was not significantly different for female 
headed and/or resource poor households compared to their male-headed and/or 
resource rich counter parts. Instead, village dummies found to be the main variables 
                                                 
32 Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 shows that on average female-headed households were poorer than their male 




that explained the variations in farmers’ perception of tenure insecurity as the 
coefficients on other variables in the model are insignificant.33 These results might 
suggest that variations in farmers’ perception of tenure insecurity in rural areas can 
mainly be explained by village factors (for example past land redistribution 
experiences).   
In summary, the estimation results in this section show that after controlling for 
household wealth, education, access to extension services, participation in local 
labour sharing arrangements and village dummies, tenure insecurity had limited 
impact on the decision to participate in land-related investments in rural Ethiopia. 
These findings suggest that the observed low level of land-related investments by 
female-headed and/poor households can be mainly explained by their limited access 
to farming resources such as land, labour and other capitals. These findings suggest 
that the tenure security variables should be interacted with the other variables such as 
land size, sex of the household head, and access to extension services. Given limited 
variability over time in most of these variables, interacting all other investment 
constraints with the tenure security variable is statistically demanding. Thus, only the 
land size variable is interacted with tenure security indicator in the pooled probit 
model. The coefficient estimate on this interaction term, however, is insignificant.  
 
                                                 
33 One exception here is the coefficient on the variable indicating adult literacy education in a 




3.7. Conclusion   
This chapter examine whether there is a relationship between tenure insecurity 
(measured by farmers’ own perception of tenure insecurity) and farmers’ investment 
decisions in rural Ethiopia. Results from econometric analyses of determinants of 
land-related investment decisions indicate that perceived tenure insecurity was not a 
significant factor in farmers’ decisions to participate in land related investments in 
rural Ethiopia. Instead, other factors, such as topography (erosion), access to 
extension services and labour, education and availability of other resources (for 
example land) were important determinants of land-related investment decisions.  
However, the empirical analyses in this chapter are not without shortcomings. One 
limitation is that the proportion of households that had a change in their tenure status 
between 2004 and 2009 is small in the sample. Given this, panel data estimation 
methods are statistically demanding. Thus, the little statistical significance of the 
tenure insecurity variable could be due to such small change over time in the tenure 
security variables. In addition, the observed regional patterns of changes in the tenure 
security variables may imply that time varying unobserved regional factors affect 
both farmers perception of tenure security and investment decisions.  
The use of cross-sectional data method do not allow us to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity that affects both tenure security and investment decisions. As a 
robustness check pooled data regression analysis is used while controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the study provides evidence on major 
investment constraints as mentioned by the farmers themselves. Consistent with the 
empirical evidence farm households reported that other factors not tenure insecurity 




In general, results indicate that male-headed and/or resource rich households were 
more likely to invest in land, while female-headed and/or resource poor households 
were associated with less likelihood of participation in land-related investments.These 
findings are robust to changes in model specifications. In addition, results show that 
female-headed and/or resource poor households were less likely to get access to 
extension services and labour (in the form of labour sharing arrangements). However, 
the perception of tenure insecurity was not significantly different across these groups.  
These findings suggest that the observed variations in land-related investment 
decisions among the sample households can be explained by their limited access to 
farming resources such as land, labour and other capitals. This corresponds to the 
findings of other previous studies that it is not tenure insecurity but poverty in 
farming resources and lack of access to credit, input, and other factor markets are the 
major constraints affecting land-related investment decisions in rural Ethiopia (Gavin 
& Ehui, 1999; Hagos & Holden, 2006; Holden & Yohannes, 2002; Pender & 
Fafchamps, 2005).Therefore, land policy reforms (e.g. titling) that are aiming to 
reduce tenure insecurity in Ethiopia should also improve farmers’ ability to use their 
land as collateral in credit markets in order to finance their investments.  
The findings of this study do not necessarily suggest that the existing land tenure 
system in Ethiopia is satisfactory for farmers’ intensification efforts. It is widely 
argued that past and current land polices in the country have led to decreased and 
fragmented of land holdings in rural areas (Rahmato, 1993; Teklue & Lemi, 2004). 
As a result, there is limited room for farm intensification. For instance, data from this 
study show that among sample households who did not grow tree crops on their land, 




more than 65% in regions with serious land shortages (Tigray and SNNP). In this 
regard, the existing land tenure system can be equally restrictive for most farmers.   
Therefore, policy-makers should implement development strategies that will improve 
access to more land, credit, labour, and extension services in order to improve land 
related investments in rural Ethiopia. In this regard, developments in rural land and 
labour markets are expected to improve farmers’ access to more land and labour and 
facilitate efficient allocation of these resources (Deininger, 2003). However, the 
analyses in Chapter 2 show that markets for both land and labour are poorly 
developed in rural Ethiopia. Thus, understanding the factors that affect farmers’ 
participation decisions in these markets has significant policy relevance in order to 













CHAPTER 4: LAND AND LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION DECISIONS IN 
RURAL ETHIOPIA  
 4.1. Introduction  
In an agrarian economy like Ethiopia, where a large share of households are poorly 
endowed with non-labour assets, access to land and participation in rural labour 
markets is an important strategy for food security and poverty reduction. However, 
lack of access to additional agricultural land in rural areas is among one of the major 
constraints to increasing agricultural production in Ethiopia (FAO, 1993). The 
analysis in Chapter 3 also shows that farmers cited land shortage as one of the major 
constraints to investing in their land. Currently, the average land holding size per 
household in rural Ethiopia is less than 1 hectare (CSA, 2012).   
Additionally, access to off-farm employment opportunities is very limited with only 
3% of households relying exclusively on non-farm employment income in rural 
Ethiopia (Loening, Rijkers, & Söderbom, 2008; MoARD, 2010). In rural settings, 
income diversification through the development of alternative and sustainable off-
farm employment opportunities can provide rural households with additional income 
sources and help them to reduce income risks associated with agricultural production 
(Block & Webb, 2001; Lemi, 2006). Therefore, it is crucial for policy-makers to 
understand the factors that affect farmers’ participation decisions in rural labour and 
land rental markets.  
Few studies in Ethiopia have analysed, separately, decisions by households 
concerning participation in land rental markets (Benin et al., 2005; Deininger et al., 
2005; Deininger et al., 2007; Deininger et al., 2011;Holden et al., 2011), and 




Bhatta & Årethun, 2013; Lemi, 2006; Woldenhanna & Oskam, 2001). However, these 
studies ignored the potential interdependency between land and labour market 
participation decisions in rural areas. The prevalence of multiple market 
imperfections in most developing countries suggests that farm households’ decisions 
regarding farm operation and off-farm employment are made jointly (Binswanger & 
Rosenzweig, 1986; Pereira & Sumner, 1990). This implies that analysis of land and 
labour market participation decisions in rural areas should take into account the 
potential jointness of land and labour allocation decisions.   
This chapter aims to examine the determinants of farm households’ participation 
decisions in rural labour and land rental markets while explicitly taking into account 
the potential jointness of land and labour allocation strategies. The multivariate probit 
(MVP) technique is used in the analysis. Joint analysis of land and labour market 
participation decisions allows one to derive conclusions about which combinations of 
factor market participation decisions are more likely to be taken up by a given rural 
household. For instance, asset-poor households often may rent out their land and then 
participate in off-farm jobs. This suggests that policy makers should give due 
consideration to the development of rural off-farm jobs to reduce poverty in rural 
areas.    
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides relevant descriptive 
statistics for sample households on labour and land rental market participations in 
rural Ethiopia. Section 4.3 provides a brief review of the literature on the 
determinants of land and labour market participation decisions. Section 4.4 discusses 




discussed in section 4.5 and section 4.6, respectively. Section 4.7 concludes with a 
summary of the main findings.  
4.2. Land and Labour Market Participation in Rural Ethiopia  
Land and labour are the two main factors of production in rural Ethiopia, where there 
is a lack of farm mechanisation. The discussion in Chapter 2 indicates that land tenure 
system plays a significant role in determining the prevalence and characteristics of 
land rental markets in rural Ethiopia. During the socialist era from 1975 to 1991, 
households were restricted, legally, from participating in both the land-rental markets 
and from hiring outside labour on their farms. Thus, land allocation through PA 
officials and family inheritance was the only formal way of getting access to land. 
Despite the ban, households had started leasing out their land informally over time 
(Omiti et al., 2000; Rahmato, 2004).   
Since 1991, restrictions on labour and land-rental markets have been relaxed. In 
particular, the land reform in 1995 officially allowed households to rent out their land 
and to hire in agricultural labour on their farm. Following this reform, the incidence 
of participating in labour and land rental markets has increased in rural Ethiopia 
(Benin et al., 2005; Pender & Fafchamps, 2005). Data from the ERHS also show that 
participation by households in both the land rental and labour markets increased in the 
sample area (Table 4.1). 34  For example, households’ participation in land rental 
                                                 
34 A household is considered as a participant in land rental markets if it either leased- in or 
leased-out land using either sharecropping and/or cash rental contract arrangements. 
Similarly, participation in labour markets indicates that a household either supplied labour to 
the labour market or hired outside labour. A household is considered as a participant in off-
farm employment if there was at least one family member in the household who participated 
in any kind of local employment activities outside the family’s own farm (but excluding 





markets increased from 33.5% in 1994 to 48.6% in 2009. The increase after 1994 was 
mainly due to an increase in land renting using cash rental contracts, which increased 
from only 9.3% in 1994 to 25.27% in 2009. Despite this, sharecropping remains the 
dominant contractual arrangement suggesting markets for credit and other non-land 
factors are underdeveloped in rural areas.  
Similarly, the percentage of households who hired outside labour on their farm 
increased from 25.7% in 1994 to 35.5% in 2009, while the percentage of households 
that participated in off-farm employment increased from 62.7% in 1994 to 74.6% in 
2009. The increase in participation in off-farm employment was mainly due to 
increased participation in off-farm wage employment from its level of 23.4% in 1994 
to 36% in 2009. However, the apparent increase in off-farm employment was partly 
because there was a change in the definition of the term to include activities which 
were previously excluded. For instance, activities such as religious work 35  and 
brewing of local alcohol were considered as off-farm employment in the 2009 survey 
but not in the 1994 survey (Table 4.2).   
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                 
35 Religious work includes working in churches. This was not included in the list of off-





Table 4.1: Percentage of households participated in land rental and labour 
markets (1994-2009) 
 Land rental and labour market participations Year  
 1994 1999 2004 2009 
Participation in land rental markets 
(% of households) 33.5 44.6 40.8 48.6 
Leased in 20.1 20.7 20.0 21.4 
Leased out  13.0 21.3 18.5 24.1 
Participations using sharecropping  90.7 72.3 74.8 74.7 





     Participation in  off-farm employment  
(% of households) 62.7 58.8 71.4 74.6 
Wage employment  23.4 27.0 37.2 36.0 
Self-employment 39.3 31.8 34.2 38.6 
     Participation in labour hiring (%  households) 25.7 23.2 31.5 35.5 
Total sample households  1477 1452 1363 1355 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
Note: Leased in and Leased out refers participation in land rental markets using both 
sharecropping and cash rental contractual arrangements.  
 
 
Despite the large percentage of households participating in off-farm job, existing off-
farm employment opportunities in rural Ethiopia are poorly developed. In general, 
activities such as selling firewood, religious work, and participation in food-for-work 
programmes were the dominant type of jobs available in rural areas (Table 4.2). For 
example, in the 2009 survey, religious work was reported as off-farm employment by 
26.9% of individuals in the sample area. This was followed by agricultural wage 
employment (15.9%) and participation in food-for-work schemes (10.1%). Skilled 
work and professional jobs, such as teaching, were reported only by 3% and 1.9% of 




Table 4.2: Types of off-farm employment activities (2004 and 2009) 
Types of wage employment  Percentage 
participated  
Average duration 
worked in 2009 
 
1994 2009 Month Dayb 
Food-for-work 25.7 10.1 5.0 31.9 
Farm worker 18.0 15.9 4.4 25.6 
Unskilled worker 7.1 11.4 6.1 51.4 
Skilled labour 4.9 3.0 6.2 42.9 
Professional  1.3 1.9 11.4 100.7 
Religious worka - 26.9 4.8 30.7 
Other wage employments 6.6 4.7 7.6 43.3 
     Types of self-employment  Percentage participated  
Average duration 
worked in 2009 
 
1994 2009 Month   
Collecting and selling of firewood 39.1 16.5 7.2   
Trade in grain 23.5 25.2 9.3 
 Handicraft and  pottery 12.7 10.9 10.3 
 Weaving/Spinning 11.8 6.7 9.7 
 Trade in livestock and livestock products  4.1 10.4 8.0 
 Traditional healer 2.0 3.7 9.6 
 Transport (by pack animal) 1.6 4.9 7.7 
 Milling 1.0 3.5 10.4 
 Brewery of local alcohola  - 12.8 9.3 
 Other self-employments 4.2 5.4 8.5   
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
 Note: a not reported in 1994 survey. b average day only refers to days worked within 4 months before the 
survey.  
 
Among self-employment opportunities, collecting and selling firewood was reported 
by 39.1% and 16.5% of individuals in 1994 and 2009, respectively. This was 
followed by trade in grain, which accounted for 23.5% and 25.2% of off-farm self-
employment in 1994 and 2009, respectively. These results show that the structure of 
off-farm employment in rural Ethiopia has hardly changed over the 15 years covered 
by the survey. Moreover, the nature of off-farm wage employment opportunities was 




involved in off-farm wage employment were actually employed for five or more days. 
However, individuals with professional jobs had employment for longer duration. 
These results indicate that farmers in rural Ethiopia have a very limited access to 
well-paying off-farm jobs. It is suggested that among other reasons, lack of alternative 
employment opportunities elsewhere in the country, and past and current land polices, 
prohibit labour movement out of agriculture and impede the development of non-farm 
income generating activities in rural areas (Rahmato, 1993, 2004).  
Table 4.3 presents summary results indicating household characteristics according to 
their participation in land rental and labour markets. Note that 49.8% of households 
that leased out land and 37% of households that did not participate in any of the factor 
markets were female-headed. These households also had, on average, smaller number 
of male family labour and livestock. Only 20.6% of those who leased out land and 
26.7% of non-participating households had a pair of oxen for farming. Similarly, 
although households that participated in off-farm employment had, on average, large 
number of family members, they were constrained in terms of other farming resources 
and skills. Thus, only 31.2% of them had a pair of oxen for farming and 31.2% were 
female-headed households. In addition, more than 60% of the households that leased 
out their land, or work in off-farm employment or did not participate in any of the 
markets, reported that they had food shortage problems at least once in the previous 
production year. In contrast, those households that leased in land and hired outside 
labour were mainly male-headed and were better endowed with farming resources 


















Total household size (num) 4.5 6.6 6 6 5.2 
Male labour (num)a 1.3 2.4 2 2.1 1.8 
Female labour (num) 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 
Head sex (=1 if male) 50.2 86.9 68.8 73 63 
Head age (years) 55.2 49 50.8 52.2 57.4 
Consumption (in Birr)  741.4 823.8 668.3 884.4 630 
Food shortage (=1 if yes) 62.5 49.6 65.3 46.7 67.1 
Plot size (in hectares) 1.8 1.7 1.5 2.1 1.6 
Land to labour ratio 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 
Cultivated land to labour ratio 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Livestock holdings (in value) 1381.1 4436.8 1986.3 3601.3 1440.8 
Own a pair of oxen  
(=1 if yes) 20.6 71 31.2 51.8 26.7 
Access to production loan  
(=1 if yes) 25.3 34.7 31.4 36.8 22.4 
Total observations  296 259 802 467 165 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS round 2009. 
Note: a male and female labour refers to the number of working age family members. 
 
The findings in Table 4.3 show that a significant percentage of households that leased 
out land were female-headed and were relatively poor in non-land resources. These 
observations may suggest that female-headed households were motivated to rent out 
their land because they were poorly endowed in farm equipment and skills. From 
Table 4.4 it is evident that on average, compared to male-headed households female-
headed households had significantly smaller male labour force (1.2 vs 2.3) and 
livestock holdings (1312.3 Birr vs 2660.4 Birr).  
In addition, only 20.9% of female-headed households owned a pair of oxen and 
22.8% of them took loans to finance production-related expenses, while these figures 




headed households also had significantly smaller allocated and cultivated land sizes, 
while the average land area leased out was significantly larger in the case of female-
headed households. These results suggest that households lacking the necessary 
physical and managerial ability for farming, in particular, female-headed households 
are more likely to rent out their land though they have on average smaller land 
holdings.   










Total household size(number) 6.3 4.4 *** 
Male labour (number) 2.3 1.2 *** 
Female labour (number) 2.1 2.0 * 
Head age (years) 52.4 53.4 
 Consumption (value) 720 723.1 
 Food shortage (=1 if yes) 57.6 67.7 *** 
Plot size (in hectares) 1.8 1.4 *** 
Land to labour ratio 0.5 0.5 
 Cultivated land to labour ratio 0.4 0.3 *** 
Livestock holdings (in value) 2660.4 1312.3 *** 
Own a pair of oxen (=1 if yes) 41.2 20.9 *** 
Access to production loan (=1 if yes) 32.6 22.8 *** 
Participated in off-farm jobs (=1 if yes) 63.1 59.8 
 Hired in outside labour (=1if yes) 39.1 30.4 ** 
Leased out land (=1 if yes) 16.9 35.3 *** 
Leased in land (=1 if yes) 25.8 8.2 *** 
Area Leased out (in hectares) 0.1 0.3 *** 
Area Leased in (in hectares) 0.2 0.1 *** 
Number of Observations  874 421 1295 








Furthermore, although households that leased out land had, on average, a larger land 
size than those that leased in land, they cultivated a much smaller land size relative to 
those who leased in additional land. The result may indicate that land rental markets 
were not equalising land/labour ratios among the sampled households. In fact, land 
rental markets may lead to transfer of land from households that are poorly endowed 
with non-land productive assets (but not necessary rich in land) to those better 
endowed with these assets (but not necessary poor in land).  
Finally, Table 4.5 highlights the likely correlations between land rental market 
participation decisions and labour market participation decisions, based on data from 
the 2009 survey year. An estimated 41.5% of the sample households participated in 
off-farm employment; however, this estimate increased to 50% in the case of those 
households that leased out their land. In the case of those households that participated 
in off-farm employment activities, 27.1% also leased out their land. Likewise, an 
estimated 15% of the sampled households were hired outside labour but this estimate 
increased to 21% in the case of households that leased in land. Furthermore, in some 
instances, farm operators hired outside labour while, at the same time, supplying 
labour to off-farm employment. This typically happens when there is a mismatch 
between the skills or education level of the household members and the lower 
requirements of the farm job; here, the household may supply the high-priced labour 
of well-educated household members and then hire cheap agricultural labour 
(Sadoulet et al., 1996). However, given a very small proportion of individuals who 
work in professional or skilled work (1.9 % and 3 % in 2009), this may suggest that 




times and work off-farm (mainly self-employment) during slack seasons in the same 
year.  
 Table 4.5:Participation in labour and land rental markets, sample 
conditional probabilities (2009) 
Participation in labour markets given land rental market participations 
  Land markets (%)  







and out  
Not 
participated Total 
Worked off -farm  50 30.9 50 41.6 41.5 
Hired in labour 8.6 21.6 10 15.6 15.1 
Both hired in and 
out labour 12.3 32 30 19.8 20.7 
Not participated 29.1 15.6 10 23 22.7 
 
Participation in land rental markets given labour market participations 








in and out 
Non-
participant Total 
Leased out 27.1 12.8 13.3 28.9 22.5 
Leased in 14.9 28.6 30.9 13.8 20 
Both Leased in 
and out 1.8 1.0 2.2 0.7 1.5 
Not participated 56.2 57.6 53.6 56.7 56 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
 
 
4.3. Literature Review: Theory and Empirical Evidence   
In a model of perfectly functioning factor markets, where transaction costs are close 
to zero, participation in land and labour markets depends on the relative prices of land 
and labour, the land to labour ratio, and the amount of other non-tradable inputs in the 
household (Collier, 1989; Otsuka, 2007; Sadoulet, De Janvry, & Benjamin,1998). If 
one assumes that production exhibits constant returns to scale and no production 




utilised by their family labour or they can supply their extra labour to the labour 
market. Likewise, large-scale producers can either hire outside labour or supply their 
land to the market36 . Thus, efficiency can be improved either by a land market 
transaction or by exchange of labour through factor markets (Otsuka, 2007; Otsuka, 
Chuma & Hayami, 1992).   
If markets for all non-land factors of production are perfect then achieving efficiency 
may not entail land markets to function (Pender and Fafchamps, 2006).However, it is 
well recognised that in the context of developing economies, those markets for 
insurance, factors of production, and output are either missing or highly imperfect 
(Carter & Yao; 2002; Skoufias, 1995). In particular, it is widely argued that labour 
market transactions in agrarian economies resulted in efficiency and welfare losses 
(Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1986; Holden, Shiferaw & 
Pender, 2001; Sadoulet et al., 1998; Skoufias, 1995). The main source of imperfection 
in labour markets lies in an incentive problem in relation to the work efforts of hired 
labour (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985, 1986; Otsuka, 
2007). Given the disutility of work, the incentive problem arises whenever 
information is costly and asymmetrically distributed (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 
1986). In such conditions, hired labour has a tendency to shirk, while the level of 
effort applied by that hired labour cannot be easily observed, especially for tasks that 
                                                 
36 Otsuka (2007, pp. 2680-2681) argued that the equality of the marginal product of land can 
be achieved also through  land sales market as land-rich farmers can sell a portion of their 
land to land poor farmers, at the price reflecting the present value of future returns to land. 
Thus, with perfect markets in land tenancy, land sell, land rent and labour employment can 
lead to identical and equally efficient outcomes. However, land adjustment through land 
rental markets is more dominant than adjustment through the land sales market. This is 
mainly because relative to the land sales market, land rental markets are characterised by low 
transaction costs. Also, they are less vulnerable to credit market imperfections, and require 





require care and judgment, such as land preparation and fertiliser application 
(Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985; Hayami & Otsuka, 1993; Otsuka, 2007).   
To overcome problems associated with the incentive problem of hired labour, farm 
operators exercise either strict supervision over the work of that labour or design 
various mechanisms that provide better incentives to work well, such as permanent 
labour contracts (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986).37 In this regard, compared to 
small-scale farmers large farm owners are expected to hire outside labour as they are 
in a better position to bear the fixed costs of supervision (Ray, 1998). However, 
because the variable supervision cost associated with hired labour increases as land 
size increases the efficiency of supervision diminishes as farm size increases (Carter 
& Olinto, 1998; Vranken & Swinnen, 2006; Lipton, 2009). Thus, due to high 
transaction costs associated with supervision of hired labour, large-scale producers 
may prefer to supply their land rather than to use hired labour (Binswanger & 
Rosenzweig, 1986; Collier, 1989; Skoufias, 1995).   
In contrast to hired labour, labour provided from within the family is perceived as 
having a high incentive to provide effort when compared with labour hired from 
elsewhere, suggesting that small-scale farmers prefer to utilise, fully, their family 
labour by renting-in more land (Eswaran & Kotwal, 1986). As a result, compared to 
large-scale farmers, small-scale farmers employ more labour per acre. This implies 
that with relatively high labour to land ratios and assuming that hired labour is not a 
                                                 
37 The high cost of supervising hired labour is used to explain the use of permanent farm 
labour contracts in most agrarian economies because a permanent contract helps the 
employer to elicit credibility from hired workers (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Eswaran 
& Kotwal, 1986). Binswanger & Rosenzweig (1986), however, argued that because of 
seasonality and synchronic timing of agricultural production, short-term labour contracts are 




perfect substitute for family labour, small-scale farmers have been considered more 
productive than large-scale farmers with hired labour (Benjamin & Brandt, 2002; 
Berry & Cline, 1979; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985; Feder, 1985).  
A constraint limiting labour supply to off-farm jobs was identified as another source 
of inefficiency in the labour market (Pereira & Sumner, 1990). With a limited number 
of off-farm jobs, farm households cannot sell their extra labour to the labour market 
and so the marginal product of one’s own labour on the farm would be less than the 
market wage, leading to inefficiency in allocation of resources. Additionally, markets 
for hiring managerial ability and draught animals are often either missing or imperfect 
in rural economies of developing countries (Bardhan, 1977; Binswanger & 
Rosenzweig, 1986).   
The presence of multiple market imperfections in non-land factors were suggested as 
being the rationale for the emergence of tenancy markets in rural areas (Binswanger 
& Rosenzweig, 1986; Pant, 1983; Pereira & Sumner, 1990; Skoufias, 1995). It was 
also suggested that relative to other factor markets, land tenancy markets are 
characterised by fewer problems relating to moral hazard, because in most instances 
any behaviour that does damage to the land can be easily observed (Binswanger & 
Rosenzweig, 1986; Skoufias, 1995). As a result, farm households prefer to adjust 
their land holding sizes in relation to other non-land factor endowments.   
However, credit market imperfections may prevent small-scale farmers with liquidity 
constraints, as well as landless workers, from borrowing in the same way as the 
better-off households on the on-going market price (Eswaran & Kotwal, 1986; 




credit-constrained small-scale farmers and landless workers may find it difficult to get 
access land through land market, and finance their production costs.   
Moreover, transaction costs in land rental markets affect farmers’ participation 
decisions and the extent of their participation in land rental markets (Key, Sadoulet, & 
de Janvry, 2000; Skoufias, 1995). Transaction costs in land rental markets imply that 
the effective rent price paid to rent in land by the lessee is greater than the effective 
rented out price received by the lessor (Carter & Yao 2002; Key, Sadoulet, & de 
Janvry, 2000). The larger the gap between these prices the greater the number of 
households that opt not to participate in land rental markets. For instance, Carter and 
Yao (2002) show that improved land transfer rights lower transaction costs in land 
rental markets, which in turn increases participation in land rental markets. 
Building on the earlier work of Bliss and Stern (1982), Skoufias (1995) developed a 
theoretical model in order to assess the role of transaction costs in land rental markets 
in developing countries. He showed that both fixed and variable costs associated with 
land rental markets restricted farm households from making full and efficient 
adjustments of their land holdings to the desired optimal holding size. Similar studies 
from Africa showed the presence of significant transaction cost in land rental markets 
(Deininger et al, 2009; Holden et al., 2011; Pender & Fafchamps, 2006; Teklu & 
Lemi, 2004).  
Imperfections in other factor markets, together with restrictive regulations over land 
leasing, asymmetric information, contract enforcement, and search and negotiation 
costs were identified as some of the sources of transaction costs in the tenancy 




1995). For example ,according to Otsuka (2007), in China migration of individuals 
from a village to a city was limited due to restrictions on land transfer rights and 
because migrants feared losing their land rights as a result of land reallocations in the 
future. Similar studies conducted in Ethiopia also showed that an improvement in 
security of tenure was associated with a higher propensity for land renting 
transactions and for migration to take place (De Brauw & Mueller, 2012; Deininger, 
et al, 2011; Holden et al., 2011). These results suggest that institutional settings that 
determine the cost of land rental transactions significantly affect the propensity of 
individuals to participate in decisions relating to labour and land rental markets.  
Farmers’ participation decisions in land rental markets are also affected by labour 
market imperfections in rural areas. Lack of off-farm employment opportunities in 
rural areas increases the propensity of farm households to farm their own land, 
thereby decreasing their propensity to supply land to the market (more efficient 
farmers). Similarly, binding constrains on hired labour (such as availability, 
monitoring and supervision constraints) can limit the demand for renting in additional 
land, while these constraints increase the propensity of labour-constrained farm 
households to supply land (Pereira & Sumner, 1990).   
The potential link between the development of land rental markets and availability of 
off-farm employment in rural areas is well recognised in the international literature 
(Feng, Heerink, Ruben & Qu, 2010; Kung, 2002; Pereira & Sumner, 1990; Yao, 
2000; Zhang, Qingguo, & Xu, 2004). Some of these studies showed that access to 
employment opportunities off the farm was associated with more transactions in land 
rental markets (Kung, 2002; Yao, 2000; Zhang et al., 2004). Others showed that the 




activities (Kung & Lee, 2001; Shi, Heerink, & Qu, 2007). These results suggest that 
any gain from participation in land rental markets can be affected by availability of 
off-farm employment opportunities in rural areas. Likewise, demand for land can 
improve the development of land rental markets, thereby encouraging land supply to 
the market and participation in off-farm jobs. This implies that participation in the 
off-farm jobs in rural areas is contingent on the presence of well-functioning land 
rental markets and institutional settings that improve the security of tenure of farm 
households.   
In summary, the main factors that influence land rental transactions in rural areas 
have been identified: availability of other non-land factor endowments, farming 
ability, insecurity of tenure, transaction costs in land lease markets, access to credit, 
and imperfections in rural labour and credit markets (Benin, et al., 2005; Deininger et 
al., 2005; Deininger et al, 2007; Holden et al., 2011; Otsuka et al., 1992; Pant, 1983; 
Skoufias, 1995). The descriptive analysis in the previous section also shows that 
imperfections in markets for draught animals, managerial skills for farming, and lack 
of male labour force were important factors that affected farmers’ participation 
decisions in labour and land rental markets in the sample area.  
Land renting transactions involving a contractual arrangement for sharecropping are 
considered to be one means to mitigate labour and capital market imperfections 
(Eswaran & Kotwal, 1986; Otsuka, 2007; Pant, 1983). A sharecropping arrangement 
allows a combination of risk sharing with some work incentives for hired labour 
(Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985; Otsuka, 2007; Otsuka, et al., 1992; Stiglitz, 1974). In 
addition, sharecropping can lead to access to production credit and non-tradable 




contractual arrangement in rural Ethiopia (Table 4.1). In general, resources pooling 
(i.e. management knowledge, oxen, and labour) and credit provision by the landlords 
are suggested as the main rationale for the existence and persistence of sharecropping 
in rural Ethiopia (Rahmato, 1984).  
Likewise, the literature on income diversification suggests that households mainly 
diversify into off-farm jobs either due to ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors (Barrett, Reardon, & 
Webb, 2001; Ellis, 2000; Reardon, 1997). The ‘push’ factors include land shortage, 
risk and seasonality of agricultural production, inadequate farm income, and absence 
or failure of input and credit markets. The ‘pull’ factors include increased 
opportunities and profitability in the non-farm employment sector. In the context of 
Ethiopia, the data in Table 4.3 shows that farmers who participated in off-farm work, 
on average, had smaller per capita land holing sizes and small proportion of them had 
owned a pair of oxen (31.2%). This may suggest that farmers in rural Ethiopia 
participate in off-farm employment mainly because of the ‘push’ factors. Moreover, 
Table 4.5 shows that a significant proportion of farm households in the sample 
simultaneously adjusted both their land and labour margins.   
The discussion in this section suggests that the gain from participation in land rental 
markets can be affected by availability of off-farm jobs in rural areas. Likewise, 
participation in off-farm jobs is contingent on functioning of rural land rental markets. 
This suggests that the two participation decisions are interlinked. Therefore, an 
understanding of the pattern and determinant factors of land rental and labour market 
participations and the interaction between these factors, has significant relevance in 
formulating policy for poverty reduction in rural areas. Against this background, this 




participate in land and labour markets while explicitly taking into account the 
potential jointness of land and labour allocation strategies. Ignoring the correlation 
between different factor market participation decisions that are in competition for the 
same resources may lead to erroneous results.   
4.4. Theoretical Model   
The discussion in the previous section suggests that imperfections in markets for 
draught animals, managerial skills for farming, heterogeneity in access to credit and 
other farming assets are important factors in determining farmers’ participation 
decisions in rural labour and land rental markets. The theoretical model used for this 
study is based on an agricultural household model with imperfect factor markets 
developed by Vranken and Swinnen (2006). The advantage of this model is that it 
incorporates the multiple factor market imperfections, which are common in Ethiopia.  
The model assumes the presence of transaction costs in land rental markets, credit 
market imperfections, moral hazard in hired labour, and rationing in off-farm labour 
markets. These conditions are considered generally applicable in rural Ethiopia.   
Consider a farm household with endowments of labour , land , some initial 
wealth , and  other non-tradable inputs and fixed productive assets  (for example 
managerial or technical skills). Farm households can derive their income from 
farming their own farm, supplying land to land-rental markets and supplying labour to 
labour markets. Agricultural output is produced according to the following production 
function, which is increasing, strictly quasi-concave and twice continuously 
differentiable: 







Here, A is the land used by a household, L is the effective labour input on the farm 
(i.e. family or hired labour or both) , X is the amount of purchased inputs (for 
example seed and fertilizer) used on the farm with price vector xP , and   is  
managerial or technical skills. The land used, A, is defined as  with 
 being the land initially owned by the household,  being the amount of land 
rented in, and   the amount of land rented out. The household allocates its labour 
endowment, , between leisure (l), on-farm labour ( ), and off-farm 
labor ( ). Due to the assumption of moral hazard in the hired labour family labour 
can be used to supervise hired labour. Then the effective labour input L is given by: 
                                                      [2] 
Here,  is the family labour devoted to farming,  is the number of hired labour. 
The function   is a supervision function, with 0≤ s (.) ≤1, which reflects how 
nominal labour input is transformed into labour effort (Vranken & Swinnen, 2006). 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that variable supervision cost 
increases with increase in land and so the efficiency of supervision diminishes as farm 
size increases (Carter & Olinto, 1998). Following, the efficiency of supervision is 











s ) diminishes as the farm size increases, for a given level of family 
labour input:  and (Vranken & Swinnen, 2006).  
It is also assumed that  farm households face binding credit constraints associated 



























owned38 and other productive assets. Although land cannot be used as collateral in the 
formal credit markets in rural Ethiopia, close to 70% of the loans (26% informal loans 
and 47% formal loans) needed to provide some type of guarantor (see Table 2.8 in 
Chapter 2). In addition, the descriptive statistics in Chapter 2 also show that the 
percentage of households who got access to loans for production purposes increased 
as land size increased (see Table 2.7 in Chapter 2). Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that loan access depends on household wealth and land size.  
It is further assumed that the labour market is cleared by quantity rationing.  Off-farm 
employment opportunity in rural Ethiopia is institutionally limited as movement of 
labour out of agriculture is restricted. Thus, due to limited off-farm employment 
opportunities in rural areas, not all household members will find jobs in rural off-farm 
employment. Household endowment, household-specific characteristics, or kinship 
may determine access to the limited off-farm employment opportunities. Thus, it is 
assumed that the quantity of wage employment is rationed. That quantity rationing 
imposes a ceiling in the form of . The assumption of the presence of 
transaction costs in land rental markets implies that the price of land rented in ( ) 
will be higher than the price for land rented out ( ). The larger the gap between  
and  the greater the number of households opt not to participate in land rental 
markets (remain Autarky). 
Furthermore, labour market imperfections due to lack of off-farm employment 
opportunities and moral hazard problems associated with hired labour imply that the 
                                                 
38  ‘Land owned’ refers to land obtained through non-market means (allocated by PA officials or 








wage paid to hired labourers ( ) will be less than the wage that household members 
can secure from off-farm employment ( ). Finally, output price is normalised to one.  
Incorporating all of the above conditions, a given household maximises the following 
utility function which is an increasing function of income ( ) and leisure ( ): 
       [3] 
s.t. 
 ooooiiiix LwArWABLwArXP  )(   [4] 
        [5] 
       [6] 
Where household net income, , is given by:  
 
ooooiiii
x LwArLwArXPZXALfy  ),,,(  [7] 
Equation (4) reflects the liquidity constraint, which specifies total expenditure on 
factor inputs may   not exceed the amount of loan at a household’s disposal ( ), 
initial wealth ( ) revenue from off-farm employment ( ), and received rental 
payment ( ). Equation (5) and equation (6) capture constraints on off-farm 
employment opportunities and time constraints of household members, respectively. 
Thus, a households’ decision problem is to choose the amount of land leased in or 
leased out, the number of hired labour, the level of purchased inputs, and whether to 






















leisure time. The first order conditions for the amount of land rented in and the 
amount of land rented out , and the number of family labour and hired labour  
devoted to the farm are: 
     [8]
 
     [9]
 
              [10]
   
 
              [11]
 
Here,  and  are the Lagrange multipliers for the liquidity constraint and off-farm 
employment constraints, respectively. The more households that are credit-
constrained implies the larger the value of ,which means that the likelihood of 
renting in land decreases while the likelihood of renting out land increases (equation 8 
and 9). From equation 10 and 11, larger value of  implies that fewer farm labour 
will be employed due to credit constraints. This in turn decreases the marginal 
product of land, thereby decreasing land renting in while it increases land renting out. 
Similarly, limited access to off-farm jobs (the large the value of ) implies that farm 
household use more labour on their farm (equation 10 and 11), increasing the 
marginal product of land.  This in turn is expected to increase the likelihood of land 









































In the context of Ethiopia, a lack of access to credit and substantial market 
imperfections in non-land factor markets implies that households that are better 
endowed with agricultural production resources such as farming ability, male family 
labour, and oxen are expected to participate as a tenant in land rental markets while 
supplying less labour to off-farm jobs. In contrast, households that are less endowed 
with these resources are expected to participate as a landlord in land rental markets. 
Moreover, lack of access to well-paying off-farm employment opportunities in rural 
areas is expected to increase the probability of additional land renting in, while this 
factor is expected to decrease the probability of land renting out.  
Furthermore, Table 4.5 suggests positive correlation between renting out land and 
participation in off-farm employment. This correlation probably arises because 
households that were not able to farm their land due to lack of farming ability and 
resources were more likely to rent out part of their land and then obtain off-farm 
employment for additional income. Similarly, households that leased in additional 
land also hired outside labour. Thus, it would be interesting to examine the extent to 
which these various correlations can be explained by differences in the observable 
household characteristics and unobservable factors. The next section provides 
description of the estimation strategy used to examine these issues.   
4.5. Estimation Strategy   
According to the theoretical model presented in an earlier section, a farm household 
can make four possible decisions in a given production year regarding participation in 
the land and labour markets. Therefore, four separate participation equations are 




labour to off-farm employment, and (4) hire outside labour for farming. The 
dependent variables are all binary dummy variables that assign 1 if a household 
participated in a given activity and 0 if it did not participate.   
In the literature, a multinomial logit model (MNL) has been widely used to analyse 
such equations. However, the potential problem of using a MNL within this 
framework lies in the assumption of ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)’, 
which implies that the relative probability of any two given alternatives for market 
participation is not influenced by the existence of other alternatives. This assumption 
is likely to be violated in my case. For example, the relative probability of 
participation in off-farm employment and land renting activities can be influenced by 
the availability of outside labour (hired labour). If there is an option to hire outside 
labour, then this may increase the propensity to rent in more land or reduce the 
propensity to rent out land and participate in off-farm employment.      
Alternatively, a multivariate probit model (MVP) is used to fit, jointly, the 
distribution of different types of factor market participation outcome equations. The 
MVP model relaxes the IIA assumption while taking into account the potential 
endogeneity of the alternative participation equations. The M–equation multivariate 
probit models may be specified as (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2006; Greene, 2008): 
      [12] 
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Here,  denotes the underlying latent response associated with the  type of 
market participation outcome for =1,….,M;  denotes the binary response 
outcome associated with the  type of market participation outcome, and , 
=1,…,M, are error terms distributed as multivariate normal, each with an expected 
value of zero, and variance-covariance matrix R,  where R has values of 1 on the 
leading diagonals and correlations ρjk= ρkj  as off-diagonal elements for j, k=1,…, M. 
, denotes a vector of control variables, and  denotes model parameters to be 
estimated. The errors in each equation are assumed to be orthogonal to the covariates. 
The log likelihood function for the sample of N independent observations is given by: 
             [13]
 
where   denotes the multivariate standard normal distribution, and  are 
‘signs’ variables, being equal either to 1 or to -1, depending upon whether the 
observed binary outcome equals 1 or 0:  for each observation.  is a 
matrix which constitutes elements , where  for j=1,…, M and 
 for . The joint probability of observing all possible 
outcomes is given by: 
























Following the method of Cappellari and Jenkins (2003, 2006), model parameters were 
estimated using the simulation maximum likelihood (SML) estimation procedure. The 
same covariates were included in all equations because participation was assumed to 
occur simultaneously39. In line with the literature (for example, Bedemo et al., 2013; 
Deininger et al., 2007; Holden et al., 2011; Lemi, 2006), the control variables 
included were number of male and female working age family members in a 
household, characteristics of a household head such as sex, age and education level, 
highest education level of family members, land and non-land endowments, tenure 
security indicators, and access to credit and extension services.   
Proxy variables were used to indicate household level liquidity constraints; for 
example, whether a household stored any crops from previous harvest and whether a 
household could get access to cash, 100 Birr, if needed. In order to control for 
potential effects of insecurity of tenure, two variables were included: farmers’ 
perception of the probability of losing land within five years’ time and farmers’ 
perceived land transfer rights. In addition to these variables, woreda (village) level 
dummy variables were included to control for differences in geographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the sample area. Because some of the variables were 
only available in the last two survey rounds, I estimated the model using pooled data 
from the 2004 and 2009 years. Thus, year dummies were included in the pooled data 
estimation in order to control for policy changes over the study period.  
                                                 
39 Further, Greene (2008) suggests that in the bivariate probit model estimation case there is 
no requirement that different variables should appear in different equations, nor that a 




4.6. Results and Discussions   
Table 4.6 presents results from the MVP model estimates for the determinants of 
participation in land and labour markets. Note, first that the likelihood ratio test of the 
null hypothesis that all the correlation coefficients, , are jointly zero is strongly 
rejected(with p value=0.000); this justifies the more general specification here in 
comparison with the restrictive single-equation or MNL approach. The estimated 
correlation coefficient between the landlord equation and the tenant equation is 
negative and significant; this finding suggests that after controlling for observed 
household characteristics, those households that rented in land had unobserved 
characteristics that made them less likely to rent out their land.40  
Similarly, the positive and significant correlation between the equation indicating 
land renting in and the equation indicating labour hiring suggests that those 
unobserved characteristics that increased the likelihood of renting in land also 
increased the probability of hiring outside labour. Likewise, the correlation coefficient 
is positive and significant for the landlord and the off-farm employment participation 
equations. The result suggests that after controlling for observed household 
characteristics, those households that leased out their land had unobserved 
characteristics that made them more likely to supply labour to the off-farm 
employment activities.   
The coefficient estimates for the observed determinants of participation in land and 
labour markets agree with results found from the earlier descriptive analysis in section 
                                                 
40 The estimated correlation coefficient between the landlord and the tenant equations is 
0.866 (with p value=0.000), while the figure is -0.088(with p value=0.064) between the 
landlord and the off-farm employment equations, and it is 0.238(with p value=0.000) 






4.2 in this chapter. The coefficient of male family labour is negative and significant in 
the landlord and the labour hiring equations, while it is positive and significant in the 
off-farm employment equation. This result suggests that due to imperfections in the 
labour and the land rental markets, households prefer to use their own family labour 
on their farm; therefore, it is less likely for them either to hire outside labour or to rent 
out their land.   
In contrast to male labour in a household, the availability of more female labour force 
in a household did not affect either participation in the land rental markets or labour 
hiring. However, more female family labour in a household was associated with the 
likelihood of supplying some of that labour to off-farm employment. The result is 
consistent with the fact that in the Ethiopian context, the male labour force is more 
important for farming (and can supervise hired labour), while female household 
members often participate more in domestic work and in some off-farm employment 
activities such as  collecting firewood and brewing local alcohol.  
The presence of a family member with higher education (at least primary education) 
in a household was associated with more likelihood of hiring outside labour and 
renting in land. These results may suggest that highly educated family members were 
more likely to earn higher wages from off-farm work either within the village or 
outside their village. Income from the off-farm jobs could be used to finance labour 
hiring and land renting costs. As a result, households with skilled or well-educated 
household members could supply those members to work at off-farm jobs and at the 




However, households with an educated head (in this context, one who can read and 
write) were associated with less likelihood of land renting in activities, while they 
were more likely to rent out their land and work at off-farm jobs. One possible 
explanation could be that compared to households that had a household-head without 
education those with educated household heads could find some off-farm jobs. 
However, income from such jobs might not be enough to finance labour hiring and 
land renting activities. Moreover, due to time constraints, they might found it difficult 
to supervise farm works.    
The sex of a household head is a significant factor only for the decisions concerning 
land rental market participation; male-headed households were more likely to rent in 
land, and less likely to rent out land. These results are consistent with what I found in 
the descriptive analysis: female-headed households on average were poorly endowed 
with farming resources such as oxen and a male labour force, both of which are 
crucial for successful farm operation; therefore, a large proportion of households on 










Table 4.6: Multivariate probit estimates of determinants of land and labour market 
participations (2004 and 2009) 
VARIABLES Landlord Tenant work off-farm 
Hire in 
labour 
Male family labour (num) -0.18*** 0.00 0.08** -0.13*** 
 
-0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Female family labour(num) 0.04 -0.04 0.19*** -0.05 
 
-0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Head can read and write(1=yes) 0.15* -0.26*** 0.16** 0.12 
 
-0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 
Adult literacy (proportion) -0.39** 0.31 -0.01 0.14 
 
-0.19 -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 
Primary education(proportion) -0.09 0.33** 0.12 0.17* 
 
-0.11 -0.13 -0.09 -0.1 
Secondary and above education -0.05 0.26* -0.04 0.46*** 
 
-0.13 -0.15 -0.11 -0.12 
Head sex(1=male) 0.37*** -0.59*** -0.06 0.04 
 
-0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 
Per capita land size(hec) 1.24*** -1.94*** -0.79*** 0.42** 
 
-0.2 -0.26 -0.18 -0.19 
Land size square -0.27*** 0.54*** 0.17*** -0.14** 
 
-0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 
Livestock holdings(htu) -0.55*** 0.51*** -0.41*** 0.21** 
 
-0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 
Have a pair of oxen (1=yes) -0.06*** 0.08*** -0.01 0.07*** 
 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Access to credit(1=yes) -0.09 0.26*** -0.01 0.19*** 
 
-0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 
Equb member(1=yes) -0.06 -0.07 0.34*** 0.06 
 
-0.11 -0.1 -0.09 -0.09 
Store  crops(1=yes) -0.11 0.27** 0.07 0.49*** 
 
-0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.09 
Perceived land transfer 
rights(1=have right) 0.09 0.11 0.06 -0.09 
 
-0.10 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 
Expected land loss in 5 years’ time 
(1=yes) 0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.16 
 
-0.14 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 
Labour sharing(1=yes)  -0.62*** 0.34*** 0.17** 0 
 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
Access to cash(100 Birr)(1=yes) -0.13* 0.15 -0.03 0.17** 
 
-0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 
Access to extension services(1=yes) -0.19** 0.14 -0.17** 0.14* 
  -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.  Note: Regression includes woreda(village) and 
time dummies,  head age and age square ,and a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N=2245, chi2=1784(p=0.000), ll=-3811. 




Draught animal power is a critical input in agricultural production. The coefficient on 
the possession of a pair of oxen is negative and significant in the landlord equation, 
while it is positive and significant in the tenant and the labour-hiring equations. These 
results indicate that relative to land and labour markets, rental markets for oxen are 
highly imperfect in rural areas. As a result, households without oxen tend to rent out 
their land, while households with oxen were in a position to lease in land and hire 
outside labour.  
The size of a household’s land holdings is another important factor that had a 
significant impact on that household’s decisions concerning participation in the land 
and labour markets. In general, and against a background of limited off-farm 
employment opportunities, households with larger land holdings but with limited non-
land resources such as labour can be expected either to rent out some of their land or 
to hire outside labour to cultivate their land. These households are less likely to rent in 
additional land or supply labour to off-farm employment. Consistent with this 
expectation, the estimated coefficient of per capita plot size is positive and significant 
in the landlord and labour hiring equations, while it is negative and significant in the 
tenant and off-farm employment equations.   
However, the relationship between plot size and decisions concerning factor market 
participation is non-linear. The estimated coefficient of the square of per capita plot 
size is negative and significant in the landlord and labour hiring equations, while it is 
positive and significant in the tenant and off-farm employment equations. These 
results show that an increase in plot size initially increased the likelihood of renting 
out land, but the likelihood decreased after a certain level of plot size is reached. 




land, but this likelihood increased after a certain level of plot size is reached. These 
results might suggest that because of imperfections in the non-land factor markets, 
land can be leased from land-rich to land-poor farmers; likewise, land can also be 
leased from land-poor farmers to land-rich farmers.   
The propensity to hire labour initially increased with respect to plot size but then 
decreased after a certain level of plot size is reached. One possible explanation is that 
up to a certain plot size, large farm owners were in a better position to bear fixed costs 
of supervision; therefore, they were more likely to hire outside labour (Ray, 1998). 
However, variable supervision cost increases as land size increases and so efficiency 
of supervision diminishes as farm size increases; this implies that there is a critical 
plot size at which inefficiencies of supervision start to outweigh the advantage of 
larger plot size (Carter & Olinto, 1998).   
Regarding participation in off-farm employment, an increase in plot size was 
associated with a lower propensity to supply labour to off-farm employment, but that 
propensity started to increase after a certain level of plot size. One reason why this 
observation applies to Ethiopia is that household income in rural areas is determined 
by the agricultural sector rather than labour markets due to lack of well-developed 
off-farm employment opportunities in rural Ethiopia. As shown in Table 4.2 above, 
most available off-farm employment opportunities were not well paid  (there were 
only fewer than 2% professional jobs, such as teaching). As a result, income from off 
farm work is not attractive in comparison to farm income in rural areas, suggesting 
that farm households with more land and less education prefer to spend more time on 
their own farms in order to achieve food self-sufficiency. However, the positive 




plot sizes could participated in off-farm self-employment activities such as grain and 
livestock trades.  
Furthermore, it is suggested that in addition to imperfections in labour and oxen 
markets, imperfections in the credit market also affect decisions by households on 
whether to participate in land lease markets. Consistent with this view, I found that 
households that stored crops during the survey period and got access to credit were 
more likely to rent in additional land and hire in outside labour. Similarly, households 
that were richer in livestock holdings were more likely to rent in additional land and 
hire in outside labour, while they were less likely to rent out their land and work in 
off-farm jobs. Results also show that households who had the ability to get at least 
100 birr if needed were more likely to hire outside labour, while they were less likely 
to rent out their land. These results suggest that poor farmers with liquidity constraints 
tend to find it difficult to rent in more land, and to finance their production costs.   
One variable that indicates both a social network and access to finance is referred to 
as Equb, which is a rotating saving scheme. The coefficient of this variable is positive 
and significant only as far as participation in off-farm employment activities is 
concerned. This result suggests that credit constrained individuals might exploit this 
kind of saving scheme to provide start-up capital, particularly in order to participate in 
off-farm self-employment activities.   
Likewise, participation in local labour sharing arrangements indicates both a social 
network and access to labour. The coefficient on this variable is positive and 
significant in the tenant equation, while it is negative and significant in the landlord 




associated with more likelihood of land renting in and less likelihood of land renting 
out. The result suggests that there is significant labour market failure in rural areas. 
Participation in local labour sharing arrangements was also associated with more 
likelihood of supplying labour to off-farm jobs. The result may suggest that those 
households who participated in labour sharing arrangements were also had more 
family labour that could work at off-farm jobs.  
In addition, farm households who got access to extension services were less likely to 
rent out their land and work at off-farm jobs, while they were more likely to hire 
outside labour. This result is expected as the analysis in Chapter 3 showed that 
compared to poor household (in farming resources) those households that were rich in 
in farming resources(for example, land, labour and livestock) were more likely to get 
access to extension services. Thus, relative to poor farmers, rich farmers are expected 
to rent in more land and less likely to rent out their land.   
A lack of secure land tenure was identified as one of the key determinants of farmers’ 
land and labour market participation decisions in rural Ethiopia (De Brauw & 
Mueller, 2012; Deininger, et al, 2011; Holden et al., 2011). In contrast to these 
findings, in this study none of the variables indicating household tenure security 
status are significant in the factor market participation equations. Thus, farmers’ 
perception of tenure insecurity (expectations of losing land) and land transfer rights 
had no impact on their land rental and labour market participation decisions. The 
result is consistent with what was found by Segers et al. (2010) and results I found in 
Chapter 2; given the nature of rural factor markets farmers’ participation in land 




Lastly, the coefficients on village dummy variables suggest that there were significant 
differences in factor prices and other socio-economic variables from one village to 
another; thus, decisions on participation in the land and labour markets could differ 
from one village to the next.  
In summary, the analysis in this Chapter shows that households who were well 
endowed with farming resources were more likely to participate as a tenant in land 
rental markets and hire outside labour, while household who were poorly endowed 
with farming resources were more likely to rent out part of their land and work at off 
farm jobs. These results suggest the presence of significant market imperfections in 
credit and non-land factor markets in rural areas. Although farm households use 
sharecropping contractual arrangements to overcome credit and factor market 
imperfections, poor frames may still be rationed out from tenancy markets, if 
sharecropping involves initial input cost sharing arrangements.   
4.7. Conclusion   
This chapter examine decisions pertaining participation in the land rental and labour 
markets made by farm households in rural Ethiopia. Results from descriptive and 
econometric analysis suggest that imperfections in land, labour, drought animals, and 
credit markets were important factors in determining the nature of household 
participations in rural factor markets. However, perceived tenure security status was 
not related to any of the factor market participation decisions. In general, results show 
that households that were well endowed with farming skills and resources, and got 
access to credit were more likely to participate as a tenant in land lease markets and 




were less endowed with farming skills and resources were more likely to rent out their 
land and participate at off-farm jobs. In this way, land rental markets enhanced 
allocative efficiency by transferring land from less efficient farmers to farmers that 
are more efficient.   
Moreover, results show evidence of a non-linear relationship between plot size and 
decisions by households concerning land rental and labour market participations. An 
increase in plot size was initially correlates positively with a greater likelihood of 
renting out land, but this likelihood decreased after a certain level of plot size. 
Likewise, an increase in plot size initially decreased the likelihood of land renting in, 
but land renting in increased after a certain level of plot size. These findings suggest 
that, against the background of many imperfections in the non-land factor markets, 
not only land rich households who rent out land, but households that are poorly 
endowed with non-land productive assets (but not necessary rich in land) 
If markets for insurance and credit function perfectly (smoothly), and there are no 
significant transaction costs associated with land and labour markets, efficiency can 
be achieved either by using the land rental markets or the labour markets (Otsuka et 
al, 1992; Otsuka, 2007). In such cases, farmers with less faming ability can rent out 
their land to more able famers and earn income by selling their labour in the nonfarm 
sector. This suggests that given the lack of well-paid off-farm employment 
opportunities in rural areas coupled with a lack of credit to finance agricultural 
production, it appears that land renting out by poor households can increase their 
vulnerability, worsen their poverty, and make their food supply insecure. This implies 
that participation in land rental markets has important implications for income 




examine the relationship between households’ participation in land rental markets and 




















CHAPTER 5: POVERTY PERSISTENCE IN ETHIOPIA: THE ROLE OF LAND 
RENTAL MARKETS 
 5.1. Introduction  
While the agricultural sector in Ethiopia accounts for about 43% of the national GDP, 
it employs approximately 85% of the country’s labour force (MoARD, 2010). This 
indicates a lower return to agricultural labour. A decline in per capita farm size, 
owing to lack of alternative employment opportunities coupled with rapid population 
growth in the country, resulted in a reduction in the marginal productivity of farm 
labour and increased the prevalence and persistent of poverty in rural areas (Rahmato, 
2004). In this regard, access to additional land is an important determinant of farm 
household income in rural Ethiopia. For this reason, in Ethiopia and many other poor 
agrarian economies, there has been a renewed interest in facilitating access to land for 
the poor as a poverty-reducing tool (Holden, Otsuka & Place, 2009).   
Several studies show that access to land had a significant and positive effect on 
household welfare (Bigsten, Kebede, Shimeles & Taddesse, 2003; de Janvry & 
Sadoulet, 2001; Ellis & Bahiigwa, 2003; Ellis & Mdoe, 2003; Finan, Sadoulet & de 
Janvry, 2005; Jayne et al., 2003; Karugia, Oluoch-Kosura, Nyikal, Odumbe, & 
Marenya, 2006; Keswell  & Carter, 2014; Mukherjee & Benson, 2003; Nguyen & 
Tran, 2013; Van Landeghem, Swinnen, & Vranken, 2013). However, it is also 
suggested that the welfare benefit of access to land can be very limited if other 
complementary assets, such as access to credit and labour, are not available for small-
scale farmers (Carter & May, 1999;Carter & Olinto, 2003; Carter & Zimmerman, 




In the face of multiple market imperfections in credit and other non-land factor 
markets in many developing countries, well-functioning land rental market is 
considered important in facilitating access to land for the poor (Deininger, 2003; 
Deininger & Jin, 2005). Despite this, little is known about the impacts of farmers’ 
participation in land rental markets on household poverty dynamics. For example, 
studies by Tatwangire and Holden (2011) from Uganda, and Jin and Jayne (2013) 
from Kenya, show that access to land through land rental markets increased 
household income. These studies though only considered the impacts of participation 
in land rental markets on household income/welfare for those households that 
participated on the demand side of the land rental markets.   
The study by Jin and Jayne (2013) show that once the rental payment and other 
production costs are accounted for, access to land through land rental markets 
increased households' crop and total income by an average of 25.1% and 6.65%, 
respectively, compared to not renting (p.267). They show that households who leased 
in land generated 2.19 shillings of net crop revenue on rented land for every 1 shilling 
paid to the owner of the land. This suggests that tenants received high net revenue 
from producing on rented plots. Likewise, a recent study by Keswell and Carter 
(2014) in South Africa show that the long-term effects of asset transfer programs 
(land transfers) are larger than cash transfer programs because asset transfers “have 
the potential to crowd-in investment, learning, and income increases beyond what 
would be expected from the direct transfer alone” (p.260).  
Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 4 shows that in contrast to tenants, those farmers 
who leased out their land were at the lower end of the asset distribution scale.  




markets is associated with poverty reduction for both landlord and tenant households. 
Thus, this chapter aims to analyse the relationship between households’ land rental 
market participation decisions and poverty dynamics using data from rural Ethiopia. 
Given landlords are relatively asset poor compared to tenants, this study hypothesised 
that agricultural output and total income would be higher for those households who 
leased in land, while it would be smaller for those who leased out land. Thus, 
participation in land rental markets as a tenant is expected to improve households’ 
chance of escaping poverty, while participation as a landlord is expected to be 
associated with less likelihood of escaping poverty.   
The study contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between land access 
and household welfare in two ways. First, the study examines the relationship 
between participation on the supply side of the land rental markets and household 
poverty dynamics; this issue is not well studied. Second, and in contrast to other 
studies which used consumption or income data to analyse poverty transitions, this 
study  uses both an asset index and self-rated subjective welfare indicators to measure 
household welfare. It is well known that poverty in rural areas is multidimensional (El 
Ghonemy, 2007). Thus, one advantage of using self-rated and asset-based poverty 
indicators is that these indicators account for the non-income dimensions of welfare. 
In addition, asset-based poverty indicators are considered less prone to measurement 
errors, and it enable us to distinguish persistent structural poverty from transitory 
poverty (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000; Carter & Barrett, 2006; Filmer & Scott, 2012).  
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 begins with a literature 
review. Section 5.3 describes the patterns of land inequality in the sample area and 




estimation results are then discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Section 5.6 
concludes the chapter by providing a summary of the major findings.   
5.2. Literature Review: Theory and Empirical Evidence   
In a model of perfectly functioning factor markets, where it is assumed that factors of 
production are paid their marginal products, the initial land ownership distribution 
will not matter. This is because the market would re-allocate land to more efficient 
and able producers, thus contributing both to allocative and productive efficiency 
(Benjamin & Brandt, 1997; Otsuka, 2007). In such a situation, “Inequality of land 
thus maps directly into inequality of income through the implied distribution of rental 
income” (Benjamin & Brandt, 1997, p.461).   
In contrast, in areas characterised by both land scarcity and substantial market failures 
in labour, credit, and insurance markets, land ownership grants benefits in excess of 
the scarcity rent (Benjamin & Brandt, 1997; Finan et al., 2005). In this case, secure 
access to land determines a household’s ability to produce for its subsistence. That 
household then self-insures itself against food price increases, unemployment risks, as 
well as improves its position in financial markets (Benjamin & Brandt, 1997; 
Burgess, 2001; Deininger, 2003; de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2000, 2001; Ellis, 2000; 
Finan et al., 2005; Jayne et al., 2003). The initial distribution of land, hence, has 
important implications for poverty reduction and income inequality. In addition, 
improved access to land usually leads to an increase in economic growth and poverty 
reduction (Deininger, 2003; Jayne et al., 2003; Salam, Kamara & Brixiova, 2010). For 




agrarian economies, there has been a renewed interest in facilitating access to land for 
the poor as a poverty-reducing tool (Holden et al, 2009).   
Moreover, the observed inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity 
and/ or labour intensity in most developing countries suggests that small-scale 
farmers with family labour are more productive compared to large-scale farmers with 
hired labour (Benjamin & Brandt, 2002; Berry & Cline, 1979; Carletto, Savastano & 
Zezza, 2013; Feder, 1985; Lipton, 2006, 2009).41 One implication of these findings 
was that land redistribution from large-scale farmers to small-scale farmers would 
improve overall welfare by improving efficiency and farm output (Berry & Cline, 
1979; Griffin, Khan & Ickowitz, 2002; Lipton, 2009). Consequently, government 
mandated land redistributions have been wildly used in most parts of the developing 
world, including Ethiopia, to improve access to land for the poor, and equalise factor 
proportions at farm level.  
Some researchers argued that given a high degree of initial land inequality, 
government mandated land redistributive reforms could enhance equitable access to 
land, increase overall output, and reduce income inequality and poverty in rural areas 
(Berry & Cline, 1979; Griffin, Khan & Ickowitz, 2002). However, government 
mandated land redistribution is also criticized on the ground that it adversely affects 
security of tenure and efficient resource allocation, thereby negatively affecting 
investment and agricultural productivity (Deininger et al., 2011; Holden et al., 2011).   
                                                 





In this regard, it is suggested that from both the equity and efficiency perspectives, 
land markets can play a key role in adjusting factor ratios at farm level (Deininger, 
2003; Jin & Deininger, 2009; Yamano, Place, Nyangena, Wanjiku, &Otsuka, 2009). 
In particular, land rental markets tend to promote the transfer of land from large 
and/or less efficient farmers to small and/or more efficient farmers (Ahmed, 
Gebremedhin, Benin & Ehui, 2002; Deininger, 2003; Deininger & Mpuga, 2009; 
Deininger et al., 2011; Jin & Deininger, 2009; Gavian & Ehui, 1999; Kassie & 
Holden, 2007; Otsuka, 2007). In this way, better allocative and productive efficiency 
can be achieved through land rental markets, as these markets can allow land to be 
used by households that need it and are able to farm it.   
However, as mentioned in Chapter 4, due to significant transaction costs, land rental 
markets do not often operate efficiently (Deininger et al., 2009, 2011). Moreover, 
because of multiple imperfections in credit and non-land factor markets, the 
contribution of land rental markets to achieve equitable distribution of land holdings 
is also limited. Previous studies show that land rental markets transferred land from 
land-rich farmers to land-poor and landless farmers contributing to more equitably 
operational land holdings (Deininger et al., 2009, 2011; Deininger & Mpuga, 2009; 
Pender & Fafchamps 2001). However, there is also evidence that land rental contracts 
tend to transfer land from land-poor and/or female-headed households to land-rich 
and/male-headed households (Gebregziabher & Holden, 2009; Ghebru & Holden, 
2008; Tikabo, 2003). The analysis in Chapter 4 of this study also shows that due to 
significant market imperfections in other non-land factor and credit markets, asset 




Such land renting out by poor landlords important means of mitigating their resource 
constraints in the short-run. In particular, land rental contracts such as sharecropping 
can directly compensate for market failures in credit, insurance, and managerial skills 
(Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1986). However, in the face 
of limited access to credit and off-farm employment opportunities in rural Ethiopia, 
land renting out by poor farmers may increase their vulnerability and affect their 
long-term welfare adversely. For example, a study by Gebregziabher and Holden 
(2011) showed that poor landlords that had experienced shocks such as food shortage 
were more likely to rent out their land at reduced price at the expense of future 
income. For this reason, it is important to understand the impacts of land renting by 
poor-farmers on their household welfare.   
Although existing evidence suggests a significant and positive impact of access to 
land on household income/welfare, most of the existing studies on this issue looked at 
the effects of access to land, mainly obtained through either administrative allocation 
or inheritance on household income/welfare. There is a lack of empirical evidence 
showing the connection between decisions by farm households to participate in land 
rental markets and household poverty. In the context of Africa, Jin and Jayne (2013) 
in Kenya have recently analysed the impact of participation in land rental markets on 
the sample households’ crop and total income. These researchers show that access to 
land through land rental markets increased households' crop and total income by an 
average of 25.1% and 6.65%, respectively, compared to not renting (p.267). This 
suggests that tenants received high net revenue from producing on rented plots.   
Likewise, using data from Uganda, Tatwangire and Holden (2011) examined the 




found that land acquired through land markets (both rent and purchase) has strong 
positive welfare effect. However, these studies considered the impacts of participation 
in land rental markets on household income only for those households that 
participated on the demand side of the land rental markets. Against this background, 
this chapter is concerned with the analysis of the relationship between households’ 
participation decisions in land rental markets and their welfare for both tenant and 
landlord households.   
The analysis relies on the agricultural household model developed in Chapter 4, 
where farm households assumed to get their income from working on farm (including 
rented land), from off-farm employment, and from renting out their land. The model 
assumes that loan access depends on household wealth and land size. Thus, if we 
assume that the same production technology is used in the production process, then 
agricultural productivity (output) depends on resource endowments (Guirkinger & 
Boucher, 2008). As a result, resource poor households are expected to have lower 
agricultural output compared to resource rich households. Moreover, land-poor 
households have limited access to well-paying off-farm jobs in rural Ethiopia. For 
example, the study by Jayne et al. (2003) showed that in the case of Ethiopia, the off 
farm income share as a whole was only 12.7% of the total income for households in 
the lower land-size quantiles.42   
Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 4 shows that in contrast to tenants, those farmers 
who leased out their land were at the lower end of the asset distribution scale. Given 
landlords are relatively asset poor compared to tenants, this study hypothesised that 
                                                 




agricultural output and total income would be higher for those households who leased 
in land, while it would be smaller for those who leased out land. Thus, participation in 
land rental markets as a tenant is expected to improve households’ chance of escaping 
poverty, while participation as a landlord is expected to be associated with less 
likelihood of escaping poverty.   
Data on the amount of net farm and non-farm income, and income obtained from land 
renting out activities are not complete in the dataset. As a result, it is not possible to 
directly compare net gains obtained from land renting in activities with that of land 
renting out activities. Instead, using asset index and subjective poverty indicators, this 
study examines whether the likelihood of escaping poverty is related with 
participation on either side of the land rental markets. In subsequent sections, I 
examine the relationship between land access, participation in land rental markets, 
and household poverty. Appendix B, provides the framework used to construct asset-
based poverty measures in this study. 
5.3. Land Endowments, Land Rental Markets and Economic Well-being  
The pre-1975 land tenure system was characterised by a highly unequal distribution 
of land. Thus, equity, efficiency and the provision of a social safety net were the 
primary functions of both the initial land reform in 1975 and other subsequent land 
reforms in Ethiopia. In general, following the land reform in 1975, there was a strong 
presumption that land was more equitably distributed in Ethiopia when compared to 
other African countries (Rahmato, 1993). However, recent empirical studies have 
questioned this presumption (Kebede, 2008; Githinji & Mersha & 2007). For 




(2008) showed that the Gini coefficient for per-adult (PA) allocated land size is 
0.596; moreover, this coefficient remains as high as 0.439, even after trimming the 
top and bottom 10% of the data. This result suggests the presence of high inequality 
in land holdings among rural areas of the country. In this section, using a more recent 
data set (from 1994 and 2009 survey rounds), I examine the current land distribution 
pattern in the sample area, together with the change over time and its relation to 
household income and asset holdings.  
5.3.1.   Land distribution pattern in the sample area 
Table 5.1 provides decile rankings of allocated and cultivated land sizes for sample 
households in the 1994 and 2009 survey years. In 1994, households in the bottom two 
deciles of land distribution of  had only 0.34 hectares of allocated land which reduced 
to 0.1 and 0.07 hectares when one takes into account the per-adult allocated land size 
and the per-adult cultivated land size, respectively. These figures show that there were 
very many almost-landless households in the sample area.   
Table 5.1: Deciles of allocated and cultivated land sizes (1994 and 2009) 



















10 0.09 0.02 0.01 
 
0.37 0.09 0.03 
20 0.25 0.08 0.06 
 
0.50 0.14 0.09 
30 0.50 0.14 0.12 
 
0.75 0.20 0.15 
40 0.75 0.19 0.17 
 
1.00 0.27 0.21 
50 1.00 0.28 0.25 
 
1.15 0.33 0.29 
60 1.44 0.39 0.36 
 
1.50 0.42 0.36 
70 2.00 0.53 0.50 
 
2.00 0.54 0.48 
80 2.75 0.73 0.69 
 
2.75 0.71 0.63 
90 4.25 1.15 1.00 
 
3.50 1.03 0.86 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: here ‘allocated land’ means land 






However, the results shown in Table 5.1 indicate that both the allocated and 
cultivated land sizes increased significantly in 2009, especially for households in the 
bottom four deciles of the land distribution. On the one hand, allocated land size 
increased by about 300% for households in the first (bottom) decile and by about 
100% for those in the second-from-bottom decile. On the other hand, the per-adult 
allocated land size declined by 2%  and 10%  for households in the top two deciles of 
the land distribution, respectively. Such shifts may reflect the nature of land 
redistributions in the past as in many instances, land redistribution in Ethiopia had 
involved taking land from large holders and giving it to smaller holders (Alemu, 
1999).  
Results in Table 5.1 also indicate evidence of high inequality in the land- holding 
sizes in the sample area. For example in 1994, the average allocated land-holding size 
per adult in the top two deciles was 18.8 times larger than the corresponding figure in 
the bottom two deciles, while the average per-adult cultivated land size in the top two 
deciles was 24 times larger than the figure in the bottom two deciles of the 
distribution. Likewise, the Pen’s Parade dispersion measure (Figure B.1 in the 
Appendix) also shows that for all study periods, the land-rich household had over five 
times more land than the mean land size allocated per adult. Moreover, the Gini 
coefficient in 1994 was 0.54 and 0.53 for the per-adult allocated and cultivated land 
sizes, respectively (Table 5.2). These results suggest that there is a high degree of 






However, there is a slight decrease in inequality over time for both the per-adult 
allocated and cultivated land sizes; this decrease is evident for all inequality measures 
(Refer to Table 5.2. and Figures B.2 and B.3 in the Appendix). For example, the Gini 
coefficient for the per-adult allocated land size reduced from 0.54 in 1994 to 0.46 in 
2009, while it reduced from 0.53 to 0.45 for the per-adult cultivated land size. Access 
to additional land through Peasant Associations (PA) allocation might have 
contributed to the decline in inequality in the per-adult allocated land holdings. The 
change in inequity in the per-adult cultivated land size could be partly attributed to 
land rental markets because participation in land rental markets is officially allowed 
after 1994. 
Despite the decline in land inequality over time, the inequality analysis suggests that 
there is a significant gap between the land-poor and land-rich households in rural 





GE( a = 1) 
 Mean Log 
Deviation 
GE( a = 0) 
 Half Coeff. 
Var. squared 
GE(a = 2) 
Per-adult equivalent PA Allocated land 
1994 0.54 0.51 0.70 0.67 
1999 0.51 0.45 0.52 0.67 
2004 0.47 0.38 0.46 0.51 
2009 0.46 0.36 0.45 0.46 
Per-adult cultivated land size 
1994 0.53 0.48 0.68 0.61 
1999 0.46 0.36 0.44 0.44 
2004 0.45 0.35 0.43 0.47 
2009 0.45 0.35 0.46 0.41 




areas of Ethiopia. Furthermore, the data show evidence of a strong and monotonic 
relationship between the average amount of per-adult cultivated land size and the per 
adult allocated land size (Table B.1 in the Appendix and Figure 5.1). For example, 
Table B.1 shows that 10% of the land-poor households, on average, cultivated only 
0.06 and 0.08 hectares of land in 1994 and 2009, respectively. The corresponding 
figures for the top 10% of the land-rich households were 1.28 and 1.05 hectares, 
respectively. These figures show that on average households with small amounts of 
allocated land holdings also cultivated small sizes of land, while land-rich households 
cultivated, on average, larger land sizes.   
Figure 5.1: Allocated and cultivated land size distributions (1994 and 2009) 
 
 
5.3.2. Land endowment and poverty  
Using both asset-based and subjective poverty indicators, this sub-section discusses 
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Kernel density estimates from the 1994 and 2009 rounds of ERHS panel data.
Note: Allocated and cultivated land sizes are per-adult equivalent land sizes.
Allocated land refers to land holdings excluding plots obtained thorough land rental markets.
Cultivated land refers to land obtained thorough both market and non-market means.
 Source: Own calculations.




households. Data on the subjective poverty indicators were collected only during the 
2004 and 2009 survey years of the ERHS. Household heads were asked to answer 
these questions. One of the subjective well-being indicator asked respondents to 
evaluate economic well-being of a household in general. Answers to this question 
coded “poor” (code 1) to “rich” (code 5). Multiple correspondence analysis is used to 
construct the asset index. See Appendix B for the detail on the methodology.  
Given that farming is the dominant source of employment and the main income 
source in rural areas, household income is expected to be lower for households that 
are poor in terms of PA allocated land holdings. To examine this, Figure 5.2 presents 
the trends in 2009 for average per-adult livestock holdings and gross farm and 
nonfarm income by allocated land holding deciles.43 The figure shows the presence of 
a positive and monotonic relationship between per-adult allocated land deciles and 
per-adult livestock holdings and farm income. In contrast, there is relatively little 
correlation between off-farm income and the land holding size distribution, though 
off-farm income was on average higher for land-rich households compared to land-
poor households. The result indicates that land is the key determinant of household 
income and welfare in rural Ethiopia.  
 
 
                                                 
43 Calculating net farm income is not easy because the data on agricultural inputs seem 
unreliable and incomplete. Data on off-farm income were collected only for participation in 
off-farm jobs in four months for each year. Therefore, to make it comparable with farm 
income, I multiplied the off-farm household income by 3. However, given the seasonal nature 
of the off-farm jobs this figure surely exaggerates the total off-farm income a household gets 




Figure 5.2: Average income and asset values by land size deciles (2009)  
  
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS, 2009. Note: Both farm and off-farm 
incomes are gross incomes. All the figures are expressed in terms of per-adult equivalent 
household size.   
  
Table 5.3 further illustrates the relationship between the distribution of land holdings 
and household poverty in the sample area. Both the subjective poverty indicators and 
the asset index variable were used to measure poverty.44 The result shows that the 
average asset index increases with respect to the increase in land holding quantile. 
The average welfare index for households in the first land holding quintile was only 
0.6, while the figure increased to 2.1 for those in the second land holding quantile and 
it further increased to 2.8 for those in the fifth quintile. Likewise, for households in 
the first quintile, the percentage of households reporting that they were poor was 
36.3% based on the self-rated poverty scale variable and 62.5% based on the general 
economic condition indicator variable: the corresponding percentages were only 
                                                 
44 Households were classified as ‘poor’ based on the self-rated poverty scale variable if they 
had reported that they were poor/destitute or they never had enough for their family. 
Similarly, based on the general economic condition variable, households were classified as 




17.4% and 36% for those in the fifth quintile. These results also suggest that land is 
among the key determinants of household poverty in rural Ethiopia.   
In addition, it is evident that the average household size increases with respect to an 
increase in the size of land holdings (Table B.1 in the Appendix). This finding is 
consistent with the fact that PA officials often allocate land to farm households based 
mainly on family size. In view of the existing low level of technology in rural 
Ethiopia, labour is an important input for agricultural production, which suggests that 
land-rich households were in a better position than land-poor households to exploit 
their land holdings and family labour.   
Table 5.3: Household poverty status by land holding quintile (2009) 












First  36.3 62.5 0.6 
Second  33.5 56.5 2.1 
Third  23.4 50.4 2.2 
Fourth 19.0 41.7 2.6 
Fifth  17.4 36.0 2.8 
Total  25.9 49.4 2.9 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
 
    
The positive relationship between allocated land holding size, other household asset 
holdings, and household poverty suggests that the initial land distribution has 
important implications for the distribution of income and rural poverty. Unlike 
allocated land holdings, the degree of inequality in operational land holdings can be 
reduced by means of land rental markets as these markets allow for the transfer of 




findings in this section suggest that the factor-equalising effect of land rental markets 
was very limited; indeed, it appears that the operational land holding size depends far 
more on the initial land holding size for a given household. This strong positive 
relationship between the operational land holding size and the initial land holding size 
suggests that poor households are less likely to get access to additional land through 
land rental markets.   
Table 5.4 illustrates the relationship between the self-rated poverty status of 
households and their decisions concerning participation in the land rental markets.45 
The table shows that as far as those households that consider themselves as poor are 
concerned, 29% never participated, 11% leased in land, and 60.1% leased out land. 
As far as those who reported never having enough for their family are concerned, 
35.5% remained self-sufficient, 17.4% leased in land, and 47.2% leased out land. The 
percentage of households that participated at least three times in the demand side of 
the rental market was higher in the case of those that were very rich or rich (28.5%) 
than those were poor/destitute households (2%). In contrast, the percentage of 
households that leased out land more frequently was found to be higher for those who 




                                                 
45 In the analysis, the participation condition for land rental markets was not restricted to the 
period 2004 and 2009. For example, the variable Rent in (>=3times) indicates that households 






















      
  
 Poor/ destitute  29.0 9.0 2.0 42.0 18.1 410 17.1 
Never had enough 35.5 13.2 4.2 36.5 10.7 310 12.9 
Can manage  29.6 19.6 8.0 34.2 8.5 739 30.8 
Comfortable 28.4 22.2 17.8 25.8 6.0 772 32.1 
Very rich/rich 21.5 24.4 28.5 21.5 4.1 172 7.2 
Total sample 704 436 266 774 223 2403   
(%) 29.3 18.1 11.1 32.2 9.3   100 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.  
Notes: Leased in(>=3 times) and leased (>=3 times) indicate participation in land 
rental markets for at least three times since 1994. 
  
 
To summarise, the preceding descriptive analysis suggests evidence of high inequality 
in per-adult allocated and per-adult cultivated land size distributions in rural Ethiopia. 
Moreover, there is evidence of a strong and monotonic relationship between allocated 
land holdings and cultivated land holdings implying that households with smaller 
initial allocated land holdings also cultivated smaller land sizes. Farm households 
with smaller land holdings were also found to be poorer (in terms of livestock and 
farm income) than land-rich households.   
Furthermore, the findings provide evidence of a relatively higher incidence of poverty 
among households that participated on the supply side of the land rental markets, 
when compared with those that participated as tenants. This implies that those 
households that leased out lands were more likely to be poor compared to those who 
leased in land. The descriptive analysis, however, cannot control for factors that affect 




Therefore, in the next section, I use estimation techniques to analyse the impacts of 
participation in land rental markets on household poverty using both the asset index 
variable and the self-rated subjective poverty indicator to measure household poverty.  
 5.4. Estimation Strategies  
This section describes the estimation strategies used in the econometric analysis. First 
is a discussion of the estimation techniques used to analyse the relationship between 
participation in land rental markets and household poverty status. Following this, I 
discuss the estimation technique used to analyse poverty dynamics for tenant and 
landlord households.   
 5.4.1. Relationship between participation in land rental markets and household 
poverty  
The dependent variable of interest is poverty (measured at household level). Two 
alternative poverty measures were used in this analysis. The first one is the subjective 
welfare indicator variable (self-rated poverty scale), which indicates a sample 
household’s perception of their current level of economic well-being, using a scale 
from 1 to 5. The second one is the welfare index variable, the Composite Poverty 
Index (CPI1) variable, which is a continuous variable.46 The use of these alternative 
measures may help to check the robustness of my findings to different measures of 
poverty.  
                                                 
46 The Composite Poverty Index (CPI1) is calculated without including variables that directly 
affect land rental market participation decisions using data from the 2004 and 2009 survey 
rounds. The variables excluded from the CPI1calculation are land size, number of oxen in a 
household, ownership of farming equipment (hoe and plough), household-head 




The general empirical model depicting the relationship between a household’s land 
renting activity and the household’s poverty status is provided using the following 
single latent variable index model (Wooldridge, 2010):  
      [1] 
Here,  indicates  unobserved latent variable for the dependent variable indicating a 
given welfare indicator;  indicates a vector of independent variables measuring 
certain household characteristics that are expected to affect household welfare;  
indicates  a variable used to distinguish rental behaviour of households (i.e. rent in, 
rent out or autarkic);  indicates time-persistent, unobserved household 
heterogeneity; and,  indicates random error term, while β and  are vectors of 
parameters related to the independent variables in the model. In addition to the socio-
economic household characteristics, village (woreda) dummies were included in the 
estimation model to control for differences in agro-ecological conditions, cropping 
practices, population pressure, access to markets, and prices.  
Due to the ordered nature of the subjective welfare indicator variable, it is common 
practice to employ ordered probit/logit estimation models in order to estimate the 
impact of participation in land rental markets on subjective economic well-being. 
Based on these estimation models, the observed ordinal variable, , takes on values 
ranging from 1 through M according to the following scheme (ignoring and the 
time subscript  for simplicity): 
  if  <  ,    [2] 

















where  and  
Then, the probability that observation ‘I’ will select alternative ‘j’ is: 
                                    =  
                                       =  
                                       =  
                                      =  
For ordered probit, F is a standard normal cumulative density function, while for 
ordered logit, F is the logistic cumulative density function. The sign of the regression 
parameters, β and , shows whether the latent variable  increases with a regressor. 
For instance, if  is positive, then any increase in  decreases the probability of 
being in the lowest category (in my case being poor) and increases the probability of 
being in the highest category (being less poor).  
One of the assumptions underlying the standard ordered probit/logit models is the 
proportional odds/parallel regression assumption; this assumes that the estimated 
coefficients of independent variables are the same across all categories of an ordered 
dependent variable. However, this assumption is often violated (Pfarr, Schmid, & 
Schneider, 2011; Williams, 2006). For instance, it is possible that the e ects of 
participation in land rental markets could be different in respect of different parts of 
the outcome distribution. In this event, alternative models such as the generalised 
ordered probit/logit models can be used. These models relax the parallel regression 
assumption of the standard ordered probit/logit models (Williams, 2006). Moreover, 
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individual heterogeneity in the model can be accounted for using the random-effects 
generalised ordered probit model (Pfarr, Schmid, & Schneider, 2011). For these 
reasons, I estimated both the standard ordered probit models and the generalised 
ordered probit models with random effects specification.   
In the case of the second dependent variable, the asset index variable, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation technique can be used. However, in estimating the effects 
of participation in land rental markets on household poverty, the decision to 
participation in land rental markets could be endogenous. One potential source of 
endogeneity bias is that unobserved characteristics could influence poverty status and 
farmers’ participation decisions in the land rental markets simultaneously. Another 
source of endogeneity is reverse causality. Poverty in farming resources may lead to 
farmers to participation in land rental activities (for example rent out their land). 
These endogeneity issues could result in a biased estimation.  
 In order to deal with the endogeneity problems mentioned above, I used the 
estimation framework proposed by Deb and Trivedi (2006). The model allows 
estimating the outcome equation and a selection equation that generating process of 
the treatment simultaneously. The outcome variable can be continuous, binary or 
integer-valued, while the treatment choice is assumed to follow a mixed multinomial 
logit distribution. In my case, the outcome variable is the Composite Poverty Index 
variable (CPI1), while the endogenous multinomial treatment variable is the variable 
indicating households’ land rental market participation choices. Following Deb and 




Three alternative models were estimated using three alternative measures of the main 
variable of interest ( Rit ), which indicates the status of a household’s participation in 
land rental markets. The first model (Model 1) includes a variable indicating 
participation in land rental markets for each survey year separately (2004 and 2009), 
and all households fall into one of three categories: leased in, not participated, and 
leased out. The second model (Model 2) includes a variable indicating the type of 
participation in land rental markets since 2004 for those households that never 
participated in rental markets before then; the purpose is to exclude the effect of 
earlier land renting activity on current poverty status (2009). The third model (Model 
3) includes a variable indicating the frequency of household participation in rental 
markets since 1994. Accordingly, households were classified as follows: never 
participated (never); leased in one  or two times (leased in sometimes); leased in three 
or more times (leased in most of the time); leased out one or two times (leased out 
sometimes) ,and leased out three or more times (leased out most of the time). In all 
the models, non-participates are the base category.  
5.4.2. Poverty Persistency and Land Rental Markets  
This section presents the techniques used to analyse poverty dynamics for tenant and 
landlord households. Survival (duration) data analysis has been used widely to study 
poverty dynamics (Bane & Ellwood, 1986; Jenkins, 2000). In survival data analysis, 
the outcome to be modelled is the time to an event of interest: the survival time 
(Allison, 1995). The main advantage of using survival (duration) data analysis is that 
it overcomes the estimation bias due to the problem of non-normality of the 




In addition, all survival data analysis techniques accommodate right censoring which 
is a common phenomenon in longitudinal and survival data (Allison, 1995). Usually 
three types of censoring are encountered in any survival data analysis: right 
censoring, left censoring, and interval censoring (Allison, 1995). Right censoring 
occurs either when the subject under study stops being at risk for various reasons (for 
example, dropping out of the study or experiencing another competing risk) or the 
event does not occur before the end of the observation period. This leads to an 
underestimate of the true (but unknown) time to the event of interest. The standard 
approach to address right censoring is to assume that the censoring is non-informative 
(independent censoring) which means that censoring time is conditionally 
independent from the survival time of interest, given the covariates (Allison, 1995; 
Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012).  
Left censoring occurs when one begins observing an individual at some arbitrary 
point in time, but the observer does not know when the subject becomes at risk for the 
event. One common remedy is to drop data from the first observation. However, most 
studies ignore this type of censoring because left censoring is less common than right 
censoring; in particular, in the medical field. The third type of censoring is interval 
censoring, which occurs when the event in question occurred between two time 
points, but the exact time is unknown. This type of censoring is also common in 
longitudinal studies. For example, a sample household’s poverty status can change 
from poor at the first round to non-poor at the next round, and then the poverty time is 
interval because we do not know the exact time the event occurred. If the censoring 
times are regularly spaced, then interval censoring can often be addressed by discrete 




In this study, the event of interest is the amount of time to the end of poverty spells or 
non-poverty spells. The approach followed in the study to analyse poverty dynamics 
is the hazard rate approach initiated by Bane and Ellwood (1986). This approach 
estimates the probability of ending poverty spells (exit rates) or non-poverty spells 
(entry rates). The model also accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and duration 
dependence in the hazard rates; this allows for an examination of the effects of time 
varying factors on poverty persistence.  
Most studies define a spell of poverty as beginning at time t, when a household 
becomes poor after being observed as not poor at time t-1. Similarly, a non-poverty 
spell begins at time t when a household becomes not poor after being poor at time t-1. 
According to this approach the data eligible for analysis start at wave two (in my case 
data collected in 1999). However, the data show that most households which were 
poor (non-poor) at the first round in 1994 continued to be poor (non-poor) in 1999. 
Therefore, if one follows a similar approach to define poverty spells, then much of the 
data will be dropped as the study has only a short period panel (four regularly spaced 
waves). For this reason, the study analyses the time taken to end a spell of poverty as 
defined for a cohort of households that started poverty spells at the start of the 
observation (1994). Likewise, the study analyses the time taken to end non-poverty 
spells as defined for a cohort of households that started their non-poverty spells at the 
start of the observation (also 1994). Thus, all first spells are left censored because it is 
not known for how long the poor or non-poor households in 1994 started being at risk 
of becoming non-poor or poor, respectively. However, note that even if one were to 
start following the newly poor or non-poor households since 1999, then the transition 




experienced at least one transition since 1994 (over five-year gap). As a result, left 
censoring is unavoidable in this analysis.   
One can apply methods for continuous time survival analysis if the exact survival and 
censoring times are recorded in relatively fine time units. Discrete-time survival data 
are usually characterised by relatively little possible survival (or censoring) times 
with many subjects sharing the same survival time (Allison, 1995; Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2012). Discrete-time data can result from interval censoring, where the 
event occurs in continuous time but the time interval within which it occurred is not 
known or the time scale is inherently or intrinsically discrete. In my data set, 
households were observed within five-year time intervals. Even if the event of interest 
could be generated in a continuous time process, one could only observe the 
occurrence of the event within the given interval; it is not possible to give the exact 
time of occurrence, resulting in discrete-time survival data. Because of this, I applied 
a technique for discrete-time survival data analysis.    
Following Allison (1995), discrete-time hazard survival model is specified in terms of 
the discrete-time hazard; this is defined as the conditional probability that an event 
occurs at time t, given that it has not yet occurred: 
    [3] 
In this study, T is the time in years to exit poverty or enter into poverty; this can take 
on integer values t=1, 2,...,T. The discrete-time survival function is the probability of 





       [4]
 
The survival function is given by: 
      [5]
 
Regarding the analysis procedure, one can use non-regression approaches 
such as Life-table analysis or regression method approaches such as logit or a 
complementary log-log model (Allison, 1995). In particular, a logit model is 
more appropriate for event times that are truly discrete, while a 
complementary log-log is more appropriate for events that can happen at any 
time but are only observed to occur at discrete intervals (Allison, 1995). In 
my case, I could only observe household poverty transitions with five-year 
intervals indicating the presence of interval censoring. For this reason, I used 
a complementary log-log estimation model to analyse poverty transitions.  
The complementary log-log model is one of the alternative proportional hazard 
models applicable to discrete-time hazards (Allison, 1995; Rabe- Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2012). Proportional hazard models are the most widely used techniques for 
modelling covariate effects in continuous-time survival data analysis (Rabe- Hesketh 
& Skrondal, 2012).These models assume that continuous-time hazards are 
proportional; in other words, after controlling for covariate effects the hazard 
functions of different individuals are proportional (the hazard ratio does not depend 
on time). Given ijZ indicates a continuous survival time for subject i  in cluster j , and 













values tTij  , if tijt zZz 1 , then  the discrete time hazard is given by (Rabe- 
Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012:777-782): 
   [6] 
Here,  is the hazard rate,  is the survival function. Using the complementary 
log-log link, the random intercept complementally log-log discrete-time survival 
model is specified as: 
   [7] 
Here, is the random intercept term, which is assumed to be independent 
from the covariates, tsijd indicates a dummy variable for each period. The model also 
can be written in terms of a continuous latent response as: 
   [8] 
Where, sij  has a standard extreme-value type-1 or Gumbel distribution, given the 
covariates and the random intercept . The observed binary response sijy  assigns 1 if 
and otherwise assigns zero.  
I used the Composite Poverty Index (CIP2) variable to measure poverty status of a 
sample household in each period considered when analysing the poverty dynamics. 
The Composite Poverty Index (CPI2) was calculated without including variables that 
directly affect land rental market participation decisions using data from 1994, 1999, 
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defined in relative terms and households were categorised as asset poor if their asset 
index is less than 60% of the median Composite Poverty Index (CPI2) value. The 
variable that indicates the frequency of household participation in rental markets since 
1994 was included in the model to capture household’s land rental market 
participation status. Data from the four rounds (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009) of ERHS 
were used in the analysis.   
5.5. Results and Discussions  
This section first presents estimation results from the ordered probit models and the 
endogenous multinomial treatment effects models. Then, estimation results from the 
survival data analysis are presented.   
  
5.5.1. Relationship between Participation in Land Rental Markets and 
Household Poverty 
I estimated two different models of subjective well-being: the standard ordered probit 
model (Table B.2 in the Appendix) and the generalised ordered probit model with 
random effects, where parameters were allowed to be outcome-specific (Table 5.5).47 
Estimation results from Table B.2 show that the coefficient on the variable indicating 
participation in land rental markets for each year (2004 and 2009) is positive and 
significant (p<0.01) for households who leased in land, while it is negative and 
significant (p<0.01) for households who leased out their land. The estimation 
coefficient on the variable indicating participation in land renting after only 2004 is 
significant (p<0.01) only in the case of land renting out. Similarly, the estimated 
coefficient on the frequency of participation in the land rental markets is positive and 
                                                 
47 Test of parallel regression employed after ordered logit(result not reported here). A significant 




significant for households that leased in land at least once, while it is negative and 
significant for those that leased out their land at least three times. These results 
suggest that the likelihood of being non-poor was higher for households who leased in 
land than non-participants, while the likelihood of being poor was higher for 
households who leased out their land.   
I found similar result from the generalised ordered probit model estimates that land 
renting out was associated with more likelihood of being poor, while land renting in 
was associated with less likelihood of being poor (Table 5.5). In this model, the 
negative effect of land renting out on household welfare is higher for the lower 
categories of the self-rated poverty indicator. For example, the coefficient on the 
frequency of participation in land rental markets is negative and significant for 
households that leased out land at least three times, but only for lower categories 
(categories C1 and C2). These results suggest that among households who leased out 
their land the likelihood of becoming poor was higher for poor households than 
relatively better-off households.   
The results are consistent with the findings in Chapter 4 that asset poor household 
were more likely to participate on the supply side of the land rental markets. These 
results are also consistent with what we have seen in the descriptive analysis that 
there is evidence of a relatively higher incidence of poverty among households that 
participated on the supply side of the land rental markets, when compared with those 





Table 5.5: Random effects generalized ordered probit model ( 2004 and 2009) 
 Model 1   Model 3 
VARIABLES C1 C2 C3 C4   C1 C2 C3 C4 
Land renting in 2004 and 2009        Leased in land  0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20***      
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)      Leased out land  -0.32*** -0.21** -0.20** 0.22      
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14)      
Frequency of participation          Leased in sometimes      0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 
      (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) Leased in most of the time     0.27** 0.27** 0.27** 0.27** 
      (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) Leased out sometimes       -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
      (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Leased out most of the time     -0.38*** -0.32** -0.12 0.22 
      (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) 
Observations 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371   2,376 2,376 2,376 2,376 
loglikelihood -3006 -3006 -3006 -3006  -3015 -3015 -3015 -3015 chi2 714.7 714.7 714.7 714.7   707.1 707.1 707.1 707.1 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.  
Note: The estimation includes regional dummies and other control variables (see Table B.3 for this). Model 2 failed to converge. Standard 





Using the Composite Poverty Index (CPI1) variable as a dependent variable Table 5.6 
provides estimation results from the endogenous multinomial treatment effects model. 
Estimation results from this model also suggest that participation as a tenant in the land 
rental markets was associated with increased household welfare, while participation as a 
landlord was with decreased household welfare. For example, the estimated coefficient on 
the variable indicating participation in the land rental markets for each year (2004 and 
2009) is 0.45 for tenants and it is -0.55 for landlords (both significant at 1% level). This 
result suggests that in comparison with households that did not participate, participation as a 
tenant increased household welfare by 0.45 units, while participation as a landlord 
decreased household welfare by 0.55 units.   
Likewise, in comparison with households that did not participate, participation as a tenant at 
least three times increased household welfare by 0.13 units (significant at 5% level), while 
participation as a landlord at least three times decreased household welfare by 0.62 units 
(significant at 1% level). Moreover, the estimation coefficient on the variable indicating 
participation in land renting after only 2004 is 0.43 units (significant at 1% level) for 
tenants, while it is -0.48 units (significant at 1% level) for landlords. The result suggests 
that in comparison with households that did not participate, participation as a tenant since 
2004 has increased household welfare by 0.43 units, while participation as a landlord 
decreased household welfare by 0.48 units. Thus, results from the multinomial treatment 
effects model estimate consistently indicate that being a tenant was associated with 
increased household welfare, while being a landlord was associated with decreased 
household welfare. These results are also consistent with what I found in the ordered probit 
model estimates using the subjective poverty indicator that households that leased in land 




households that leased out land were more likely to be poor than those that did not 
participate.   
Table 5. 6: Multinomial treatment effects model (pooled data, 2004 and 2009)  
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
land renting in 2004 and 2009 




    
Leased out land   -0.55***  
(0.04)  
  
Land renting only after 2004 





Leased out land    -0.48***  
(0.07)  
 
Frequency of participation  
Leased in sometimes  
  
   
0.06  
(0.05)  
Leased in most of the time  
  
  0.13**  
(0.05)  
Leased out sometimes   
  
  -0.63***  
(0.03)  
Leased out most of the time  
   
 -0.62***  
Observations  2,384  1,114  2,389  
Loglikilhood   -3666  -1606  -4702  
chi2  4126  1383  4634  
p  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.   
Note: Results from the land rental market participation equation is not provided here. The poverty 
equation includes regional dummies and other control variables (see Table B.4 for this). In Model 2 
only data from 2009 used.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
 
Finally, in both the ordered probit and the multinomial treatment effects models, the 
estimated coefficients on other determinants of poverty status are all as expected.  In 




education, male household-head, own a pair of oxen, and had more livestock and per capita 
land holdings were associated with less likelihood of being poor.  
5.5.2. Poverty Persistency and Land Rental Markets  
This section presents estimated results from the survival data analysis. Figure 5.3 and 
Figure 5.4 indicate estimates of the survival function from Life-table analysis by 
participation status in the land rental markets and size of initial land holdings, for ending 
poverty spells and ending non-poverty spells, respectively. The results show that the 
survival rate for ending poverty spells was higher for those households that had a land 
holding size of less than one hectare, while it was the lowest for households with a land 
holding size of three or more hectares (Figure 5.3). This result indicates that households 
who were initially poor (in 1994) were more likely to remain poor if they had a landholding 
size of one hectare or less (high survival rate), while they were more likely to escape 
poverty if they had a landholding size of three or more hectares (low survival rate). The 
result is consistent with results found by other similar studies that access to additional land 
(not necessarily via land rental markets) had a positive effect on household welfare (Bigsten 
et al., 2003; de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2001; Ellis & Bahiigwa, 2003; Ellis & Mdoe, 2003; 
Finan et al., 2005; Jayne et al., 2003)  
Results also show that the survival rate for ending poverty spells was higher for those 
households that leased out lands three or more times during the study period, while it was 
the lowest for households that leased in land three or more times during the study period. 
These results suggest that households who were poor in 1994 were more likely to remain 
poor if they leased out their land more frequently, while they were more likely to become 




Figure 5.3: Survival rates for poor households (1994-2009)  
 
 
Likewise, results show that the survival rate for ending non-poverty spells was higher for 
those households that had a land holding size of three or more hectares/leased in land more 
frequently, while it was the lowest for households with a land holding size of one or less 
hectares/ leased out land more frequently (Figure 5.4). These results suggest that 
households who were not poor in 1994 were more likely to remain not poor if they had a 
land holding size of three or more hectares/leased in land more frequently, while they were 
more likely to become poor if they had a land holding size of one or less hectares/ leased 
out land more frequently. These results are consistent with the findings in section 5.3 that 
there is a positive relationship between land holdings on the one hand, and household 






Figure 5.4: Survival rates for non-poor households (1994-2009)  
 
 
Results from the Life-table analysis are consistent with results I found from other 
estimation models that land renting out was associated with more likelihood of being poor, 
while land renting in was associates with more likelihood of becoming non-poor. However, 
the Life-table analysis does not control for other determinants of poverty transitions. Thus, 
controlling for other determinants of poverty transitions, Table 5.7 presents results from the 
complementary log-log models. Constituent with what I found from the Life-table analysis, 
estimation results show that the estimated hazard rate of escaping poverty (for those who 
were poor in 1994) was significantly (significant at 1% level) lower for households that 
leased out land more frequently, relative to those that did not participate in the land rental 
markets. The result suggests that among households who were poor in 1994 the likelihood 
of escaping poverty was significantly lower for those households who leased out their land 




Likewise, the estimated hazard of entry into poverty was significantly (significant at 1% 
level) higher for households that leased out land at least once, in comparison with those 
households that never participated in the land rental markets, while it is significantly 
(significant at 1% level) lower for those households that leased in land more frequently. 
These results suggest that among households who were not poor in 1994 the likelihood of 
becoming poor was significantly higher for those households who leased out their land at 
least once, relative to those that did not participate in the land rental markets. However, the 
likelihood of non-poor households becoming poor was significantly lower for households 
who leased in land at least three times during the study period.   
Despite the different model estimates used in the analysis, I found consistent results that 
support the stated hypothesis in section 5.2 that in the absence of well-paying off-farm jobs 
in rural areas, land renting-out by poor farmers could adversely affect their effort to 












 Table 5.7: Estimation results from complementary log-log 
models (1994-2009) 
Variables Exit rates Entry rates 
Leased out land most of the time 0.44*** 2.22** 
 
(0.13) (0.77) 
Leased out land sometimes 0.83 1.74*** 
 
(0.19) (0.32) 
Leased in land most of the time 2.18 0.40*** 
 
(1.13) (0.13) 
Leased in land sometimes 0.99 0.75 
 
(0.21) (0.14) 
Plot size > 1 hectares 2.25*** 0.41*** 
 
(0.50) (0.09) 
Plot size >2 hectares 2.66*** 0.33*** 
 
(0.89) (0.14) 
Have a pair of oxen 2.85*** 0.62* 
 
(0.90) (0.17) 
Male family labour  0.99 0.87** 
 
(0.09) (0.06) 
Female family labour  1.03 1.02 
 
(0.09) (0.06) 
Number of  children  0.99 0.94* 
 
(0.05) (0.03) 
Head sex 1.20 1.18 
 
(0.24) (0.23) 
Head can read and write 1.64** 0.52*** 
 
(0.34) (0.08) 
Access to credit 0.88 0.82 
 
(0.19) (0.15) 
Work off-farm wage emp. 1.05 1.16 
 
(0.12) (0.11) 
Work off-farm self emp. 1.03 0.96 
 
(0.16) (0.11) 
Receive transfer income 1.67* 0.86 
 
(0.51) (0.21) 
Equb member 0.76 0.68* 
  (0.21) (0.15) 
Observations 687 1,715 
Loglikilhood -322.2 -561.6 
Rho 0.129 0.296 
sigma_u 0.494 0.833 
lnsig2u 0.24** 0.69 
 
(0.15) (0.34) 
chi2_c 14.83 54.66 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
Note: PA is used as a clustering variable and the estimation includes interval 






Regarding other control variables, results  show that the estimated hazard rate of escaping 
poverty was significantly (significant at 1-5% level) higher for households that had more 
land holdings, oxen, a household head that can read and write, while the estimated hazard of 
entry into poverty was significantly lower for these households and households that had 
more male family labour. Although the estimated hazard rate of escaping poverty was 
significantly higher (at 10% level) for households that received some transfer income, 
participation in local off-farm employment was not significant. This result suggests that 
given most available off-farm employment jobs were not well-paid works (only less than 
2% professional jobs such as teaching) participation in off-farm jobs play a limited role in 
helping farm household to escape poverty in rural Ethiopia. These results suggest that farm 
related assets such as land, oxen, and male labour are the key determinants of household 
income and poverty in rural Ethiopia.   
In summary, the estimation results in this section show that the decisions to lease in land 
was associated with increased household welfare, while the decisions to lease out land was 
associated with decreased household welfare. Furthermore, the findings from the poverty 
dynamics analysis indicate that the probability of falling into poverty (for the non-poor) was 
lower for households that leased in land and/or were rich in farming resources, while it was 
higher for those households that were poor in farming resources and/or leased out their land 
more frequently. These findings are robust across alternative model specifications and the 





5.6. Conclusions   
This chapter examine the relationship between participation by households in land rental 
markets and household poverty, using a panel dataset from ERHS. Results show that both 
household income and asset holdings were positively correlated with household land 
holding sizes. In addition, households with more land holding size were less likely to 
become poor compared to those households with small land holdings. This show that access 
to land is a key determinant of income and poverty in rural Ethiopia. However, results also 
show that access to more land by land-poor households was very limited as land poor 
households on average cultivated smaller land sizes compared to land-rich households. For 
instance, 10% of the land-poor households in the sample, on average, cultivated only 0.08 
hectares of land in the 2009 survey year, while the corresponding figure for the top 10% of 
the land-rich households was 1.05 hectares. This implies that there is a high degree of 
inequality in land holdings in the sample area.  
Analysis of the relationship between participation in land rental markets and household 
poverty status shows that participation in the land rental markets as a tenant was associated 
with a relatively low probability of being poor, while participation as a landlord was 
associated with a higher probability of being poor. Furthermore, estimation results from the 
survival data analysis also suggest that the hazard rate of entering into spells of poverty (for 
initially non-poor) is significantly higher for households that frequently participated as a 
landlord in the land rental markets. This rate is lower for households that participated as a 
tenant. These results suggest  that in the absence of alternative income sources and multiple 
market failures in credit and insurance markets, the chance of becoming poor(and remain 
poor) is higher for those households who rent out their plots, unless the income landlords 




regard, the findings in this chapter imply that the income landlords earn from land renting 
out is not enough to let them escape poverty. 
The analysis in this chapter does not necessary imply that land renting out by farm 
households is a cause of poverty, however. In general, participation in land rental markets, 
which was mainly in the form of sharecropping, is important for households with less 
farming assets to secure their food. However, without improvements in the off-farm 
employment sector, asset poor households that leased out their land could face difficulties 















CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS  
 6.1. Introduction    
In poor agrarian economies, secure access to land determines the ability of households to 
produce food for their subsistence and serves as a source of insurance against 
unemployment and food price shocks (Benjamin & Brandt, 1997; Burgess, 2001; 
Deininger, 2003; de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2001; Jayne et al., 2003). For this reason, land 
reforms aimed at enhancing land access by the poor and tenure security over land are 
considered important for reducing rural poverty in the developing world (Deininger, 2003; 
Holden et al., 2009). Among the reforms, land titling and registration programmes, and 
liberalisation of land rental markets have been widely proposed as fundamental policy 
instrument for improving tenure security and access to land by poor farmers. Despite this, 
there are on-going debates on whether such land reforms meaningfully benefited 
smallholder farmers in poor agrarian economies.   
Ethiopia is among the few African countries to implement large-scale land titling 
programmes. One of the main objectives of the land reform (land titling) is to enhance 
tenure security of farmers, thereby stimulating greater land-related investments in rural 
areas. Since 1995, Ethiopia also has partially liberalised rural land rental markets with the 
aim of improving the functioning of these markets. However, evidence on whether these 
reforms resulted in improved land access by the poor and increased land-related 
investments are scarce and inconclusive.  
This thesis aimed to achieve four main objectives: (i) to examine whether or not the 
preconditions for economic effectiveness of land registration are satisfied in the case of 




(iii) to analyse the factors that influence decisions by households in rural Ethiopia 
concerning land and labour market participation, and, (iv) to analyse the relationship 
between  farmers’ participation in land rental markets and household economic well-being 
in rural Ethiopia.   
The data source for this study is the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS), which 
consists of a panel of 1477 sample households covering four main regions in the country 
(Amara, Tigray, Ormina, and SNNP). The dataset covered the period 1994–2009. In 
addition, some data from the 2011/12 Ethiopian Rural Socioeconomic survey (ERSS) were 
also used as additional data source in Chapter 2.   
6.2. Summary of Research Findings   
The findings of the thesis were presented in four chapters. Chapter 2 presented results of the 
data analysis answering the research question as to whether prerequisites for economic 
effectiveness of land registration and titling are satisfied in the case of Ethiopia. To answer 
the research question, I examined the land tenure system, and the structure of rural factor 
and credit markets in rural Ethiopia. Overview of the details of the land tenure system in 
Ethiopia shows that despite some policy changes relative to the previous regime land policy 
(before 1991), the current governing land tenure system in Ethiopia is very restrictive in 
many aspects. Land is owned by the state and framers only have usufruct rights, and are not 
allowed to sell or mortgage their land. Access to land, through either PA allocation or 
inheritance, is strictly contingent on continued residence in the area where the land is 





In addition, although land renting has been officially allowed since 1995, there are still 
various institutional restrictions that limit farmers’ transactions in land rental markets. For 
instance, farmers are allowed to rent out land only as long as the amount of land remaining 
is enough to produce annual food consumption for the farming families. Given small per 
capita land holdings in rural areas, such restrictions are expected to limit farmers from 
participating in land rental markets, and prevent land rental markets from functioning 
freely. In this regard, the land reform (land tilting) does not relax any of the existing 
restrictions imposed by the land policy on land rental transactions or labour movements.  
In regards to the land rental markets, the main benefit of land title ownership is that it helps 
to reduce asymmetric information between transacting agents (Feder & Nishio, 1999; 
Deininger & Feder, 2009). The data in this study show that, in the 2009 survey year, less 
than 10% of the plots used by farmers were obtained through land rental markets, of which 
6.4% was sharecropping arrangement (Table 2.1). Moreover, land rental transactions in 
rural Ethiopia were mainly among relatives, neighbours or friends residing within the same 
village (Belay & Manig, 2004; Deininger et al., 2009; Segers, et al., 2010).  Data from this 
study also show that among households who leased out plots in the 1994 survey year, close 
to 88% of the plots leased were located within the same PA they resided in, while 33% were 
adjacent to their own plots. This suggests that transaction costs related to verification of 
landlords or tenants could not be a constraint to participate in land rental markets in rural 
Ethiopia.   
Results from descriptive data analysis of participations in land rental markets from four 
regions of the country suggest that there was no significant relationship between land 
renting transactions and land titling programmes in rural Ethiopia. These findings support 




transactions taken place within a village where everyone knows each other, and the existing 
land tenure system is sufficient to the types and volumes of land transactions that are typical 
in the area under consideration (Deininger & Feder, 2009; Feder & Nishio, 1999). 
Therefore, under the existing conditions, land title ownership is expected to have limited 
role in improving the functions of land rental markets in rural Ethiopia   
Ownership of land titling in rural Ethiopia also does not provide benefits that are linked to 
credit markets, as farmers are not allowed to mortgage or use their land as collateral in the 
credit markets. Findings from analysis of the structure of input and credit markets suggest 
that both input and credit markets are poorly developed in rural Ethiopia. For instance, in 
the 2009 survey year more than 65% of the loans taken by farmers were informal sector 
loans. Furthermore, the data show that access to loans for production purposes (mainly from 
formal sources) were wealth biased as land rich households were more likely to get access 
to these loans than land-poor households (Table 2.7). These findings suggest that despite 
having a title, poor farmers may not be able to invest in their lands if they lack access to 
working capitals that is needed to finance their investments.   
Improvement in tenure security is one of the main rationales for the land titling programme 
in Ethiopia. There is some evidence that land title ownership has increased tenure security 
for farmers in rural Ethiopia (Deininger et.al, 2011; Holden et.al, 2009, 2011). However, 
detailed examination of the land policy in Ethiopia indicates that ownership of land titling 
does not provide any more rights than the rights stipulated on the existing land laws in the 
country. For instance, despite land titling, local government officials in all regions still 
possess the power to expropriate farmers from their land when it is necessary to do so. As a 
result, expectations about potential government sponsored land redistributions in the future 




from the three rounds of the ERHS (1999, 2004, and 2009) which show that none of the 
households in the sample area reported land loss in the past or expected land loss in the 
future due to land grabs by other households.   
Moreover, fear of land expropriation by the government remained high among farmers 
despite the titling programme in many parts of the country. For instance, since 1997, land 
redistribution has been banned in Tigray regional state and the actual land redistribution 
experience among the sample households was zero after that year (Table 2.2). Despite this, 
the number of households who reported fear of losing land because of land redistribution in 
Tigray was 11.6% and 9.7% during the period 1999– 2004 and 2004–2009, respectively. 
These results suggest that the land titling programme is expected to have limited impact to 
improve tenure security in rural Ethiopia.  
In spite of the above mentioned institutional limitations, the main justification for the land 
tilting programme in rural Ethiopia is based on the view that insecure tenure is a major 
impediment to prompt land-related investments. Chapter 3 of the thesis empirically 
examined the relationship between tenure insecurity and farmers’ land-related 
investments.48 Estimation techniques such as the correlated random effects probit model, 
pooled bivariate probit model, and the recursive multivariate probit model were used in the 
analysis. Estimation results from these models show a lack of significant relationship 
between farmers’ perceived tenure insecurity and land-related investment decisions. 
Instead, other factors, such as access to extension services, education, sex of a household 
head, participation in local labour sharing arrangements, household wealth (livestock and 
                                                 
48 The discussion in Chapter 2 shows that government sponsored land redistributions (or expropriations) are 
the main sources of tenure insecurity. Thus, tenure insecurity is defined as a perception of losing land in the 





land), and village dummies were important determinants of land-related investment 
decisions in rural Ethiopia. For example, households with more members who are educated, 
had more land and livestock holdings, and got access to extension services and local labour 
sharing arrangements were more likely to invest on their land. In contrast, households that 
lacked these resources and/or female-headed households were less likely to invest on their 
land.   
The estimation results also show that access to extension services and participation in 
labour sharing arrangements were more biased towards the better-off households. For 
example, it was found that compared to male-headed and/or resource-rich households, 
female-headed and/or resource-poor households (had less land, labour, and livestock) were 
less likely to get access to extension services and participate in labour sharing 
arrangements. The perception of tenure insecurity though was not significantly different 
across these groups. These findings suggest that low levels of land-related investments by 
female-headed and/poor households are due to limited access to farming resources such as 
land, labour and other capitals.   
Furthermore, descriptive analysis of farmers’ response as to why they did not invest in tree 
cropping indicates that among the sample households about 75% in Tigray, 46% in 
Amhara, 68% in SNNP, and 19% in Oromia reported land shortage was the main constraint. 
A lack of security of tenure was reported as a major constraint only by 1.2% of the 
respondents that are from Tigray and Amhara regional states–regions where land 
redistributions were widespread during the current regime. Other factors reported are water 
shortage, labour shortage, and lack of funding. Regarding reasons for not investing in soil 
conservation practices, a large number of them reported absence of erosion as a major 




sample areas reported lack of security of tenure as a reason for not practising soil 
conservation on their land.  
Chapter 4 of the thesis presented results from the analysis of land and labour market 
participation decisions in rural Ethiopia. The study used a multivariate probit model to 
account for potential endogeneity in land and labour market participation decisions. The 
analysis in the chapter also found no significant relationship between farmers’ perception of 
tenure insecurity and farmers’ participation decisions in local labour and land rental 
markets. Instead, heterogeneity in access to farming endowments and multiple market 
failures in rural areas were important factors in determining farmers’ participation decisions 
in rural labour and land rental markets. The estimation results show that male-headed 
households and/ or households that were well endowed with farming resources, such as 
oxen, livestock, and managerial ability, were more likely to participate as a tenant in land 
lease markets. They were also more likely to hire outside labour on their farm. In contrast, 
female-headed households and/or households that were less endowed with farming skills 
and resources were more likely to rent out their land, and they were also more likely to 
participate at off-farm jobs.  
Finally, Chapter 5 of the thesis presented results from analysis of the relationship between 
households’ participation in land rental markets and household economic well-being. The 
study used both asset-based and subjective poverty indicators to measure poverty in a 
multidimensional sense. Estimation techniques used include: generalised ordered probit 
model, endogenous multinomial treatment effects model, and survival data analysis. Results 
from the descriptive analysis show that there is positive relationship between land holding 
sizes, and livestock holdings and household farm income. These results suggest that access 




main source of income, large numbers of households in the sample cultivated very small 
land sizes with the median per-adult cultivated land size being 0.29 hectares in the 2009 
survey year. Results also show that there is strong and monotonic relationship between the 
average amount of per-adult cultivated land size and the per-adult allocated land size. For 
instance, 10% of the land-poor households on average cultivated only 0.08 hectares in 2009. 
The corresponding figures for the top 10% of the land-rich households were 1.05 hectares. 
These figures show that households with small amounts of allocated land holdings also 
cultivated only small sizes of land, while land-rich households cultivated, on average, larger 
land sizes.  
Additionally, estimation results from analysis of the relationship between participation in 
land rental markets and household poverty suggests that households that leased in land were 
less likely to be poor than those that did not participate in rental markets, while households 
that leased out land were more likely to be poor than those that did not participate. 
Furthermore, findings from the survival data analysis also show that the estimated hazard 
rate of escaping poverty (for those who were poor) was significantly lower for households 
that leased out their land relative to those that did not participate in the land rental markets, 
while the likelihood of escaping poverty was significantly higher for households that leased 
in land more frequently. Similarly, the estimated hazard of entry into poverty (for those who 
were not poor) was significantly higher for households that leased out land more frequently, 
in comparison with those households that never participated in the land rental markets, 
while it was significantly lower for those household that leased in land more frequently. 
Results from both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 suggest that poor households tend to rent out 
their land more often, and they remain trapped in poverty mainly due to lack of  well-paid 




6.3. Policy Implications  
The research findings from this thesis have some important policy implications. One of the 
key findings of this study is that limited access to land and other farming resources are 
important determinates of farmers’ participation in land-related investments and their 
decisions to participate in rural factor markets. In particular, land shortage was reported as a 
key factor in limiting land-related investments in all regions covered in this study. It is 
evident that because of the high population pressure, land scarcity is becoming prevalent, 
and the degree of near-landlessness is increasing among the rural population of the 
highlands of Ethiopia. Currently, most households in rural areas are farming land holdings 
that do not allow them to produce enough to feed their families (MoARD, 2010). In the 
2009 survey year, close to 60% of the households covered in this study reported that they 
had food shortage problems at least once in the previous production year.  
Although, since 1995, land lease markets have been officially allowed to operate in rural 
areas to facilitate efficient land allocations, the analysis in this research shows that this 
policy change does not guarantee access to land by poor farmers if the functioning of other 
non-land factor and credit markets are not reformed as well. Under existing conditions, land 
rental markets transfer land mainly from less able farmers (relatively poor) to more able 
farmers (relatively rich). The study also showed that although land renting out is one 
strategy for poor farmers to solve some of their production related-constraints, asset poor 
households who leased out land were more likely to remain poor.   
These findings suggest that policy makers should give priority to solving problems related 
to land shortages in rural areas. However, this is easier to say than to do. Provision of 
additional land to farmers is unattainable, especially in the highland areas where almost all 




limited in rural areas with less than 3% of the rural households relying exclusively on 
income from non-farm employment (MoARD, 2010). Thus, the distribution of income in 
rural areas significantly depends on land ownership distributions. In this regarded, 
government’s policy to redistribute land to new comers (which often involves taking land 
from land rich to land poor farmers) only creates more near-landless farmers in the future. 
This, in turn, can adversely affect investment and productivity in rural areas. Therefore, 
policy makers should give more emphasis for strategies seeking to create an environment 
conducive to development in the off-farm employment sector and small enterprises in rural 
area. Such strategies may provide an important contribution towards reducing the existing 
pressure on land and improving food security in rural areas.   
Given a serious shortage of arable land in the country, the government needs to revisit its 
land policy in order to create non-farm employment opportunities in rural areas. The 
existing land tenure policy in rural Ethiopia explicitly restricts free labour movement 
outside agriculture despite the dire shortage of land in rural areas. It has long been argued 
that lack of alternative employment opportunities, and past and current land policies in the 
country prohibit labour movement out of agriculture and impede the development of non-
farm enterprises in rural areas (Rahmato, 1993, 2004). In general, under the current land 
law, access to land is contingent on continued residence in the area where the land is 
located and the individual must be engaged in farming as main livelihood activity. Such 
policy presupposes that land only serves as a means of production.  
Nevertheless, it is well recognised that access to land also serves as a means of insurance 
against unemployment and food price shocks in rural areas (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2001; 
Deininger, 2003). This means that in the face of uncertainty to get permanent non-farm jobs 




too small for framing. For this reason, this thesis proposes that farmers should be allowed to 
diversify their livelihood strategies without the fear of losing their land rights if they 
migrate or work in non-farm jobs. Furthermore, the findings in the thesis suggest that 
without reforming the existing land policy, and addressing problems in factor and credit 
markets, land titling is expected to play very limited role in improving tenure security, 
investment, and land rental market participations in rural Ethiopia. Therefore, policy 
measures that improve credit access by the poor, increase access to more land, facilitate the 
creation of non-farm jobs, and remove current legal restrictions on land transactions and 
labour movements are expected to be more effective in increasing investment and reducing 
poverty than the mere allocation of land title in rural Ethiopia.   
 6.4. Limitations of the Study   
Although a consistent story emerges from the analysis in the different chapters of the study, 
there are some limitations that need to be acknowledged. First, analysis of the impacts of 
land rental market participation decisions on household poverty in Chapter 5 was based on 
subjective and asset index poverty indicators. These measures were found to be a good 
proxy to measure multi-dimensional poverty. The results from this analysis indicate how 
the decision to rent out land or rent in land was associated with poverty status. Due to data 
limitations though, it was not possible to calculate the net income households received from 
renting out land and off-farm employments, and compare these with net income revenue 
received from producing on rented plots. Thus, future research can address the issue so that 
we can better understand the welfare impacts of different livelihood strategies in rural areas.   
Second, analysis of poverty dynamics in Chapter 5 was based on short panel data set; as a 




analyse the relationship between land renting activities and poverty status, results from the 
poverty dynamics analysis indicate that the likelihood of falling into poverty (for non-poor) 
was lower for households that leased in land, while it was higher for those households that 
leased out their land more frequently. The presence of left censoring, however, may 
overstate/understate transition probabilities. Thus, it is advisable that future research use 
longer panel data sets to improve estimates of poverty transitions.   
Third, the study is based on data that represent mainly the sedentary farming systems in the 
country, excluding the pastoralists and semi-pastoralist areas that represent about 10% of 
the total population in the country (CSA, 2012). These, areas also have slightly different 
land tenure polices. Results from this study thus should not be considered as nationally 
representative. More studies are required to understand the impacts of land tenure 
arrangements and access to land on livelihoods of the pastoralist and semi-pastoralist areas 
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Appendix A:  Appendix for Chapter 3 
 
Table A.1: Probit estimates of the determinants of tree-planting (2004) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expected land loss in 5 
years' time  -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) 
Lost land during 1983-1999  
 
-0.13 -0.14 -0.20 
  
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Perceived land transfer right  
 
0.05 0.01 
   
(0.12) (0.12) 
Male labour (num) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Female labour (num) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Adult literacy  -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.23 
 
(0.25) (0.24) (0.27) (0.30) 
Primary education 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) 
Secondary  education 0.32** 0.32** 0.32* 0.25 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Head sex -0.31** -0.30** -0.29** -0.22* 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) 
Head age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per-capita land size 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 
 
(0.30) (0.32) (0.41) (0.36) 
Access to Extension services 
  
0.24* 
    
(0.13) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) 
   
0.03** 
    
(0.01) 
Member in labour-sharing arrangements 
 
0.01 
    
(0.09) 
Constant -0.37 -0.39 -0.29 -0.36 
 
(0.50) (0.57) (0.52) (0.53) 
Observations 1,117 1,114 1,105 1,067 
chi2 257.4 314.5 563.6 405.4 
P 0 0 0 0 
Loglikelihood -518.1 -516.7 -514.0 -496.0 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.  
Note: Regression includes woreda(village) dummies,  head age square , land size square.  





Table A.2: Probit estimates of the determinants of tree-planting (2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expected land loss in 5 years' 
time  -0.26 -0.26 -0.28 -0.31 
 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.18) (0.23) 
Lost land during 1983-1999  
 
0.14 0.12 0.06 
  
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Perceived land transfer right  
  
0.27* 0.28* 
   
(0.14) (0.17) 
Male labour (num) 0.09 0.09* 0.09* 0.06 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Female labour (num) 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Adult literacy  0.59* 0.65 0.64* 0.62* 
 
(0.35) (0.41) (0.38) (0.36) 
Primary education 0.35** 0.36** 0.36** 0.33** 
 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) 
Secondary  education 0.36* 0.36* 0.36** 0.27 
 
(0.19) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) 
Head sex -0.30** -0.29*** -0.28** -0.19* 
 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
Head age 0.03 0.03* 0.03 0.03 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per capita land size 1.15*** 1.09*** 1.07*** 0.80** 
 
(0.25) (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) 
Access to Extension services 
  
0.27*** 
    
(0.09) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) 
  
0.03** 
    
(0.02) 
Member in labour sharing arrangements 
 
0.42*** 
    
(0.12) 
Constant -1.63*** -1.63*** -1.84*** -2.08*** 
 
(0.52) (0.50) (0.58) (0.55) 
Observations 1,127 1,124 1,119 1,117 
chi2 456.1 767.3 363.7 549.9 
p 0 0 0 0 
Loglikelihood -580.8 -578.6 -575.5 -556.4 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.  
Note: Regression includes woreda(village) dummies,  head age square , land size square.  









Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: Regression includes woreda(village) and time 
dummies,  head age square , land size square,  and time averages of the covariates. Bootstrap standard errors 
in parentheses (200 replications) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A.3: Standard random effects probit estimates of the determinants of tree-planting  
(2004 and 2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expected land loss in 5 years' 
time  -0.21* -0.21 -0.21* -0.21 
 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) 
Lost land during 1983-1999 
 
0.04 0.03 -0.03 
  
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
Perceived land transfer right  
  
0.11 0.07 
   
(0.10) (0.09) 
Male labour (num) 0.07* 0.07 0.07* 0.04 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female labour (num) 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Adult literacy   0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 
 
(0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.19) 
Primary education 0.20* 0.19* 0.20* 0.16 
 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Secondary education 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32** 0.24* 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) 
Head sex -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.33*** -0.25*** 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Head Age 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per capita land size 0.51** 0.49** 0.47* 0.35 
 
(0.21) (0.20) (0.25) (0.24) 
Access to Extension services 
   
0.28*** 
    
(0.08) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) 
   
0.03*** 
    
(0.01) 
Member in labour sharing arrangements 
 
0.24*** 
    
(0.09) 
Constant -0.70 -0.71 -0.74* -0.92** 
 
(0.46) (0.47) (0.44) (0.42) 
Observations 2,437 2,431 2,413 2,361 
Number of uhhid 1,227 1,224 1,223 1,222 
chi2 512.9 433.5 524.0 374.4 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sigma_u 0.544 0.541 0.532 0.496 
lnsig2u -1.22*** -1.23*** -1.26*** -1.40 
 
(0.31) (0.33) (0.40) (1.46) 
Loglikelihood -1120 -1117 -1113 -1080 








Table A.4: Probit estimates of the determinants of soil conservation (2004) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expected land loss in 5 years' time  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.18 
 
(0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) 
Lost land during 1983-1999 
 
0.20* 0.21 0.19 
  
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15) 
Perceived land transfer right  
  
0.13 0.09 
   
(0.13) (0.12) 
Male labour (num) 0.10* 0.09 0.10* 0.07 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
Female Labour (num) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Adult literacy  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
Primary education -0.15 -0.15 -0.18 -0.12 
 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
Secondary and above  education -0.21 -0.21 -0.25 -0.23 
 
(0.17) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) 
Head sex -0.22* -0.24 -0.26* -0.28** 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) 
Head age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per capita land size -0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.04 
 
(0.37) (0.32) (0.35) (0.37) 
Access to Extension services 
   
0.14 
    
(0.12) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) 
   
0.01 
    
(0.02) 
Member in labour sharing arrangements 
   
0.27* 
    
(0.15) 
Constant 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.78 
 
(0.56) (0.54) (0.60) (0.60) 
Observations 1,016 1,013 1,002 963 
chi2 593.0 874.7 1764 1137 
p 0 0 0 0 
Loglikelihood -375.0 -371.4 -365.7 -335.4 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: Regression includes woreda(village) dummies,  head 
age square , land size square. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (200 replications) *** p<0.01, ** 







Table A.5: Probit estimates of the determinants of soil conservation practices(2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expected land loss in 5 years' time  -0.38* -0.38* -0.38* -0.37* 
 
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) 
Lost land during 1983-1999  
 
0.05 0.06 0.00 
  
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14) 
Perceived land transfer right  
  
-0.12 -0.10 
   
(0.19) (0.18) 
Male labour (num) 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.10* 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female labour (num) 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
Adult literacy  0.63* 0.70** 0.71** 0.65** 
 
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30) 
Primary education 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.14 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) 
Secondary and above  education 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.24 
 
(0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) 
Head sex -0.15 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Head age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per capita land size 0.34 0.27 0.28 0.22 
 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.39) (0.42) 
Access to Extension services 
   
0.30** 
    
(0.13) 
Livestock holdings(TLU) 
   
0.00 
    
(0.01) 
Member in labour-sharing arrangements 
 
0.30** 
    
(0.13) 
Constant 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.20 
 
(0.55) (0.49) (0.53) (0.55) 
Observations 1,067 1,064 1,059 1,057 
chi2 454.7 430.0 611.0 499.5 
p 0 0 0 0 
Loglikelihood -425.2 -423.8 -423.0 -414.9 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: Regression includes woreda(village) dummies,  head 
age square , land size square. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (200 replications) *** p<0.01, ** 








Table A.6: Standard random effects probit estimates of the determinants of  
soil conservation practices (2004 and 2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expected land loss in 5 years' time  -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.12 
 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) 
Lost land during 1983-1999  
 
0.11 0.11 0.07 
  
(0.12) (0.10) (0.14) 
Perceived land transfer right  
  
-0.00 -0.03 
   
(0.12) (0.11) 
Male labour (num) 0.11*** 0.11** 0.12*** 0.10** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Female labour (num) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Adult literacy  0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) 
Primary education -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) 
Secondary  education 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
Head sex -0.20** -0.20** -0.20** -0.17* 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Head age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per capita land size 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 
 
(0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) 
Access to Extension services 
   
0.25*** 
    
(0.10) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) 
   
0.00 
    
(0.01) 
Member in labour-sharing arrangements 
  
0.29*** 
    
(0.09) 
Year dummy (1=2004) -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.28*** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Constant 0.82* 0.84** 0.88** 0.75* 
 
(0.43) (0.37) (0.43) (0.41) 
Observations 2,312 2,306 2,289 2,247 
Number of uhhid 1,167 1,164 1,163 1,162 
chi2 413.7 424.8 447.8 304.9 
p 0 0 0 0 
sigma_u 0.390 0.407 0.400 0.441 
lnsig2u -1.88 -1.80 -1.83 -1.64 
 
(2.17) (1.91) (2.19) (1.64) 
Loglikelihood -819.8 -814.9 -809.5 -774.3 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: Regression includes woreda (village) dummies, head 
age square, land size square, time averages of the covariates. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (200 






Table A.7: Marginal effects on the marginal probability of investment (Eucalyptus tree) 
  
Pooled probit   Panel CRE probit 
1 2 3   4 5 












 Perceived land transfer right  0.02 




   
(0.02) 




(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.013 (0.02) 




(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 




(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 




(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Land size(hectares)       




(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 




(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) 




(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.03) 




(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 




(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 




(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Previous tree planting 
  
0.11*** 
   
   
(0.02) 
   Planted trees in 1994 
  
0.04* 
   
   
(0.02) 
   Observations 2,373 2,374 2,372 
 
2,373 2,374 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS (2004 and 2009). Notes: Regression includes, head age and age 
square, time averages of time-varying exogenous covariates, time and village dummies, and a constant. Standard 
errors of the estimated marginal effects are presented in parentheses. Bootstrap standard errors (200 replicates) used 






Table A.8:Marginal effects on the marginal probability of investment (soil conservations) 
  
Both stone terraces and soil 
bund 
(pooled probit)   
Stone terraces 
(panel CRE probit) 
1 2 3   4 5 
        





















(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 




(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 




(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 




(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Land size(hectares)       




(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 




(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 




(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 




(0.00) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 




(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 




(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 2,373 2,372 2,373   2,372 2,373 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS (2004 and 2009). Notes: Regression includes, head age 
and age square, time averages of time-varying exogenous covariates, time and village dummies, and a 
constant. Standard errors of the estimated marginal effects are presented in parentheses. Bootstrap standard 








Table A.9: A recursive multivariate probit estimation for participation in tree 
planting (pooled data 2004  and 2009) 








Expected land loss in 5 years' time 
 
-0.12 
    
(0.25) 
Perceived land transfer right  
 
-0.10 0.14 
   
(0.10) (0.09) 




   
(0.11) 
 Male labour  -0.08** 0.05* 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Female labour  -0.00 0.06* -0.07 -0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Adult literacy  0.33** 0.13 0.31* 0.10 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) 
Primary education 0.59*** 0.01 0.13 0.30*** 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) 
Secondary education 1.03*** -0.07 0.14 0.45*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) 
Head sex -0.26*** -0.16** -0.11 -0.20*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) 
Head age 0.03** -0.03** 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 







Livestock (TLU) 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.03*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Member in labour-sharing arrangements 
 
0.28* 
    
(0.16) 
Access to Extension services 
  
0.17 
    
(0.15) 




   
(0.05) 





  Observations 2,354 2,354 2,354 2,354 
chi2 11622 11622 11622 11622 
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Loglikelihood -4395 -4395 -4395 -4395 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
 Note: The education variable indicates the highest education level in a household. Regression 
includes woreda(village) and time dummies,  head age square , land size square ,and a constant. 





Table A.10: A recursive multivariate probit estimation for participation in soil conservation 
practice (pooled data 2004 and 2009) 









Expected land loss in 5 years' time   -0.06 
    
-0.21 
Perceived land transfer right  -0.12 0 
   
-0.1 -0.1 




   
-0.11 
 Male labour  -0.09*** 0.05* 0.02 0.08** 
 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 
Female labour  0 0.06* -0.08 0.05 
 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 
Adult literacy  0.33** 0.14 0.32* 0.14 
 
-0.15 -0.15 -0.18 -0.16 
Primary education 0.60*** 0.01 0.13 0.01 
 
-0.09 -0.08 -0.12 -0.11 
Secondary and education 1.04*** -0.06 0.15 0.12 
 
-0.1 -0.1 -0.14 -0.13 
Head sex -0.26*** -0.17** -0.11 -0.15* 
 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 
Head Age 0.03** -0.03** 0.01 -0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 














Livestock  (TLU) 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.01 0 
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Member in labour-sharing   0.11 
    
-0.15 
Access to Extension services  0.27* 
    
-0.16 




   
-0.05 
 Member in local informal funeral 




  Observations 2,353 2,353 2,353 2,353 
chi2 15594 15594 15594 15594 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Loglikelihood -4081 -4081 -4081 -4081 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: Regression includes woreda(village) and 
time dummies,  head age square , land size square ,and a constant. Robust standard errors in 








Table A.11: Household characterises by change in tenure status between 2004 and 2009 
 
change in transfer 
rights  
change in expected land 
lose 
  Yes NO 
 
Yes NO 
Head can read and write (%) 44 36 
 
42 35 
Household size(num) 5.89 5.77 
 
5.58 5.75 
Head sex (male ) 61 72  68 71 Male labour size 1.58 1.43 
 
1.47 1.42 
Female labour size 1.61 1.49 
 
1.4 1.5 
Have a pair of oxen(%) 28 34 
 
42 32 
land labour ration 0.44 0.47 
 
0.45 0.47 
livestock holdings(value) 1883.12 2403.55 
 
2347.47 2339.25 
Lost land in 2004(%) 4.0 2.0 
 
3.0 2.0 
Region (%)     Tigray  10.0 11.3 
 
10.2 11.08 
Amhara 20.0 32.4 
 
41.4 30.70 
Oromia 45.0 25.4 
 
30.5 26.43 
SNNP 25.0 30.9  18.0 31.79 
Total households with change in 
tenure status (%) 6.45 90.89   10.31 88.72 























Table B.1: Cultivated land size and household size by allocated land 
size(1994 and 2009) 
 





















10 0.06 3.09 
 
0.08 2.95 
20 0.07 3.73 
 
0.14 3.4 
30 0.11 3.78 
 
0.19 3.77 
40 0.17 3.79 
 
0.23 3.82 
50 0.22 3.82 
 
0.29 3.85 
60 0.33 3.88 
 
0.32 3.97 
70 0.47 4.39 
 
0.39 4.13 
80 0.59 4.55 
 
0.53 4.31 
90 0.79 4.56 
 
0.63 4.43 
100 1.28 5.36   1.05 4.63 
























Table B.2: Standard ordered probit estimates(2004 and 2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Land renting in 2004 and 2009    Rent in land  0.18***   
 (0.07)   Rent out land  -0.18***   
 (0.07)   
Land renting only after 2004 
   Rent in land   0.01  
  (0.11)  Rent out land   -0.37***  
  (0.12)  
Frequency of participation  
   Rent in sometimes   0.15** 
   (0.07) Rent in most of the time   0.25** 
   (0.1) Rent out sometimes    -0.07 
   (0.07) Rent out most of the time   -0.20* 
   (0.12) 
    Male family member(num) 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) Female family member(num) 0.09*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) Head can read and write 0.06 0.01 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) Source: Own calculation using data from ERHS.  




















Table B.2 (continued): Standard ordered probit estimates 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Family member age <15 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Family member age >65 0.13*** 0.16** 0.13*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Adult literacy 0.02 0.31 0.03 
 (0.12) (0.2) (0.12) Primary education 0.27*** 0.38*** 0.26*** 
 (0.07) (0.1) (0.07) Secondary and above  education 0.48*** 0.58*** 0.47*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) Head sex 0.16*** 0.21** 0.14** 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) Consumption expenditure(log) 0.31*** 0.39*** 0.30*** 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) Have pair of oxen 0.22*** 0.23** 0.24*** 
 (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) Livestock holdings (htu) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) Per capita land size 0.93*** 1.13*** 0.93*** 
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.14) Land size square -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.20*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) work of farm wage employment  -0.04* -0.10*** -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) work of farm self-employment 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Cut1 1.88*** 2.58*** 1.83*** 
 (0.27) (0.42) (0.27) Cut2 2.42*** 3.16*** 2.37*** 
 (0.27) (0.43) (0.27) Cut3 3.42*** 4.19*** 3.36*** 
 (0.27) (0.44) (0.27) Cut4 4.92*** 5.73*** 4.87*** 
 (0.28) (0.46) (0.28) Observations 2,371 1,104 2,376 
N_clust 1234 564 1235 
Loglikilhood -3046 -1416 -3053 
ll_0 -3515 -1623 -3523 
chi2 774.4 412.4 795.1 
p 0 0 0 
Source: Own calculation using data from ERHS.  






Table B.3: Random effects generalised ordered probit models( 2004 and 2009) 
  Model 1   Model 3 
VARIABLES C1 C2 C3 C4   C1 C2 C3 C4 
Land renting in 2004 and 2009 
       Rent in land  0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20***      
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)      Rent out land  -0.32*** -0.21** -0.20** 0.22      
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14)      
Frequency of participation  
         Rent in sometimes      0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 
      (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) Rent it most of the time      0.27** 0.27** 0.27** 0.27** 
      (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) Rent out sometimes       -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
      (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Rent out most of the time      -0.38*** -0.32** -0.12 0.22 
      (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) Male labour (num) 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Female labour (num) 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Head can read and write 0.19** 0.23*** -0.04 -0.03  0.18** 0.23*** -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.1)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.1) Family member age <15 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***  0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Family member age >65 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Source: Own calculation using data from ERHS. Note: The estimation model includes village dummies. Model 2 is failed to converge. Standard errors in 







  Table B.3 (continued): Random effects generalised ordered probit models 
  Model 1      Model 3  
VARIABLES C1 C2 C3 C4   C1 C2 C3 C4 
Adult literacy -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) Primary education 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***  0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Secondary above education 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48***  0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) Head sex 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***  0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Consumption expenditure (log) 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.39*** 0.43***  0.19*** 0.29*** 0.38*** 0.42*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) Have pair of oxen 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***  0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) Livestock holdings (htu) 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***  0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Per capita land size 1.17*** 1.08*** 0.97*** 0.61***  1.17*** 1.09*** 0.96*** 0.64*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)  (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) Land size square -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23***  -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) Work of farm wage employment  -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05*  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Work of farm self-employment  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Constant -1.39*** -2.44*** -3.88*** -5.50***   -1.35*** -2.41*** -3.80*** -5.46*** 
 





Table B.4: Multinomial treatment effects model (pooled data, 2004 
and 2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
land renting in 2004 and 2009    




















 Frequency of participation  
   rent in sometimes 
  
0.06 
   
(0.05) 
rent it most of the time 
  
0.13** 
   
(0.05) 
rent out sometimes  
  
-0.63*** 
   
(0.03) 
rent out most of the time 
  
-0.62*** 
   
(0.06) 
hhsise15 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male family member(num) 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Female family member(num) 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Head can read and write 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Head sex -0.09*** -0.09** -0.13*** 










Table B.4(continued): Multinomial treatment effects model 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Per capita land size 0.68*** 0.48*** 0.67*** 
 (0.07) (0.1) (0.07) 
Land size square -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.17*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Have pair of oxen 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.36*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Consumption expenditure (log) 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Work of farm wage employment  -0.03** 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Work of farm self-employment  0.07*** 0.04 0.06*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Regional dummies    
Amhara 0.87*** 0.92*** 0.95*** 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Oromia 0.88*** 0.98*** 0.87*** 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
SNNP 0.65*** 0.81*** 0.64*** 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Constant -0.10 0.07 0.03 
 
(0.11) (0.15) (0.11) 
 
  
  Observations 2,384 1,114 2,389 
Loglikilhood  -3666 -1606 -4702 
chi2 4126 1383 4634 
p 0 0 0 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. Note: The land rental market 
participation equation includes village dummies. Standard errors in parentheses *** 
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Note:Allocated land refers to land holdings excluding plots obtained thorough land rental markets. 







Figure B. 3: Generalised Lorenz curves for land holding sizes (1994-2009)  
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Note:Allocated land refers to land holdings excluding plots obtained thorough land rental markets. 







The standard approach in the literature analysing poverty dynamics is to use income 
or consumption (the monetary approach) as a measure of household or individual 
poverty (Bane & Ellwood, 1986; Bigsten & Shimeles, 2008; Devicienti, 2002).This 
approach identifies poverty with a shortfall in income or consumption below some 
defined poverty line. Yet, a number of shortcomings may be anticipated in those 
studies analysing poverty dynamics that rely exclusively on income or consumption 
as a measure of poverty or welfare. First, any poverty analysis that relies exclusively 
on income or expenditure data fails to adjust for all relevant non-income dimensions 
of welfare such as literacy, life expectancy, and provision of public goods (Ravallion, 
2012; Sen, 1992; Thorbecke, 2005).  
Second, poverty measures based on consumption or income data are prone to 
measurement errors, and seasonality effects (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000; Devereux & 
Sharp, 2006). As a result, any random changes in income or consumption measures 
may lead observers to conclude wrongly that households have made transitions in 
their poverty status (exit or entry) when their poverty status in reality is unchanged.  
Alternatively, an asset-based poverty analysis based on visible assets such as land or 
livestock is less sensitive to measurement errors (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000; Carter & 
Barrett, 2006).  
The multidimensional nature of poverty has been widely recognised in the literature 
since the seminal work of Amartya Sen (1979, 1985, 1987). Sen proposed a capability 
approach and argued that well-being should be measured by looking at the 





that they value. Despite the degree of flexibility in selecting the dimensions to be 
included in the measurement of well-being, the one main challenge in adapting the 
capability approach is that it is difficult to define and measure capabilities 
empirically. For this reason, other alternative approaches including the Basic Needs 
Approach (BNA) and the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) have been used 
widely in the literature to understand multidimensional aspects of poverty (Clark, 
2005; Frediani, 2010).   
Poverty measurement using BNA takes into account needs such as consumption of 
food, shelter, clothing, and access to pure water, sanitation, public transport, health, 
and education. On the other hand, the SLA method states that household welfare 
depends upon their asset accumulation and the context in which they develop their 
livelihood strategy (Ellis, 2000). This latter approach aims to address issues of 
vulnerability and risk building on the belief that people need various kinds of assets to 
achieve positive livelihood outcomes (Ellis, 2000; Frediani, 2010; Petersen & 
Pedersen, 2010). These different kinds of assets are divided into five categories: 
physical (productive assets such as domestic equipment, access to infrastructure); 
financial (credit access, saving); human (education, health, nutrition); social (trust and 
reciprocity); and natural (land, water, mineral). The SLA method differs from Sen’s 
Capability approach, as it does not explore other dimensions of well-being, such as 
freedom to appear in public (Frediani, 2010).   
The conceptual framework for an asset-based poverty measure suggests that poverty 
or the welfare status of a household reflects a conjunction of low asset endowments, 
low returns on these endowments, and vulnerability to shocks (Baulch & Hoddinott, 





errors and it enables one to distinguish persistent structural poverty from transitory 
poverty; in other words, poverty that passes naturally with time (Baulch & Hoddinott, 
2000; Carter & Barrett, 2006). Nevertheless, an asset-based approach is criticised on 
the ground that it is usually based on a relatively narrow range of assets that are 
measurable and that arbitrary weights are applied to each asset (Hulme & McKay, 
2005). A study by Filmer and Scott (2012), however, showed that those results from 
assed-based welfare measures are systematically consistent across alternative 
aggregations.  
Another alternative to conventional ways of defining poverty is to use subjective 
poverty/welfare indicators. It is suggested that a person’s perception of his or her own 
welfare situation should be considered as a reliable source of information on poverty 
as that person is the best judge of his or her own poverty status (Deaton, 2010). 
Furthermore, the self-reported poverty status includes other dimensions of deprivation 
that are not captured by consumption/income-based poverty estimates such as asset 
ownership, health status, social capital, and relative deprivation (Ravallion, 2012; 
Thorbecke, 2005). According to Thorbecke (2005), the main advantage of using this 
type of subjective approach is that:  
The answers that are given rely implicitly on the utility function of the subject in 
question. In other words, the individual stating that he does not feel poor uses an 
implicit set of individual weights and minimum thresholds from the various attributes 
of wellbeing and aggregates accordingly to obtain a scalar measure. This resolves the 
very thorny and essentially arbitrary issue of having to select a set of attributes’ 





Different approaches have been used to quantify poverty or welfare by using 
subjective indicators and these can be classified broadly into two: the first approach 
uses a money-metric of subjective welfare, while the second approach uses qualitative 
categories in the welfare space (Ravallion, 2012). The first approach includes the 
Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) that asks what level of income is considered ‘very 
bad’, ‘bad’, ‘not good’, ‘not bad’ and ‘good’. It also includes the Minimum Income 
Question (MIQ) that asks what levels of income are needed to ‘make ends meet’. The 
second approach includes the Satisfaction with Life question (SWL) and the 
Economic Ladder Question (ELQ).  
The SWL approach is based on answering the question: ‘Overall, how satisfied are 
you with your life?’ with the answers ranging from 1 to 5:  1 means ‘very unsatisfied’ 
and 5 means ‘very satisfied’ The ELQ is based on answering the following question: 
‘Imagine six steps, and at the bottom, on the first step, stand the poorest people and on 
the top, on the sixth step, stand the rich. On which step are you today?’ Unlike the 
money-metric approach, which uses income as an indicator of welfare, the qualitative 
approach uses self-rated welfare as the welfare indictor (Ravallion & Lokshin, 2002).  
Mainly because of its tractability, the SLF approach was chosen for this study and 
used an asset-based approach to measure household poverty. The Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA) technique was used to construct a Composite 
Poverty Index (CPI) for each household. The detailed procedure for constructing the 
asset indices is provided in the next section. In addition, to the asset indices, 






Construction of an asset index  
A substantial number of literatures in poverty analysis use an asset-based alternative 
to the conventional use of consumption or income in defining poverty (Filmer & 
Pritchett, 2001; Carter & May, 2001; Carter & Barrett, 2006). Those studies that use 
an asset-based approach to poverty either used a one-dimensional asset or constructed 
an asset index using various techniques to define poverty. In most developing 
countries, ownership of land and livestock is considered as a key indicator of 
household wealth in rural areas. As a result, several studies have used a one 
dimension asset measurement, such as livestock, to analyse poverty dynamics in rural 
areas (Barrett & McPeak, 2004; Lybbert, Barrett, Desta, & Coppock, 2004; Mogues, 
2006).   
Alternatively, a number of other studies have used various assets and then have 
constructed an asset index using different aggregation methods to measure poverty 
(Barrett, Carter, & Little, 2006; Liverpool & Winter-Nelson, 2011; Sahn & Stifel, 
2003). The key issues in constructing an asset index are to decide which assets should 
be considered and then to consider how diverse categories of assets should be 
aggregated. There are several ways of constructing an asset index, of which factor 
analysis (FA) or principal components analysis (PCA) are the most widely used 
methods in the literature (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Sahn & Stifel, 2003).   
Recent studies have used multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to construct 
poverty/welfare indices in the area of multidimensional poverty analysis (Asselin, & 
Anh, 2009; Booysen, Van Der Berg, Burger, Maltitz, & Rand, 2008). The multiple 





analysis algorithm to multivariate categorical data coded in the form of an indicator 
matrix or a Burt matrix49 (Greenacre, 2010). It is suggested that the use of MCA is 
more appropriate than PCA when using categorical data or a mix of continuous and 
categorical data; this is because PCA is mainly designed for continuous variables 
(Asselin, & Anh, 2009). In addition, factor Analysis technique does not take into 
account the relative importance of different assets in generating income (Hulme & 
Mckay, 2005).  
The other advantage of MCA over PCA or FA is that MCA satisfies two desirable 
properties (Asselin, & Anh, 2009).The first of these is the distributional equivalence 
property: this ensures that MCA gives extra weight to the smaller categories within 
each primary indicator. The second is the reciprocal bi-addivity or duality property 
which states that: (a) the composite poverty score of a population unit is the simple 
average of the standardised factorial weights or the poverty categories to which it 
belongs, and (b) the weight of a given poverty category is the simple average of the 
standardised composite poverty scores of the population units belonging to the 
corresponding poverty group.   
For the reasons stated above, and because most of the variables available to measure 
welfare/poverty are categorical indicators, I used MCA and constructed a Composite 
Poverty Index (CPI) to define poverty for sample households.  Following the works of 
Asselin, & Anh (2009), the functional form of the MCA-based CPI can be written as:  
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Here, K is the number of primary welfare indicator variables, jk is the number of 
categories for indicator K, Wj*kI,k is the core of category j (the weight determined with 
MCA) which is the factor score on the first axis normalised by the eigenvalue, Iik, jk is 
the binary variable 0/1 taking the value 1 when the unit I has the category jk .  
According to Asselin, & Anh (2009), the MCA-based CPI must satisfy two important 
axioms: (i) the CPI must be monotonically increasing in each of its primary 
indicators. This implies that if the welfare condition of an individual is improved 
according to a given primary indicator then the CPI must increase, representing a 
decrease in poverty, and (ii) the CPI must satisfy the composite poverty ordering 
consistency; thus, the population ordering for a primary indicator is preserved with 
the composite indicator.   
The MCA procedure is applied using the Burt matrix calculated from the data.50  Data 
from the last two rounds (2004 and 2009) of the ERHS were used for this analysis. In 
order to consider poverty over time, weights were derived by applying the MCA 
procedure using the weights only in the first year, 200451. The scoring coefficients 
from the MCA procedure were then used to calculate the CPI for each household. 
Because the weights that result from the MCA procedure can have both positive and 
negative values, one can rescale the CPI so that the composite index is always greater 
or equal to zero. Based on the sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA), the variables 
                                                 
50 The MCA was used with the joint option and this procedure is called the Joint Component Analysis 
(JCA).This method analyses a variant of the Burt matrix, in which the diagonal blocks are iteratively 
adjusted for the poor diagonal fit of MCA.  





taken into account to construct the Composite Poverty Index (CPI) are grouped into 
four main groups.  
These are: (i) natural assets (land holding size, number of oxen and livestock quintile 
excluding oxen), (ii) other assets (ownership of hoe, plough and radio), (iii) human 
capital (proportion of available male labour force in a household, proportion of female 
labour force, proportion of household members considered as being old, and sex of a 
household head as proxy for farming ability), and (iv) education levels, financial and 
social capitals. These three items designated under (iv) are variables that indicated 
highest level of education in a household, if a household stored any crop, could get 
access to 100 Birr if needed, had food shortage problems, and was a member of social 
networks such as equb, eddir, or labour-sharing arrangements52 . Other additional 
variables were also included in the MCA and this included ownership of a toilet, sole 
access to a source of water and health status. However, these variables were dropped 
after the first stage of the MCA because they did not satisfy the monotonicity axiom 
property of the MCA.    
Table B.5 lists all the variables used, and the coefficient estimates obtained, from the 
MCA procedure.  The first dimension explains 76% of the total inertia of the cloud of 
variables. The explanatory power drops to 9% for the second dimension (axis). This 
finding indicates that most of the variance of the set of variables used is captured by 
one axis. Results in Table B.5 also show that all variables satisfy the monotonicity 
property of MCA. The indicators that are negatively correlated to the first axis 
describe deterioration in the state of poverty, while the indicators that are positively 
correlated with the first axis describe improvement in poverty condition.   
                                                 





 A review of the most negatively correlated variables to the first axis allow one to 
identify poor households as follows: households with a small land size (<0.5 ha); 
households in the lowest livestock quintile with no oxen; those with a higher 
proportion of female and old individuals in the household; those with no individuals 
with schooling; and, households that did not own assets such as a hoe or plough, did 
not store any crop, and couldn’t get access to 100 Birr if needed. In addition, poor 
households had no radio and faming equipment such as hoe and plough, were not 
members of social networks such as eddir, equb, and labour-sharing arrangements.  In 
contrast, rich households generally had more land (>3 ha), own more livestock 
holdings, had at least a pair of oxen, own a radio, were members of equb, had at least 
one member with a maximum education level of high school and above, and the head 
is educated (in this context ‘educated’ means ‘can read and write’).    
For the 2004 survey year, the minimum value for CPI is -4.26 and the maximum 
value is 3.14. An examination of the characteristics of households with the lowest 
value of CPI indicates that: the household head is female and cannot read and write; 
there was no working age male family member in the household; the household had 
no ox; it experienced food shortages in both periods (2004 and 2009); livestock 
holding is in the first quantile (in other words, owns no livestock); the size of the land 
holding was less than 0.5 hectare; and, no household member completed school.  
 In contrast, the household with the largest value of CPI was characterised as follows: 
the household head was male and can read and write; the maximum education in the 
household was high school and higher; the household had more than two hectares of 
land; it had at least two male family members of working age; it owns a pair of oxen; 





during both years under review (2004 and 2009). Overall, the results from the MCA 
suggest that the first axis describes adequately the welfare situation in the sample 
area.   
In addition to the CPI, I constructed additional Composite Poverty Index1 (CPI1) and 
Composite Poverty Index2 (CPI2) variables without excluding variables that directly 
affect land rental market participation decisions. The CPI1 is constructed using data 
from the 2004 and 2009 survey rounds, while the CPI2 is calculated using data from 
the four survey rounds (1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009) in which case weights are 
derived by applying the MCA procedure using the weights in the first year, 1994. The 
variables excluded from the CPI1 and CPI2 calculation are land ownership, number of 
oxen, farming equipment (hoe and plough), household sex and education, and male 














Table B.5: Description of variables used in MCA and estimated weight from the first dimension 
(2004) 
  Variables  Category  weights 
Variable
s  Category  weights  
1 Land and livestock 
 
3 Other household assets  
 





1 less than 0.5 hectares -1.82 
 
1 No  -1.23 
 
2 between 0.5 and 1 hectares -0.83 
 
2 Yes 0.489 
 





4 greater than 3 hectares 1.824 
 




2 Yes 0.813 
 





2 Q2 -0.47 
 
1 N0 -0.293 
 
3 Q3 -0.08 
 
2 Yes 1.788 
 
4 Q4 0.637 4 Financial and social 
 
 
5 Q1 2.219 
 
Can get 100 Birr 
 
 
Number of oxen  
  
1 No  -1.277 
 
1 own no oxen  -1.46 
 
2 Yes  0.909 
 
2 own one ox  0.355 
 
store crop  
 
 
3 own a pair of oxen 2.276 
 
1 No -1.652 
 
4 own more than 3 oxen  3.275 
 
2 Yes 0.821 
2 Human capital  
  




   
1 no -0.6 
 
1 Female -1.35 
 
2 yes 1.72 
 
2 Male  0.561 
 
 eddir member 
 
 
Proportion of male labour 
  
1 No -1.705 
 
1 less than 1/3 -0.27 
 
2 yes 0.417 
 





3 greater than 2/3 -0.37 
 
1 yes  -0.279 
 
Proportion of female labour 
  
2 No 1.337 
 





2 between 1/3  and  2/3 -0.37 
 
1 No -0.585 
 
3 greater than 2/3 -1.7 
 
2 Yes 0.777 
 
Proportion of old age 
     
 
1 less than 1/3 0.174 
    
 
2 between 1/3  and  2/3 -1.47 
    
 
3 greater than 2/3 -2.48 
    
 
Maximum education level 
     
 
1 no schooling -1.56 
    
 
2 some adult literacy  0.776 
    
 
3 primary 0.554 
    
 
4 high school level 0.939 
    
 
Head can read and write 
     
 
1 no schooling -0.68 
    
 
2 Yes 1.227 











Subjective welfare indicators  
In addition, to the asset indices, subjective economic well-being indicators were also 
used in the analysis to quantify poverty. One of the subjective economic wellbeing 
indicator variables (labelled as ‘self-rated poverty scale’), which is similar to the 
ELQ, is based on answering the following question:   
‘Just thinking about your own household circumstances, would you describe your 
household as: 1) very rich, 2) rich, 3) comfortable, 4) can manage to get by, 5) never 
have quite enough, 6) poor, and 7) destitute?’53   
Another subjective economic well-being indicator (labelled as ‘General economic 
condition’) is based on answering the following question:   
‘In general how would you describe your household : 1) Doing well: able to meet 
household needs by our own efforts and making some extra for store, savings and 
investment, 2) doing just okay: able to meet household needs by own effort but with 
nothing extra to save or invest, 3) struggling: managing to meet household needs but 
by depleting productive assets and or sometimes receiving support, 4) unable to meet 
household needs or dependent on support from community or government’.   
In addition, to the above subjective poverty indicators, households were asked about 
the adequacy of household expenditures on food, health, and housing in a given 
period.  For example, the issue of adequacy of food consumption is explored, based 
on answers to the following question:   
                                                 
53 Only a small percentage of households reported that they were very rich, and therefore I 





‘Concerning your family’s food consumption over the past month, which of the 
following is true?: 1) It was less than adequate for the family’s needs; 2) it was just 
adequate for the family’s needs; and  3) it was more than adequate for the family’s 
needs’.  
Similar questions were also asked regarding health and housing expenditures over the 
year. Moreover, respondents were also asked to rate their welfare status based on 
broader concepts of welfare such as ‘happiness’ and using the following question:   
‘Taken all together, how would you say things are for you these days? Would you say 
you are: 1) very happy, 2) pretty happy, and 3) not too happy’.54  
Table B.6 shows the percentages of sample households ranked according to the 
subjective economic well-being indicators. Results from the self-rated poverty 
indicator variable show that for those households sampled, 17% reported that they 
were poor or destitute, 12.9% reported that they never had enough for their family, 
while 31.9% and 7.2% reported that they were comfortable and rich, respectively. 
Based on the self-rated poverty scale variable, households were classified as ‘poor’ if 
they reported that they ‘never had enough’ or ‘poor/destitute’. Based on this poverty 




                                                 
54 For the purpose of this analysis the variables were re-coded as 1 indicating ‘not too happy’ and 3 





Table B.6: Percentage of households by subjective economic well-being indicators  
(Pooled data , 2004 and 2009) 
Other economic 
well-being 
indicators   







manage  Comfortable 
Very 
rich/rich Total  
       Happiness  
Not too happy 68.4 49.0 27.3 10.4 8.0 30.3 
Pretty happy 27.7 44.3 62.5 69.3 56.0 55.9 
Very happy  3.9 6.7 10.3 20.3 36.0 13.8 
Food expenditure 
     Less than adequate 76.3 70.7 38.1 15.4 5.7 39.1 
Just adequate 19.3 26.1 57.9 78.2 73.7 54.9 
More than adequate 4.4 3.2 4.0 6.4 20.6 5.9 
Health care expenditure 
Less than adequate 64.2 51.3 37.9 23.0 16.7 37.7 
Just adequate 33.3 45.8 57.1 67.9 64.4 55.7 
More than adequate 2.5 2.9 5.0 9.1 19.0 6.6 
Housing expenditure 
Less than adequate 64.4 54.1 36.2 20.5 16.6 36.8 
Just adequate 31.5 40.5 58.7 69.1 64.0 55.5 
More than adequate 4.2 5.4 5.2 10.4 19.4 7.7 
General economic condition 
Unable to meet 
family needs 34.3 18.3 6.2 2.4 1.2 11.0 
Struggling 53.1 62.5 51.0 21.1 6.6 40.1 
Just doing okay 10.6 17.3 38.9 66.4 62.9 41.8 
Doing well 2.0 2.0 3.9 10.1 29.3 7.1 
Total households 
(%)  17.0 12.9 31.1 31.9 7.2 100.0 
Total households 410 310 739 772 172 2403 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
 
A comparison was made between other subjective indicators of poverty and the self-
rated poverty status indicator. The comparison centred on those 17% of households 





reported that they were ‘not too happy’, 76.3% had inadequate expenditure on food, 
64% reported that housing and health care expenditures were less than adequate, and 
about 87% reported that either they were unable to meet their family needs or 
struggling to meet their family needs. These results suggest a strong correlation 





















 Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter 1 
 
 
Figure C.1: Survey sites in rural Ethiopia 
 



















Table C.1: The sample frame of the ERHS  
Farming system 
Population 




number of  












Grain plough complex - Northern 21.2 20.2 3 0   
Grain plough complex-Central  27.7 29 4 2 31 32.4 
Grain-plough/hoe complex 
Grain plough Arsi/Bale 9.3 14.3 2 1 25.4 25.6 
Sorghum plough/hoe Hararghe 9.9 6.6 1 1 15 12.4 
Enset (with or without coffee/cereals) 31.9 29.9 5 2 8.7 29.6 
Total 100 100 15 6 100 100 






Table C.2:Summary statistics on characteristics of sample households 
  
Variable  
1999(N=1456) 2004(N=1373) 2009(N=1357) 
mean  S.D. mean  S.D. mean  S.D. 
Household composition  
    Family size  5.8 2.7 5.6 2.5 5.7 2.6 
Male family labour  (number) 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.9 1.3 
Female  family labour  (number) 1.9 1.2 1.9 1.1 2.1 1.2 
Sex of head (1 if male) 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 
Age of head (in years) 49.3 15.6 50.8 15.3 52.6 15.1 
Head can read and write (dummy) 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Head main economic activity (proportions) 
    Farmer 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.5 
Domestic worker 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Non-farm work 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Not in the labour force 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 
Proportion of family members working in: 
    Farming 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 
Domestic work 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 
Non-farm jobs 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Land and asset holdings  
      Land held (in hectares) 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 
Land/labour ratio 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Livestock value (in 1994 price) 1535 1811 2193 2876 2228 3174 
Own a pair of oxen (% of HH) 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 
          












 Table C.3: Characteristics by attrition status(1994) 
  Mean values    
  Non-attritors (n=1241)a 
Attritors 
(n=236)b t-test 
Male family labour 1.57 1.14 *** 
Female family labour 1.68 1.42 ** 
Family member aged <15 2.70 2.13 *** 
Family member aged >15 0.25 0.28  
Head sex 0.80 0.67 *** 
Head can read and write 0.34 0.28  
Head age 46.17 47.89  
Livestock holdings(value) 1800.82 1159.62 *** 
Plot size 1.74 1.35 *** 
Per capita consumption 70.53 80.68  
Leased in land 0.21 0.16  
Leased out land 0.12 0.17 * 
Hired labour 0.26 0.28  
Worked off-farm 0.58 0.47 ** 
Planted tree crops 0.37 0.23 *** 
Village dummies    
Haresaw 0.06 0.03 * 
Geblen 0.05 0.04 
 Dinki 0.06 0.05 
 Yetmen 0.04 0.05 
 Shumsha 0.09 0.17 *** 
Sirbana Godeti 0.06 0.09 
 Adele Keke 0.07 0.05 
 Korodegaga 0.07 0.08 
 Trirufe Ketchema 0.07 0.06 
 Imdibir 0.05 0.02 
 Aze Deboa 0.06 0.03 
 Adado 0.08 0.15 *** 
Gara Godo 0.07 0.02 ** 
Doma 0.05 0.08 ** 
D.B. -Milki 0.05 0.02 * 
Kormargefia 0.04 0.03 
 Karafino 0.03 0.02 
 Bokafia 0.02 0.00   
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS.  
Note: a n=1237 and 1240 for leased out variable and head education variable, respectively. b 





Table C.4: Attrition probit estimates (1994-2009) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Leaded in land -0.07 
    
 
(0.11) 
    Leased out land 
 
0.08 
   
  
(0.13) 




   
(0.09) 
  Planted trees 
   
-0.11 
 
    
(0.12) 
 Livestock holdings 
    
-0.00 
     
(0.00) 
Male family labour -0.13** -0.13** -0.13** -0.13** -0.12** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Female family labour -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Family member aged <15 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04* -0.04 -0.03 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Family member aged >65 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Male household-head  -0.26** -0.28** -0.27** -0.27** -0.26** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Head can read and write -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Primary education -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
High school and above 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Head age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Plot size -0.15** -0.16** -0.15** -0.14* -0.13* 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Plot size square 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Per capita consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 









 Table C.4(continued): Attrition probit estimates(1994-2009) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Village dummies      
Geblen 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 
 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Dinki 0.48* 0.47* 0.48* 0.44 0.46* 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
Yetmen 0.72** 0.68** 0.69** 0.73** 0.76*** 
 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) 
Shumsha 1.01*** 1.02*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 1.00*** 
 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Sirbana Godeti 1.04*** 1.06*** 1.02*** 1.05*** 1.11*** 
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) 
Adele Keke 0.47* 0.49* 0.46* 0.45* 0.47* 
 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Korodegaga 1.11*** 1.12*** 1.11*** 1.06*** 1.10*** 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Trirufe Ketchema 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 
 
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) 
Imdibir 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.40 
 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) 
Aze Deboa 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.43 0.38 
 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) 
Adado 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.90*** 
 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) 
Gara Godo 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.25 
 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Doma 1.19*** 1.19*** 1.18*** 1.15*** 1.15*** 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
D.B. -Milki 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.46 
 
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Kormargefia 0.98*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.99*** 1.10*** 
 
(0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) 
Karafino 0.66* 0.65* 0.67* 0.68* 0.73** 
 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Bokafia 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.27 
 
(0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.55) 
Constant -1.10*** -1.10*** -1.07*** -1.10*** -1.12*** 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Observations 1,475 1,471 1,475 1,475 1,475 
R-square 0.0927 0.0945 0.0928 0.0931 0.0944 
Source: Own calculations using data from ERHS. 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
